AMBIVALENSI KEKUASAAN PREROGATIF PRESIDEN PASCA AMANDEMEN KONSTITUSI

This study discusses the political process relating to the issue of presidential prerogative control with an emphasis on the views and interests of the actors involved in discussing the issue. This study explains two main questions, namely how the actualization of presidential prerogative powers in Indonesia's presidential system after the constitutional amendment and what is behind the ambivalence of the president's prerogative power formulation in Indonesia's presidential system after the constitutional amendment. This study finds that constitutional amendments related to the president's prerogatives show ambivalence that distorts the prerogative meaning itself and is not strict between limiting or actually expanding the president's power. This happens because of the tug-of-war between legislative and executive interests. Behind the issue of controlling the president's prerogative powers, there is the interest of legislative institutions to equalize power with the president. Instead, the executive seeks to maintain or extend the president’s prerogative power.Keywords: Prerogative Power; Presidential; Amendment of Constitutions.Abstrak. Studi ini membahas proses politik berkaitan dengan isu pengendalian prerogatif presiden dengan penekanan pada pandangan dan kepentingan para aktor yang terlibat dalam pembahasan isu tersebut. Studi in menjelaskan dua pertanyaan pokok: (1) Bagaimana aktualisasi kekuasaan prerogatif presiden dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia pasca amandemen konstitusi? (2) Apa yang melatarbelakangi ambivalensi rumusan kekuasaan prerogatif presiden dalam sistem presidensial Indonesia pasca amandemen konstitusi? Hasil studi inii menemukan bahwa amandemen konstitusi terkait dengan prerogatif presiden menampakkan ambivalensi yang mendistorsi makna prerogatif itu sendiri dan tidak tegas antara membatasi atau justru memperluas kekuasaan presiden. Hal ini terjadi karena adanya tarik menarik antara kepentingan legislatif dan eksekutif. Di balik isu pengendalian kekuasaan prerogatif presiden, ada kepentingan institusi legislatif untuk menyetarakan kekuasaan dengan presiden. Sebaliknya, pihak eksekutif berupaya untuk mempertahankan atau mempeluas kekuasaan prerogatif presiden.Kata Kunci: Kekuasaan Prerogatif; Presidensial; Amandemen Konstitusi.

Zwolnienie z konstytucyjnego wymogu kontrasygnaty – rozważania na tle niekontrasygnowanych obwieszczeń Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej o wolnych stanowiskach sędziego w Sądzie Najwyższym i Naczelnym Sądzie Administracyjnym

On June 29, 2018 in Dziennik Urzędowy “Monitor Polski” (the Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland) were published two announcements by the President of the Republic of Poland – from May 24, 2018, on the vacant positions of the judges in the Supreme Court and from May 28, 2018 on the vacant positions of the judge in the Supreme Administrative Court. The obligation to announce the number of vacant judges’ positions is a result of changes in the structure of the Supreme Court introduced by the new law of 8 December 2017 and the obligation to apply these provisions to the judges of the Supreme Administrative Court. The controversy is aroused by the fact that the published announcements were not countersigned – although this competence is not included in the catalog of presidential prerogatives, exempted from the obligation of co-signing by the Prime Minister. The analysis of the constitutional shape of the countersignature and the practice of using by the President of his competences will allow to answer the question whether the President’s announcements require for their validity the signature of the Prime Minister’s or are they exempt from this requirement. In the light of the doctrinal reflections, the recognition of the announcement of the President of the Republic of Poland on vacant judicial positions in the Supreme Court and the Supreme Administrative Court may be considered as a derivative or analogous competence to the presidential prerogative of appointing judges. However, this stands in contradiction with the Constitutional Tribunal jurisprudence, which excludes the possibility of a broad interpretation of the constitutional catalog of prerogatives. Nevertheless, due to the informative, non-normative character of the announcements of the President, the issue of qualifying them to the catalog of official acts, for which the countersignature is required, raises reasonable doubts.

Exercising Unilateral Discretion: Presidential Justifications of Unilateral Powers in a Shared Powers System

There is a puzzle in the literature on presidential unilateral power that, on one hand, presents executive orders as the outcome of presidential prerogative but on the other hand identifies delegated discretion as a limit to presidential action. To address this question, we examine the use of delegated authority in unilateral orders from 1951 to 2009 and relate these to the ideological underpinnings of the institutions delegating and overseeing the use of this discretion (Congress and the Court). Our findings indicate that presidents are likely to issue unilateral directives with more substantive discretion when ideologically farther away from either the medians in Congress or the Supreme Court, but more likely to scale back their use of discretion when both branches are jointly ideologically distant from the president. The results demonstrate support for both an assertive and restrained president when relying upon delegated authority to act unilaterally.