scholarly journals On the Very Idea of Risk Management: Lessons from the Space Shuttle Challenger

Author(s):  
Robert Elliott
Author(s):  
Ruth Guthrie ◽  
Conrad Shayo

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) is a government organization, founded to explore space to better understand our own planet and the universe around us. Over NASA’s history, there have been unprecedented successes: Apollo missions that put people into space and walking on the moon, the remarkable findings of the Hubble space telescope and the Space Shuttle Program, allowing astronauts to perform scientific experiments in orbit from are usable space vehicle. NASA continues to be a source of national wonder and pride for the United States and the world. However, NASA has failures too. In February of 2002, the Space Shuttle Columbia disintegrated as it returned to Earth. This event occurred 16 years after the Space Shuttle Challenger exploded during take-off. As information was collected, investigators found that many of the problems uncovered during the Challenger investigation were also factors for Columbia. Underlying both disasters was the problem of relaying complex engineering information to management, in an environment driven by schedule and budget pressure. Once again, NASA is looking at ways to better manage space programs in an environment of limited resources.


2006 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 30-44 ◽  
Author(s):  
Junichi Murata ◽  

One of the most important tasks of engineering ethics is to give engineers the tools required to act ethically to prevent possible disastrous accidents which could result from engineers’ decisions and actions. The space shuttle Challenger disaster is referred to as a typical case in almost every textbook. This case is seen as one from which engineers can learn important lessons, as it shows impressively how engineers should act as professionals, to prevent accidents. The Columbia disaster came seventeen years later in 2003. According to the report of the Columbia accident investigation board, the main cause of the accident was not individual actions which violated certain safety rules but rather was to be found in the history and culture of NASA. A culture is seen as one which desensitizedmanagers and engineers to potential hazards as they dealt with problems of uncertainty. This view of the disaster is based on Dian Vaughan’s analysis of the Challenger disaster, where inherent organizational factors and culture within NASA had been highlighted as contributing to the disaster. Based on the insightful analysis of the Columbia report and the work of Diane Vaughan, we search for an alternative view of engineering ethics. We focus on the inherent uncertainty of engineers’ work with respect to hazard precaution. We discuss claims that the concept of professional responsibility, which plays a central role in orthodox engineering ethics, is too narrow and that we need a broader and more fundamental concept of responsibility. Responsibility which should be attributed to every person related to an organization and therefore given the range of responsible persons, governments, managers, engineers, etc. might be called “civic virtue”. Only on the basis of this broad concept of responsibility of civic virtue, we can find a possible way to prevent disasters and reduce the hazards that seem to be inseparable part of the use of complex technological systems.


1991 ◽  
Vol 44 (6) ◽  
pp. 539-550 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gregory Moorhead ◽  
Richard Ference ◽  
Chris P. Neck

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