variational free energy
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2021 ◽  
pp. 1-63
Author(s):  
Jelle Bruineberg ◽  
Krzysztof Dolega ◽  
Joe Dewhurst ◽  
Manuel Baltieri

Abstract The free energy principle, an influential framework in computational neuroscience and theoretical neurobiology, starts from the assumption that living systems ensure adaptive exchanges with their environment by minimizing the objective function of variational free energy. Following this premise, it claims to deliver a promising integration of the life sciences. In recent work, Markov Blankets, one of the central constructs of the free energy principle, have been applied to resolve debates central to philosophy (such as demarcating the boundaries of the mind). The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we trace the development of Markov blankets starting from their standard application in Bayesian networks, via variational inference, to their use in the literature on active inference. We then identify a persistent confusion in the literature between the formal use of Markov blankets as an epistemic tool for Bayesian inference, and their novel metaphysical use in the free energy framework to demarcate the physical boundary between an agent and its environment. Consequently, we propose to distinguish between ‘Pearl blankets’ to refer to the original epistemic use of Markov blankets and ‘Friston blankets’ to refer to the new metaphysical construct. Second, we use this distinction to critically assess claims resting on the application of Markov blankets to philosophical problems. We suggest that this literature would do well in differentiating between two different research programs: ‘inference with a model’ and ‘inference within a model’. Only the latter is capable of doing metaphysical work with Markov blankets, but requires additional philosophical premises and cannot be justified by an appeal to the success of the mathematical framework alone.


2021 ◽  
Vol 33 (3) ◽  
pp. 713-763
Author(s):  
Karl Friston ◽  
Lancelot Da Costa ◽  
Danijar Hafner ◽  
Casper Hesp ◽  
Thomas Parr

Active inference offers a first principle account of sentient behavior, from which special and important cases—for example, reinforcement learning, active learning, Bayes optimal inference, Bayes optimal design—can be derived. Active inference finesses the exploitation-exploration dilemma in relation to prior preferences by placing information gain on the same footing as reward or value. In brief, active inference replaces value functions with functionals of (Bayesian) beliefs, in the form of an expected (variational) free energy. In this letter, we consider a sophisticated kind of active inference using a recursive form of expected free energy. Sophistication describes the degree to which an agent has beliefs about beliefs. We consider agents with beliefs about the counterfactual consequences of action for states of affairs and beliefs about those latent states. In other words, we move from simply considering beliefs about “what would happen if I did that” to “what I would believe about what would happen if I did that.” The recursive form of the free energy functional effectively implements a deep tree search over actions and outcomes in the future. Crucially, this search is over sequences of belief states as opposed to states per se. We illustrate the competence of this scheme using numerical simulations of deep decision problems.


2021 ◽  
pp. 1-36
Author(s):  
Beren Millidge ◽  
Alexander Tschantz ◽  
Christopher L. Buckley

The expected free energy (EFE) is a central quantity in the theory of active inference. It is the quantity that all active inference agents are mandated to minimize through action, and its decomposition into extrinsic and intrinsic value terms is key to the balance of exploration and exploitation that active inference agents evince. Despite its importance, the mathematical origins of this quantity and its relation to the variational free energy (VFE) remain unclear. In this letter, we investigate the origins of the EFE in detail and show that it is not simply ”the free energy in the future.” We present a functional that we argue is the natural extension of the VFE but actively discourages exploratory behavior, thus demonstrating that exploration does not directly follow from free energy minimization into the future. We then develop a novel objective, the free energy of the expected future (FEEF), which possesses both the epistemic component of the EFE and an intuitive mathematical grounding as the divergence between predicted and desired futures.


2020 ◽  
Vol 32 (11) ◽  
pp. 2085-2121
Author(s):  
Takuya Isomura ◽  
Karl Friston

This letter considers a class of biologically plausible cost functions for neural networks, where the same cost function is minimized by both neural activity and plasticity. We show that such cost functions can be cast as a variational bound on model evidence under an implicit generative model. Using generative models based on partially observed Markov decision processes (POMDP), we show that neural activity and plasticity perform Bayesian inference and learning, respectively, by maximizing model evidence. Using mathematical and numerical analyses, we establish the formal equivalence between neural network cost functions and variational free energy under some prior beliefs about latent states that generate inputs. These prior beliefs are determined by particular constants (e.g., thresholds) that define the cost function. This means that the Bayes optimal encoding of latent or hidden states is achieved when the network's implicit priors match the process that generates its inputs. This equivalence is potentially important because it suggests that any hyperparameter of a neural network can itself be optimized—by minimization with respect to variational free energy. Furthermore, it enables one to characterize a neural network formally, in terms of its prior beliefs.


2020 ◽  
Vol 17 (169) ◽  
pp. 20200370 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex B. Kiefer

An approach to implementing variational Bayesian inference in biological systems is considered, under which the thermodynamic free energy of a system directly encodes its variational free energy. In the case of the brain, this assumption places constraints on the neuronal encoding of generative and recognition densities, in particular requiring a stochastic population code. The resulting relationship between thermodynamic and variational free energies is prefigured in mind–brain identity theses in philosophy and in the Gestalt hypothesis of psychophysical isomorphism.


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