Fate and Foreknowledge in Greek Philosophy

The majority of this chapter focuses on Greek philosophical approaches to fate and foreknowledge. To understand the background of Origen’s thought on these topics, we must distinguish between three distinct types of problem: a) logical problems that concern the possibility of making true statements about the contingent future, b) the problem of how human beings can be held morally responsible for their actions if their actions are fated, and c) the problem of how human beings can choose freely between courses of action if God (or the gods) can have foreknowledge of the future. This chapter shows where and why these conceptions of fate, prophecy, and human autonomy differ, and why these distinctions matter. First, it examines the puzzles set and answered by Aristotle concerning the logical problem of future contingent statements. Then it explores some of the terminological difficulty in talking about ‘free will’ in the Greek context. Next it examines Stoic and Platonist discussions about choice and autonomy, which focus primarily on ethical considerations. Finally, it argues that Origen’s framing of these issues was heavily influenced by his pagan near-contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias. The chapter ends with a survey of some other early Christian texts on autonomy and moral responsibility that show the Christian context in which Origen was arguing and sets the stage for the argument that Origen deviates significantly from his Christian contemporaries.

Betting on the Open Future

A.N. Prior considered an objection to open future views, viz. that they are inconsistent with our ordinary practices of betting. Prior worried that, on open future views, if we bet on rain, and then it does rain, I could refuse to grant the payout on grounds that the proposition you bet was true was not true at the time of the bet. The author argues that this objection fails, by developing a picture of betting on which we are not betting on anything like current truth. He then considers the objection that his view is inconsistent with the idea that there are non-zero probabilities of future events; he argues that though our credence in a given future contingent proposition may be zero, the objective probability of the relevant event may nevertheless be high. The author develops a comparison between this view and parallel views about the probability of conditionals and probabilities in fictions.

Francisco Suarez on God’s Knowledge of Future Contingent Events

The problems of contingency, free will, omniscience and omnipotence of God, possible worlds, posed by the famous representative of the second scholasticism, the Spanish philosopher Francisco Suarez (1548–1617) in his work “On God’s knowledge of future contingent events” are discussed in the historical, philosophical and theological context. Suarez (unlike, for example, Spinoza) recognizes the existence of contingent events in the world, shows that the existence of contingent events does not diminish the omnipotence of God. Suarez, following Thomas Aquinas, shows how it is possible to reconcile the existence of free will, the main source of contingency, with the omniscience of God. As Luis Molina, Suarez recognizes God’s knowledge not only of real, but also of possible future. The originality of Suarez manifests itself in solving the question of how God knows possible future events and, accordingly, possible worlds. Attention is paid to the influence of Suarez’s philosophy on the philosophy of modern times, including Descartes and Leibniz. The reader is also offered a translation of the first chapter of the second part of the essay of the Spanish philosopher and theologian Francisco Suarez “On God’s knowledge of future contingent events”, in which Suarez on the basis of the hermeneutics of the Biblical texts proves the thesis about God’s knowledge of future contingent events, which could have happened, but in reality had not happened and will not happen in the future, disproving the arguments of Catholic theologians Ambrogio Catarino Politi (1484–1553) and Jansenius of Ghent (1510–1576), who questioned the assertion that God possesses such knowledge. The translation is provided with comments, an introductory article and a list of references.

Aquinas on Predication and Future Contingents. A Reply to Costa

In his paper “Aquinas, Geach, and Existence”, D. Costa maintains that Aquinas’ solution to the puzzle of future contingent events entails that future contingent entities already exist (in God’s perspective). This is tantamount to state that Aquinas endorsed a form of eternalism, since he maintained that past, present and future timelessly exist in God’s sight. I object that Aquinas’ texts are also compatible with another reading. In any statement of the form “S will be P”, the verb “will be” simply states the truth of the predicative link between S and P, not the existence of either S or P. In other words, I take the verb “to be” occurring in sentences describing future events as having the meaning of the “esse ut verum” (“being as true”).

Semantical Interpretations of the Temporal Logic Systems CL and Kb with the Gaps of Traditional Truth-values

Over the past several decades, in the field of temporal logic there have been created a great number of semantical theories that provide different truth conditions for tensed propositions. In this article we deal with five non-bivalent semantical interpretations of the temporal logic systems CL (Cocchiarella Linear) and Kb (Kripke Branching): 1) Ł3 by J. Łukasiewicz; 2) K3 by S. C. Kleene; 3) Ockhamism by A. Prior; 4) supervaluationism by R. Thomason; 5) relativism by J. MacFarlane. The aim of this article is to present a detailed typology of the five semantical theories based on these criteria: a) the ability to deal with the problem of retrospective evaluation of future contingent propositions; b) the ability to deal with the problem of divine omniscience and free will; c) their relation to the law of excluded middle; d) their relation to other formulas that are intuitively acceptable in an intederministic context. It is argued that the only theory that satisfies all four criteria is the relativism of J. MacFarlane; however, it faces some serious challenges when dealing with the problem of retrospective evaluation of future contingent propositions in the theological context.

