space shuttle challenger
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2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 1371-1379 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anne-Laure Sellier ◽  
Irene Scopelliti ◽  
Carey K. Morewedge

The primary objection to debiasing-training interventions is a lack of evidence that they improve decision making in field settings, where reminders of bias are absent. We gave graduate students in three professional programs ( N = 290) a one-shot training intervention that reduces confirmation bias in laboratory experiments. Natural variance in the training schedule assigned participants to receive training before or after solving an unannounced business case modeled on the decision to launch the Space Shuttle Challenger. We used case solutions to surreptitiously measure participants’ susceptibility to confirmation bias. Trained participants were 19% less likely to choose the inferior hypothesis-confirming solution than untrained participants. Analysis of case write-ups suggests that a reduction in confirmatory hypothesis testing accounts for their improved decision making in the case. The results provide promising evidence that debiasing-training effects transfer to field settings and can improve decision making in professional and private life.


2019 ◽  
pp. 249-256
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Altschuler ◽  
Fernando J. Ballesteros

This chapter focuses on the life of the American astronaut Judith Resnik, who died in the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger.


2019 ◽  
pp. 257-261
Author(s):  
Daniel R. Altschuler ◽  
Fernando J. Ballesteros

This chapter talks about the life of the Sharon Christa McAuliffe, a teacher who, when participating in the Teacher in Space program, died in the explosion of the space shuttle Challenger.


2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 9
Author(s):  
Kouroush Jenab ◽  
Josh Herrin ◽  
Saeid Moslehpour ◽  
Sam Khoury

<p class="1Body">NASA became overconfident with consecutive successful flights with no major failures leading up to Flight 25 of the Space Shuttle Challenger and failed to correctly apply quality assurance to reanalyze the possibilities of failure when extreme cold weather was present for what would become the last Challenger launch. System Hazard Analysis applied correctly to analyze the failure rate patterns of the NASA Space Shuttle Challenger Solid Rocket Booster field joints may have prevented the launch of the tragic Flight 25, where there was a total loss of aircraft and seven astronauts were killed in the accident. The steps of System Hazard Analysis will be explained that if followed may have provided the data necessary for NASA to correct the field joint error prior to instead of after the Challenger explosion.</p>


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