In the Middle of Love: At the Fringes of Personhood. An Explorative Essay on the Dialogue of I and Thou and the Poetics of the Impersonal

In Works of Love, Søren Kierkegaard introduces the idea that God’s love is “the middle term.” It is a love that manages to be in the middle of all created being. To that extent, love is not just one relation among others, but the “being-in-relation” as such. It is, in Heideggerian terms, “the with” of being-with. This implies, further, that the middle is as inconspicuous as it is ubiquitous. According to Martin Buber, however, there is a privileged relation to the middle in the I–Thou relation. It is here that it reveals itself. For Buber, this is so on the strength of two important traits of this dyadic relation: that it is dialogical and personal. It is in dialogue that I and You are responsive to the word of God; and it is in personal co-presence that the theophany of “the absolute person” may occur. This paper explores these tenets of “philosophy of dialogue” at their fringes. Accordingly, it explores the impersonal in the person and the monologue in dialogue. More specifically, it aims to show how: (a) the impersonal in the person is disclosed in love and angst and how (b) the monologue in dialogue is expressed in a poetics of the impersonal.

Moving Beyond Two Goals: An Integrative Review and Framework for the Study of Multiple Goals

Historically, the study of multiple goals has focused on the dynamics between two goals as the prototypical example of multiple goals. This focus on dyadic relations means that many issues central to the psychology of more than two goals are still unexplored. We argue that a deeper understanding of multiple-goal issues involves moving beyond two goals. Doing so not only reveals new insights about goal relations (e.g., how one dyadic relation affects another) but also introduces goal structure (how goals and goal relations are positioned relative to each other) as a variable in its own right worthy of study. In our review, we discuss current knowledge gaps, review methodologies both in terms of existing techniques and novel techniques we propose, and highlight new directions from moving beyond two goals—what new questions emerge and what dynamics, including intersectional issues (e.g., between goal properties and goal structure), become possible to explore.

Moving Beyond Two Goals: An Integrative Review and Framework for the Study of Multiple Goals

Historically, the study of multiple goals has focused on the dynamics between two goals as the prototypical example of multiple goals. This focus on dyadic relations means that many issues central to the psychology of more than two goals are still unexplored. We argue that a deeper understanding of multiple goal issues involves moving beyond two goals. Doing so not only reveals new insights about goal relations (e.g., how one dyadic relation affects another), but also introduces goal structure (how goals and goal relations are positioned relative to each other) as a variable in its own right worthy of study. In our review, we discuss current knowledge gaps, review methodologies both in terms of existing techniques and novel techniques we propose, and highlight new directions from moving beyond two goals—what new questions emerge and what dynamics, including intersectional issues (e.g., between goal properties and goal structure), become possible to explore.

Ties that count: explaining interest group access to policymakers

The degree to which interest groups gain access to policymakers has often been explained by focusing on the exchange of resources in a dyadic relation between interest groups and policymakers. This article argues that the position an interest group occupies within a coalition and the relations it has outside its coalition substantially affect the likelihood of gaining access to policymakers. Our empirical focus is on the Dutch interest group system for which we examine how coalitions among groups and the network position of interest groups within and between such coalitions shape access. The analysis, based on data collected among 107 Dutch interest groups and 28 policymakers, leads to the conclusion that network positions count differently for elected and non-elected officials, and that network ties that bridge different coalitions add significant explanatory leverage to resource-based explanations of access.

Why Should a Knower Care?

This paper argues that the concept of care is significant not only for ethics, but for epistemology as well. After elucidating caring as a five-step dyadic relation, I go on to show its epistemic significance within the general framework of virtue epistemology as developed by Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman, and Linda Zagzebski. The notions of “care-knowing” and “care-based epistemology” emerge from construing caring (respectively) as a reliabilist and responsibilist virtue.

Understanding the Culture and Behaviour of East Asians — A Confucian Perspective

The economic miracle of East Asia is followed by the emergence of a new common identity in Confucianism among the nations in the region. Being the predominant cultural determining force in East Asia, Confucianism has deeply influenced East Asian behaviour. Three behavioural traits in East Asians are discussed. First, the East Asian's lack of “personality” is traced to the Confucian social institution of Li — rules of propriety. Second, the East Asian's lack of principled moral thinking is linked to the dyadic, relation-based character of the Confucian ethic, its lack of hypothetical reasoning and its hierarchical view of human relationships. Third, the East Asian's lack of assertiveness is rooted in the Confucian ideal of man as a reflection of harmony in the cosmos and the Confucian ideal of society as based on the fulfilment of duties rather than the assertion of rights. The implications of these Confucian traits suggest the need to re-formulate Western conceptions of and approaches to East Asian behaviour.

Some theorems on definability and decidability

In this paper a theorem about numerical relations will be established and shown to have certain consequences concerning decidability in quantification theory, as well as concerning the foundation of number theory. The theorem is that relations of natural numbers are reducible in elementary fashion to symmetric ones; i.e.:Theorem I. For every dyadic relation R of natural numbers there is a symmetric dyadic relation H of natural numbers such that R is definable in terms of H plus just truth-functions and quantification over natural numbers.To state the matter more fully, there is a (well-formed) formula ϕ of pure quantification theory, or first-order functional calculus, which meets these conditions:(a) ϕ has ‘x’ and ‘y’ as sole free individual variables;(b) ϕ contains just one predicate letter, and it is dyadic;(c) for every dyadic relation R of natural numbers there is a symmetric dyadic relation H of natural numbers such that, when the predicate letter in ϕ is interpreted as expressing H, ϕ comes to agree in truth-value with ‘x bears R to y’ for all values of ‘x’ and ‘y’.

On reduction to a symmetric relation

In a current paper, Church and Quine show how any dyadic relation of natural numbers can be defined in terms of a symmetric dyadic relation of natural numbers together with the truth functions and quantification over natural numbers. The purpose of the present note is to extend their result to the following: Where R1, R2, …, ad infinitum are any classes or relations (of any degree) of natural numbers, they can all be defined in terms of a single symmetric dyadic relation of natural numbers together with the truth functions and quantification over natural numbers.Let pi, for each i, be the tth prime > 1. Let the degree of Ri, for each i, be di. Let R be the dyadic relation which each number x bears to each number y such that either x is a factor of y or else x is 0 and y is for some such that . Since R is dyadic, we know from Church and Quine's result that R is definable in terms of a symmetric dyadic relation. Moreover, as seen in the incidental constructions in §1 of Church and Quine, ‘y = x + 1’ is expressible on the same basis.