Abelard’s Treatment of Logical Determinism in Its Twelfth-Century Context

This article investigates Abelard’s defence of the compatibility between universal bivalence and the existence of future contingent events. It first considers the standard strategy put forward by twelfth-century commentators to solve Aristotle’s dilemma in De Interpretatione 9, which fundamentally relies on Boethius’ distinction between definite and indefinite truth values. Abelard’s own position on the dilemma is then introduced, focusing on a specific deterministic argument considered in his logical works that aims to demonstrate that, given the determinacy of present-tense propositions such as ‘“that Socrates will eat tomorrow” is true’, future contingent events such as that Socrates will eat tomorrow are determinate in advance. In addition to presenting Abelard’s reply to the argument, the article offers an analysis of his notions of contingency, determinacy, and future events, and a comparison between Abelard’s position and other twelfth-century discussions on future contingents.

The problem of future contingents: scoping out a solution

Various philosophers have long since been attracted to the doctrine that future contingent propositions systematically fail to be true—what is sometimes called the doctrine of the open future. However, open futurists have always struggled to articulate how their view interacts with standard principles of classical logic—most notably, with the Law of Excluded Middle (LEM). For consider the following two claims: (a) Trump will be impeached tomorrow; (b) Trump will not be impeached tomorrow. According to the kind of open futurist at issue, both of these claims may well fail to be true. According to many, however, the disjunction of these claims can be represented as p ∨ ~p—that is, as an instance of LEM. In this essay, however, I wish to defend the view that the disjunction these claims cannot be represented as an instance of p ∨ ~p. And this is for the following reason: the latter claim is not, in fact, the strict negation of the former. More particularly, there is an important semantic distinction between the strict negation of the first claim [~(Trump will be impeached tomorrow)] and the latter claim (Trump will not be impeached tomorrow). However, the viability of this approach has been denied by Thomason (Theoria 36:264–281, 1970), and more recently by MacFarlane (Assessment sensitivity: relative truth and its applications, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) and Cariani and Santorio (Mind 127:129–165. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzw004, 2017), the latter of whom call the denial of the given semantic distinction “scopelessness”. According to these authors, that is, will is “scopeless” with respect to negation; whereas there is perhaps a syntactic distinction between ‘~Will p’ and ‘Will ~p’, there is no corresponding semantic distinction. And if this is so, the approach in question fails. In this paper, then, I criticize the claim that will is “scopeless” with respect to negation. I argue that will is a so-called “neg-raising” predicate—and that, in this light, we can see that the requisite scope distinctions aren’t missing, but are simply being masked. The result: a under-appreciated solution to the problem of future contingents that sees (a) and (b) as contraries, not contradictories.

Open theism

Open theism is the name for a model of God which emphasizes divine love and responsiveness to creatures. It arises from a family of theologies known as free-will theism which accentuate the divine gift of freedom to humans and hold that God does not micromanage the affairs of the world. The name open theism was coined in the 1990s by a group of philosophers and theologians in order to distinguish it within the free-will theistic family. God is ‘open’ to creatures in that God is affected by what creatures do and God genuinely interacts and enters into dynamic give-and-take relationships with creatures. These reciprocal relationships mean that God has a history which includes changing mental and emotional states. As a consequence, open theists affirm that God is temporal and everlasting rather than atemporal and timeless. Open theists believe that God is omnipotent but chooses not to exercise tight control over creation. Instead, God grants to creatures great latitude to act within boundaries. Because God chooses to elicit our free collaboration in divine plans God takes risks that we will act in ways contrary to the divine intentions. According to open theists the future is ‘open’ as well because it contains multiple possible futures that may or may not come about rather than solely one unalterable future. The future is not a blueprint or script but rather a set of possibilities, and God solicits the cooperation of creatures in order to bring some of these possibilities into existence. Since the future is not determined and humans have genuine free will, God does not know with certainty future contingent actions. Rather, God possesses ‘dynamic omniscience’ in which God has exhaustive knowledge of the past and present and understands what we call ‘the future’ as the possibilities which could occur along with any events God has determined to occur. Divine omniscience is dynamic in that God constantly acquires knowledge of which possible future actions creatures select to actualize. Open theists reject standard accounts of divine foreknowledge because they believe that they are incompatible with human freedom, they are of no value to God in terms of planning and acting in world affairs and they fail to correspond with the biblical portrayal of God.

Gersonides (1288–1344)

Living all his life in southern France, Levi ben Gershom, known as Gersonides in Latin texts, was an accomplished astronomer and mathematician as well as a philosopher. A prolific and engaged exegete, Gersonides wrote biblical commentaries that are still studied today. His philosophical magnum opus, Milhamot ha-Shem (The Wars of the Lord), reached original and often unorthodox conclusions regarding many of the great issues of medieval philosophical theology. It denied creation ex nihilo, preferring a modified version of the doctrine of formatio mundi traditionally ascribed to Plato (formation of the world from pre-existing matter). It qualified traditional doctrines of divine omniscience by denying God’s determinate knowledge of future contingent events. And it confined personal immortality to the rational portion of the soul, that is, the intellect.