Public attitudes toward presidential veto powers

Previous research on presidential powers has demonstrated predictable variation in the level of support for presidential usage of those powers. However, much of this work has focused solely on unilateral powers. Here, we seek to further explore public attitudes towards constitutionally prescribed powers—namely that of the executive veto. Using original survey data, we find that public support of the president’s use of the veto is dependent on respondent partisanship as well as approval of both the president and Congress. Overall, our findings provide some support for previous research on the topic, but also offer new insights. First, we find a higher baseline level of support for presidential powers. Second, our results indicate that the president’s copartisans are more supportive of the veto even after controlling for presidential and congressional approval.

Exercising Unilateral Discretion: Presidential Justifications of Unilateral Powers in a Shared Powers System

There is a puzzle in the literature on presidential unilateral power that, on one hand, presents executive orders as the outcome of presidential prerogative but on the other hand identifies delegated discretion as a limit to presidential action. To address this question, we examine the use of delegated authority in unilateral orders from 1951 to 2009 and relate these to the ideological underpinnings of the institutions delegating and overseeing the use of this discretion (Congress and the Court). Our findings indicate that presidents are likely to issue unilateral directives with more substantive discretion when ideologically farther away from either the medians in Congress or the Supreme Court, but more likely to scale back their use of discretion when both branches are jointly ideologically distant from the president. The results demonstrate support for both an assertive and restrained president when relying upon delegated authority to act unilaterally.

Conclusion

Chapter 8 concludes with the argument that, with respect to unilateral orders, presidents often have the authority to be independent but do not always act that way. Independent presidents engage their executive authority, and discretion, to act alone, whereas administrators exercise delegated authority and political will to work with Congress. The knowledge of how presidents use unilateral orders may help to dampen the fear that presidents are able to use their unilateral powers unchecked because of a congressional retreat. The circumstances under which presidents act against Congress are selective. What remains is an understanding and awareness that the majority of unilateral orders are used to facilitate the needs of government. Concerns over an aggressive or overbearing president who pushes around an unsuspecting Congress may be overblown as presidents balance their political goals with their institutional responsibilities and duty to act.

An Independent President or Administrator?

Chapter 5 considers the unilateral actions of the dual roles of the president at the agenda-setting stage, before legislation has been introduced. At this stage, presidents have the incentive and ability to act as administrators to issue a routine order and as independent presidents more likely to issue a command. This is the most familiar and potentially dangerous type of president―those who use their unilateral powers to manage the political system in a way that corresponds to their preferences and their agenda. Because Congress is focused on identifying the topics to include on the agenda and deciding in committee the direction legislation should take, presidents do not necessarily need to work with Congress; instead, they can act independently creating edicts, which they expect others to follow.

Introduction

This book takes the next step in the study of unilateral power by quantitatively and qualitatively analyzing how the president’s unilateral orders are part of a separate and shared power system. The chapters that follow explore both the prerogatives presidents undertake and obligations they fulfill with respect to their independent and administrator executive functions. It builds on several generations of scholarship on the presidency and draws from both public law and behavioral approaches. Debate over the use of unilateral orders suggests that a president’s ability to act without the consent of Congress is largely unchecked by traditional institutional arrangements whereas others suggest presidents are more likely to be restrained by Congress because many unilateral powers are justified with interbranch authority.