A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE OF STATISTICAL TO STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA OF MARKET GAMES

We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.

STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS

In this paper, we consider a pure exchange economy with a finite number of agents who behave strategically on endowments. A notion of strategic equilibrium with partial disposability is defined and it is shown the existence of mixed strategies equilibria. Purification results on the strategic equilibrium are obtained by considering a Walrasian endowment game with incomplete information. Finally, we obtain an asymptotic result by replicating the economy.

Stochastic Learning of Strategic Equilibria for Auctions

This article presents a new application of stochastic adaptive learning algorithms to the computation of strategic equilibria in auctions. The proposed approach addresses the problems of tracking a moving target and balancing exploration (of action space) versus exploitation (of better modeled regions of action space). Neural networks are used to represent a stochastic decision model for each bidder. Experiments confirm the correctness and usefulness of the approach.