Lessons from the Japanese ninja: on achieving a higher trade equilibrium under anarchy and private constitutions

This paper investigates the possibility of anarchy achieving a high trade equilibrium via the example of ninja communities in Japan. Initially, ninjas in the mountainous regions of Iga and Kōka were stateless, constantly feuded, and had few opportunities for exchange. With the advent of civil war in the sixteenth century, ninjas’ economic conditions changed. The mercenary market significantly expanded and presented great profit opportunities for the ninjas. However, instead of creating a formal government to move to a higher trade equilibrium, the ninjas resorted to forming voluntary confederations held together by private constitutions. I argue that this development was possible because the institutional environment of the Sengoku period enabled a framework of self-governing institutions and principles. The ninjas were able to build on this framework with very low organizational costs. As a result, the ninjas were able to reap large economic gains on the mercenary market while remaining stateless—a seemingly paradoxical development that goes against the standard dichotomy of “states and thick markets” versus “anarchy and thin markets.”

Ōta Gyūichi. “Shinchō-kō ki”. Book 8 (part 1)

The publication provides a continuation of the translations of books of Shinchō-kō ki, previously published by the author. This is a commented translation into Russian of the book 7 of Shinchō-kō ki chronicle. The text comprises a description of one of the largest military clashes in the Sengoku period - the battle of Nagashino. The army of Oda Nobunaga and Tokugawa Ieyasu fought the army of Takeda Katsuyori. The victory of Nobunaga redressed the balance of power, which previously existed. The comments to the translation allow to compare the information from the Shinchō-kō ki chronicle to that preserved in other contemporary sources. They are also aimed to display the existing interpretations of the key passages.