Solipsism

‘Solipsism’ (from the Latin solus ipse – oneself alone) is the doctrine that only oneself exists. This formulation covers two doctrines, each of which has been called solipsism, namely (1) that one is the only self, the only centre of consciousness, and, more radically, (2) that nothing at all exists apart from one’s own mind and mental states. These are not always distinguished from corresponding epistemic forms: for all we know, (1) or (2) might be true. A more recent coinage is ‘methodological solipsism’, which has a quite different meaning: that the content of an individual’s thoughts is fully determined by facts about them, and is independent of facts about their environment.

The transcendental turn

Husserl’s turn from a descriptive phenomenology to a transcendental phenomenology is linked to his methodological employment of the reduction and the epoché. But how should one interpret these notions? Are they crucial to phenomenology, do they enable phenomenology to become metaphysically committed, or are they tools that reveal Husserl’s commitment to a form of methodological solipsism? Chapter 3 offers an interpretation of the reduction and the epoché that makes it clear why Husserl’s transcendental turn does not involve a turning-away from the world, but a suspension of a specific dogmatic attitude towards the world, that for the first time permits a proper understanding of the (constituted) being of the world. Contrary to various existing interpretations, it is consequently argued that whereas Husserl’s descriptive phenomenology was indeed metaphysically neutral, he started to engage with metaphysical questions concerning the mind-dependent character of the world the moment he effectuated his transcendental turn.

Solipsism – The Leitmotif in Wittgenstein’s Life and Philosophy

This paper will highlight the close relationship between Wittgenstein’s life and train of thought, using his treatment of solipsism as an example. The intensity with which Wittgenstein explored this theme hints towards an existential and cultural background that is further developed in a comparison of his works with the entries in his diaries. The treatment of solipsism will be presented as an expression of an inner wrestling for the correct view of world and life. The transition from early to late philosophical thought is paired with a revised understanding of the concept of a felicitous life, which in turn is reflected in an altered understanding of language. The replacement of an analysis of the general form of propositions by the description of language games and the departure from logical forms towards forms of life - from a practical point of view - corresponds with a new approach to overcoming alienation.For a systematic assessment of Wittgenstein’s initial espousal of solipsism (in the Tractatus) and his later criticism (in the Philosophical Investigations), the various types of solipsism, which Wittgenstein used as benchmarks, will be taken into consideration, in particular, Weininger’s ethical solipsism, Schopenhauer’s contemplative aesthetic solipsism as well as Descartes’ methodological solipsism.

Dinge im Kollektiv

Husserls Analyse der Wahrnehmung und Heideggers Zeittheorie sind beide in ihrem Theorieaufbau auf die Gegenständlichkeit der Gegenstände – oder auf den Gegenstandsbezug der Erfahrung und seine wesensmäßige Konstitution – fixiert. Hierin spiegelt sich, bei Heidegger explizit, Kantisches Erbe. Diese phänomenologische, transzendentalphilosophische Relevanz des Gegenstands verweist im Kern auf Intentionalität – und damit auf eine objektbezogene Selbstüberschreitungsfigur der Subjektivität. Ganz anders bestimmt Latour den Stellenwert der Dinge im Kollektiv, wenn er ihnen eine Handlungsmacht zuschreibt, die den traditionellen Gegensatz zwischen Handlungssubjekten und Objektbehandlung einklammert. Der folgende Beitrag kreist den kritischen Punkt ein, der in der Theoriebildung zur Verzweigung phänomenologischer und ANTistischer Ansätze führt. Während sich die Phänomenologie im Zuge einer begrifflichen Rekonstruktion der Erfahrung von Gegenständen konsolidiert, ist die ANT auf die Beschreibung von Handlungsstrukturen ausgerichtet, die sich aus Aktanten aller Art zusammensetzen. Abschließend stellt sich die Frage, ob nicht die kollektivistische Soziologie Latours von dem methodischen Solipsismus der Phänomenologie lernen kann, dass es eine konstruktive Dimension und Machtfülle der deskriptiven Arbeit gibt, die nicht einfach den Akteuren überhaupt, sondern vor allem der Analytikerin überlassen ist? </br></br>Husserl's analysis of perception and Heidegger's theory of time are both fixated on the objectivity of objects - or the objectrelation of experience and its essential constitution. This reflects - and in the case of Heidegger quite explicitly - Kantian heritage. This phenomenological, transcendental relevance of the object essentially refers to intentionality - and thus an object-related figure of self-transcending subjectivity. Quite differently, Latour determines the status of things in the collective, ascribing to them an agency that brackets the traditional opposition between acting subjects and passive objects. The contribution encircles precisely that critical point which leads to the separation of phenomenological and ANTistical approaches. While phenomenology grounds itself by reconstructing the experience of objects, ANT focuses on the description of the structures of action, which are composed of actants of all kinds. Finally, the question arises whether Latour's collectivist sociology can learn from phenomenology's methodological solipsism that there is a constructive dimension and plenitude of power in the work of description that is not just left to actors in general, but above all to the analyst herself?

Why is dialogical solving of a logical problem more effective than individual solving?

We study the accomplishment of the abstract version of Wason’s selection task in a cooperative dialogue context that has been neglected in the research devoted to this task. 123 psychology students, 75 in their third year and 48 in their first year of studies participated in the experiment. 59 students performed the task individually (control group) and 32 in dyads (experimental group) while we recorded their dialogues. In accordance with the literature, the dyads outperform significantly the students working alone. To discover the strategies implemented in the four dyads which succeeded, we analyzed their respective dialogues with a theory (‘Interlocutory Logic’) of the logical form of conversational events as they are manifested phenomenally in natural language. We show that these strategies are situated and emergent products of the dialogue, since no member of the dyads knew them before the interaction. So, it is surely by supporting the emergence of such joint cognition that the interaction is a factor of cognitive progress. We conclude this research by some remarks on the Wason’s task and moreover on the methodological solipsism in the psychology of reasoning.