myth of the given
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Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Antonio M. Nunziante

AbstractThe aim of this paper is twofold. First, I would like to bring into the light the almost unexplored Sellars’s theory of particulars. Second, I would like to show its surprising degree of compatibility with the thesis supported by some contemporary tropists (Lowe, Gozzano and Orilia (eds), Tropes, Universals and the Philosophy of Mind, Ontos Verlag, 2008; Moltmann, Mind 113:1–41, 2004 and Moltmann, Noûs 47:346–370, 2013). It is difficult to establish whether Sellars possessed an own theory of tropes, developed independently by the classical form it took in Williams 1953, but as a matter of fact the peculiar features of his “complex particulars” model it is very much like Williams’s theory. So much so that to all intents and purposes it represents a tropes variation. One of its strengths is that it is not part of a constituent ontology, since it is essentially developed from a linguistic and phenomenological point of view. It is for these reasons that this theory manages to avoid some of the classic objections to tropes and it shows to be compatible with the argument of Jonathan Lowe’s “proper visibility” as well as with Friederike Moltmann’s exquisitely linguistic interpretation of tropes.


Synthese ◽  
2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. O’Shea

AbstractThe idea of ‘the given’ and its alleged problematic status as most famously articulated by Sellars (1956, 1981) continues to be at the center of heated controversies about foundationalism in epistemology, about ‘conceptualism’ and nonconceptual content in the philosophy of perception, and about the nature of the experiential given in phenomenology and in the cognitive sciences. I argue that the question of just what the myth of the given is supposed to be in the first place is more complex than has typically been supposed in these debates, and that clarification of this prior question has surprising consequences. Foundationalism was only one of Sellars’s targets, and this not only in the familiar sense that the more fundamental issues at stake concern the very ‘objective purport’ or intentionality of our empirical thinking in general. When pushed further still, Sellars’s critique in fact hinged on his diagnoses of implicit framework-relative or ‘categorial’ metaphysical presuppositions he exposes in givenist views. Furthermore, the key to his critique accordingly turns out to rest on implicit assumptions concerning the in principle revisability or replaceability of any such presuppositions, whether ‘innate’ or acquired, and including Sellars’s own. Another key result is that widespread assumptions that Sellars’s famous critique is simply inapplicable or irrelevant to either ‘thin’ nonconceptualist views of the given (such as C. I. Lewis’s), since they are ‘non-epistemic’; or alternatively, irrelevant to ‘thick’ conceptualist and phenomenological analyses (since they, too, reject ‘sense-data’ or the ‘bare given’)–both turn out to be mistaken.


Author(s):  
Sophia Maddalena Fazio

Abstract According to McDowell, conceptualism necessarily follows from the thesis that Kant falls into Sellars’ myth of the given. However, by comparing Sellars’ and McDowell’s versions of the myth of the given, it emerges that while Sellars introduces the myth of the given as a critique of empirical fundamentalism, McDowell’s critique is directed at minimal empiricism. The aim of this paper is to show that Kant’s theory of cognition does not fall into either of the two variants of the aforementioned myth. It thus argues against a conceptualist interpretation of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. It shows this by examining the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Deduction in the Critique of Pure Reason.


Empiricisms ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 339-354
Author(s):  
Barry Allen

The chapter considers three lines of anti-empiricism in analytic philosophy: Quine and Davidson against the “dogmas of empiricism”; Sellars against the “myth of the given”; and Rorty’s new pragmatism, with its “higher nominalism” and disdain for radical empiricism. These anti-empiricism arguments were chiefly developed with Carnap in mind, and that is their weakness. The empiricism they criticize is theorematic rather than problematic, the empiricism of Russell and Carnap, not Epicurus or Newton. “Problematic” empiricisms like theirs, and including the work of the radical empiricists, are untouched by this entire line of criticism.


Author(s):  
Naiana dos Anjos ◽  
José Frota ◽  
Federico Sanguinetti
Keyword(s):  

Em seu ensaio Avoiding the Myth of the Given (AMG), McDowell traz uma nova caraterização do conteúdo da experiência perceptual e do modo que tal conteúdo torna possível ao sujeito conhecer. Esta nova caraterização tem sido acusada de gerar uma “ansiedade pluralista” (Corti 2017). Escopo deste artigo é reconstruir os problemas que, segundo Corti (2017), surgem a partir da virada argumentativa do filósofo, assim como avaliar se McDowell tem à disposição recursos conceituais para esquivar-se às críticas. Para isso, contamos com a seguinte estrutura de texto: 1. reconstruiremos em detalhe a posição revisada de McDowell acerca da experiência perceptual tal como ela foi exposta em AMG; 2. reconstruiremos o argumento de Corti (2017) acerca da possibilidade de que a nova posição de McDowell implique no surgimento de uma “ansiedade pluralista”; 3. discutiremos se é possível fornecer uma interpretação da posição de McDowell que ofereça uma saída para tal ansiedade.                                                                                


Author(s):  
Michael R. Hicks

Wilfrid Sellars's "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (EPM) begins with an argument against sense-datum epistemology. There is some question about the validity of this attack, stemming in part from the assumption that Sellars is concerned with epistemic foundationalism. This paper recontextualizes Sellars's argument in two ways: by showing how the argument of EPM relates to Sellars's 1940s work, which does not concern foundationalism at all; and by considering the view of H.H. Price, Sellars's teacher at Oxford and the only classical datum theorist to receive substantive comment in EPM. Timm Triplett has claimed that Sellars's discussion simply begs the question against Price, but this depends on the mistaken assumption that Sellars's concern is with foundationalism.  On the contrary, Sellars's argument concerns the assumption that the innate capacity for sensory experience counts as "thinking in presence" in the way needed for empiricist accounts of content acquisition. Price's distinction between noticing universals and being aware of them encapsulates the tensions empiricists face here.


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