kyle stanford
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Conceptus ◽  
2009 ◽  
Vol 38 (94) ◽  
Author(s):  
Matthias Egg

SummaryI review Philip Kitcher’s defence of scientific realism against the so-called pessimistic induction. While supporting his overall strategy, I claim that there is a lacuna in Kitcher’s argument, which needs to be filled by spelling out more precisely what parts of scientific theories we should be realists about. I attempt to do this and to show that scientific realism can thereby not only be protected against the pessimistic induction but also against a recent argument by Kyle Stanford, known as the “new induction”.


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