Non-Additive Beliefs and Strategic Equilibria

2000 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 183-215 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jürgen Eichberger ◽  
David Kelsey
Keyword(s):  
Strategic Equilibria

A NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITION FOR CONVERGENCE OF STATISTICAL TO STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA OF MARKET GAMES

2009 ◽  
Vol 11 (04) ◽  
pp. 479-489
Author(s):  
DIMITRIOS P. TSOMOCOS ◽  
DIMITRIS VOLIOTIS
Keyword(s):  
Asymmetric Information ◽  
Market Mechanism ◽  
Statistical Equilibrium ◽  
Sufficient Condition ◽  
Market Game ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient Condition ◽  
Market Games ◽  
Necessary And Sufficient ◽  
Strategic Equilibria

We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational.

STRATEGIC EQUILIBRIA WITH PARTIALLY CONSUMABLE WITHHOLDINGS

2006 ◽  
Vol 08 (04) ◽  
pp. 533-553 ◽  
Author(s):  
EMMA MORENO-GARCÍA
Keyword(s):  
Finite Number ◽  
Incomplete Information ◽  
Exchange Economy ◽  
Asymptotic Result ◽  
Mixed Strategies ◽  
Pure Exchange ◽  
Pure Exchange Economy ◽  
Strategic Equilibria

In this paper, we consider a pure exchange economy with a finite number of agents who behave strategically on endowments. A notion of strategic equilibrium with partial disposability is defined and it is shown the existence of mixed strategies equilibria. Purification results on the strategic equilibrium are obtained by considering a Walrasian endowment game with incomplete information. Finally, we obtain an asymptotic result by replicating the economy.

Stochastic Learning of Strategic Equilibria for Auctions

1999 ◽  
Vol 11 (5) ◽  
pp. 1199-1209
Author(s):  
Samy Bengio ◽  
Yoshua Bengio ◽  
Jacques Robert ◽  
Gilles Bélanger
Keyword(s):  
Neural Networks ◽  
Adaptive Learning ◽  
Decision Model ◽  
Learning Algorithms ◽  
Space Versus ◽  
Action Space ◽  
Moving Target ◽  
Stochastic Learning ◽  
Strategic Equilibria

This article presents a new application of stochastic adaptive learning algorithms to the computation of strategic equilibria in auctions. The proposed approach addresses the problems of tracking a moving target and balancing exploration (of action space) versus exploitation (of better modeled regions of action space). Neural networks are used to represent a stochastic decision model for each bidder. Experiments confirm the correctness and usefulness of the approach.

Model Checking Strategic Equilibria

2009 ◽  
pp. 166-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nicolas Troquard ◽  
Wiebe van der Hoek ◽  
Michael Wooldridge
Keyword(s):  
Model Checking ◽  
Strategic Equilibria
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