Die Rechtskontrolle der Geldpolitik der Europäischen Zentralbank in der Eurokrise

This thesis analyses the unconventional monetary policy measures taken by the ECB during the eurozone crisis, with a focus on the form of the action chosen. Using tools such as analysing both European composite administration (Verwaltungsverbund) and institutional rational choice, it considers the peculiarities of the operation of monetary policy in general and the administrative organisation of the European System of Central Banks. The thesis aims to clarify the extent to which these measures are amenable to judicial review by European courts. To this end, the author assesses legal doctrine and the case law of the ECJ and other European Courts. It examines new decisions by European courts during the crisis in terms of whether they exhaust the existing possibilities of judicial review or whether they open up new avenues. This is contextualised against the background of the evolving role of the ECB within the European Monetary Union going forward.

Activism and Law Making

This chapter seeks to outline the nature and extent of the elbow-room Indian democracy provides to various players and delve a little deeper to examine how well the established theories explain the Indian reality. It summarizes of the post-Independence institutional development of Indian politics before delving into a systematic exposition of major policy making frameworks. The theories expounded include, a) incrementalism; b) public choice; c) institutional rational choice; d) subsystems; e) advocacy coalition; f) punctuated equilibrium; and g) multiple streams approach. Next it provides a summary of the nine case studies covered in the subsequent chapters connecting them to the theories discussed. It concludes by pointing to the several questions that the case studies beget about policymaking in India. The observations from case studies would be held against the relief of these established models to check how well the models apply to the Indian setting.

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) on moulding state structures: The Non-Ergodic Africa

Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) is a ubiquitous reality. In Africa, the wave of PPP has hit states in their infancy – still moulding following only 50 years since independence. The common perspective of PPP on the realms of scholarship is transactional (focused on the delivery-end of infrastructure). This paper presents a deeper and broader perspective, and it is a distillate of a case study on PPP as a policy phenomenon. It dissects and illuminates the interaction between the forces of state formation and the wave of PPP hitting the continent. The lens of this case study is Institutional Rational Choice (IRC). The tools are a variety, comprising textual analysis, hermeneutics and econometrics – in keeping with the essence of case study (explication of reality in-situ). The product is not the orthodox generalization (claiming ‘the way’). Instead, the explication offers a viewpoint (and trigger questions) on public space of Africa, while underpinning the non-ergodic character of that space.

‘Moves on a Chess Board’: A Spatial Model of British Prime Ministers' Powers over Cabinet Formation

We use an institutional rational choice approach to help us understand how prime ministers in the UK make cabinet appointments and the implications for prime ministerial power. Assuming that prime ministers attempt to form a cabinet so as to get an overall package of policies as close as possible to their ideal, we show why the trade-offs they face are so complex, why apparently common-sense rules for making appointments might not always work well and why apparently strange choices made by prime ministers might actually be rational. Acknowledging the power prime ministers derive from their ability to appoint, we argue that the literature commonly fails to distinguish between power and luck, where lucky prime ministers get their way because they happen to agree with colleagues.

Judicial Performance and the Rule of Law in the Mexican States

What determines how judicial institutions perform? Prominent theoretical approaches, such as international political economy, institutional rational choice, social capital, and structural theories, suggest that international economic actors, political competition, political participation, and poverty may all be important forces driving institutional behavior. This study analyzes these various theoretical approaches and uses qualitative and statistical analysis to compare judicial performance in the Mexican states. It provides evidence to support the institutional rational choice hypothesis that political competition generates judicial independence. Poverty, political participation, and an export-oriented economy seem to influence judicial access and effectiveness.

Internationalization and Financial Federalism

In this article, the authors examine some effects of economic internationalization on state structures, especially in regard to the distribution of power and authority within federalist systems. Using an institutional rational choice model, they analyze changes in financial regulation and market structures in Germany and the United States. The focus is on the financial realm because of its high degree of internationalization and because, in both countries, financial markets and regulation have historically exhibited federalist traits. The findings indicate that internationalization has led to significant convergence in financial market structures and regulation across the two countries and that in each case this convergence has been accompanied by centralization of financial regulatory authority. Although both the German type of cooperative federalism and the U.S. model of competitive federalism proved to be vulnerable to the growing international pressures, the two countries took different paths of change that reflected differences in domestic institutions. Thus, the authors conclude that convergence is, and will likely remain, of a limited nature.