Selective Scientific Realism and Truth-Transfer in Theories of Molecular Structure

This chapter examines theoretical advances in understanding molecular structures at the turn of the 20th century which resulted from the Blomstrand-Jørgensen/Werner debate about the structure of cobalt complexes. Both models made predictions testable through precipitation experiments, which eventually led to Werner’s model replacing the Blomstrand-Jørgensen model of cobalt complexes. We argue that this example of theory change fits within a selective scientific realist framework: namely, the factors which gave rise to the predictive success of the failed model survived in the theory that replaced it. We further argue that the lessons from this historical case can illuminate how two contemporary objections to realism—P. Kyle Stanford’s Problem of Unconceived Alternatives and Timothy D. Lyons’ pessimistic modus tollens argument—fall short as arguments against realism.

Scientific Realism and Further Underdetermination Challenges

In an earlier article on this journal I argued that the problem of empirical underdetermination can for the largest part be solved by theoretical virtues, and for the remaining part it can be tolerated. Here I confront two further challenges to scientific realism based on underdetermination. First, there are four classes of theories which may seem to be underdetermined even by theoretical virtues. Concerning them I argue that (i) theories produced by trivial permutations and (ii) “equivalent descriptions” are compatible with the truth of standard theories; instead (iii) “as if” versions of standard theories are much worse from the point of view of theoretical virtues; finally (iv) mathematically intertranslatable theories either may become empirically decidable in the future, or can be discriminated by theoretical virtues, or realists may simply plead ignorance about their claims. Secondly, I consider Stanford’s underdetermination with respect unconceived alternatives, arguing that it essentially relies on the pessimistic meta-induction from the falsity of all past theories. Therefore, it can be resisted by (a) considering the radical advancement of present with respect to past science, and (b) arguing with selective realism that past successful theories, even if false, always included some true components.

Unconceived alternatives and another argument for instrumentalism

Selective skepticism in relation to fundamental scientific theories and criticism of the inference to the best explanation as an eliminative approach to substantiate hypotheses, enable K. Stanford to interpret and combine in his own way the classical arguments against the scientific realism – the arguments of the pessimistic meta-induction and that of the underdetermination of theory by data. Despite the fact that his justification of the instrumentalist interpretation of scientific knowledge is just another version of the argument «from error», K. Stanford’s book should be recommended to a scientific realism could be. Reflection on the book: Stanford K. Exceeding Our Grasp: Science, History, and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives. Oxford University Press, 2006.