The Strategic Games that Donors and Bureaucrats Play: An Institutional Rational Choice Analysis

2008 ◽  
Vol 19 (4) ◽  
pp. 853-871 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. Araral
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Strategic Games ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Institutional Rational Choice

scholarly journals Evolutionary institutionalism

2016 ◽  
Vol 35 (1) ◽  
pp. 48-60 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Fürstenberg
Keyword(s):  
Rational Choice ◽  
Political Behavior ◽  
Behavioral Genetics ◽  
Ecological Stability ◽  
Institutional Stability ◽  
The Third ◽  
Ecosystem Effects ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Rational Choice Institutionalism ◽  
Agency And Structure

Background. Institutions are hard to define and hard to study. Long prominent in political science have been two theories: Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI). Arising from the life sciences is now a third: Evolutionary Institutionalism (EI). Comparative strengths and weaknesses of these three theories warrant review, and the value-to-be-added by expanding the third beyond Darwinian evolutionary theory deserves consideration.Question.Should evolutionary institutionalism expand to accommodate new understanding in ecology, such as might apply to the emergence of stability, and in genetics, such as might apply to political behavior?Methods.Core arguments are reviewed for each theory with more detailed exposition of the third, EI. Particular attention is paid to EI’s gene-institution analogy; to variation, selection, and retention of institutional traits; to endogeneity and exogeneity; to agency and structure; and to ecosystem effects, institutional stability, and empirical limitations in behavioral genetics.Findings.RCI, HI, and EI are distinct but complementary.Conclusions. Institutional change, while amenable to rational-choice analysis and, retrospectively, to critical-juncture and path-dependency analysis, is also, and importantly, ecological. Stability, like change, is an emergent property of institutions, which tend to stabilize after change in a manner analogous to allopatric speciation. EI is more than metaphorically biological in that institutional behaviors are driven by human behaviors whose evolution long preceded the appearance of institutions themselves.

scholarly journals Hirschman meets Williamson: Relationship-specific investment and loyalty

2012 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 55-81
Author(s):  
Károly Mike
Keyword(s):  
Simple Model ◽  
European Integration ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Exogenous Factor ◽  
Specific Investment ◽  
First Case ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Short Run ◽  
Hirschman's Model

In Albert Hirschman’s theory, loyalty plays a key role in the equilibrium between exit and voice. This article extends economic (rational choice) analysis to the emergence of loyalty, which Hirschman considers an exogenous factor. This is accomplished by linking Williamson’s theory of specific investment to Hirschman’s model. Three cases are distinguished: (1) loyalty is due to specific investment; (2) loyalty is due to (intermediate) factors influenced by specific investment; and, (3) loyalty is independent of specific investment. A simple model formalizes the first case. A paradoxical dynamic of loyalty is identified: a lower degree of specificity may lead to a weakening of loyalty in the short run but astrengthening of loyalty in the long run. An application to the process of European integration is sketched.

How Bumble-Bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest Participation

1996 ◽  
Vol 44 (4) ◽  
pp. 668-685 ◽  
Author(s):  
Grant Jordan ◽  
William A. Maloney
Keyword(s):  
Interest Groups ◽  
Rational Choice ◽  
Survey Data ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Group Activity ◽  
Bumble Bees ◽  
Theoretical Approaches ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Public Interest Groups

This paper confirms the existence of public interest groups as a theoretical puzzle for an Olson type (economically-driven) rational choice explanation. It systematically reviews different theoretical approaches that challenge this appearance of paradox. The paper also introduces some British survey data. It concludes that rational choice analysis must subsume non-material incentives, but shows that discussions predicated on conceptions of rationality other than that used by Olson do not imply that participation is a problem to be explained. It also points to the importance of group activity in shaping the preferences of potential members and in stimulating membership.

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