Aristotle, Citizenship, And The Common Advantage

In the early chapters of Book III of his Politics, Aristotle engages in a discussion of citizenship and it quickly becomes apparent that the issues involved in citizenship are more complex than many may realize. This discussion has led to disputes over what Aristotle’s account of citizenship is and whether it leads to an incoherence in his political theory, specifically whether his account makes it impossible to distinguish legitimate from illegitimate types of constitutions. After discussing the interpretive controversy over Aristotle’s account of citizenship, I consider two arguments with promising solutions regarding its alleged incoherence with Aristotle’s overall political theory. I argue that neither one of these attempted solutions — provided by Donald Morrison and David Keyt — ultimately proves adequate. What emerges from this examination is not an alternative solution, but the surprising conclusion that Aristotle’s account of citizenship, when conjoined with his classification of constitutions, does not lead to any incoherence at all.

Recovering the Political Aristotle: A Critical Response to Smith

Thomas Smith presents an Aristotelian view of the common good that resembles much contemporary political theory in that it focuses on ethics rather than politics. Smith contends that Aristotle is a potent remedy to a society in crisis due to its unconcern about the common good. Against Smith's apolitical reading of Aristotle, we examine how Aristotle's views of common advantage, the multiple needs of citizens, and political friendship support neither harmonizing conceptions of the good nor a personal “radical conversion” that makes the common good our primary political concern. In engaging the political Aristotle, we find instead that he is concerned with the necessary conflict that resists attempts to arrive at the common advantage, with the material basis of good citizenship, and with the institutions and practices that foster a good deliberative politics.

The EMU, Monetary Crises, and the Single European Currency

After a few introductory notes on the relation between production of value, productivity, economic crises, and inflation, this article submits a theory of exchange rates, revaluations, and devaluations in terms of tendential (and counter-tendential) international distribution of value both among individual countries and between the imperialist centre on the one hand and the dominated block on the other. This framework is then used to examine the process leading towards the EMU and the Euro and the conclusion is reached that, in spite of the different EMU countries' divergent interests, their common advantage is that the costs of this further step in the process of European integration will be paid by Europe's labour. Next, the relation between the DM and the Euro on the one hand and the US dollar on the other is clarified and the link is established with monetary crises. The 1994-95 crisis is then used as an illustration.

International co-operation for Antarctic development: the test for the Antarctic Treaty

It has been suggested to me that I should take this opportunity to initiate discussion about the Antarctic Treaty: in particular to review how far the Treaty is meeting our present practical needs. During the forty years or more during which I have been associated with Antarctic affairs, I have seen some degree of international order evolved out of chaos; harmony has replaced discord; many apparently insoluble problems have been resolved one after another. I have seen that good co-operation and compromise can be and have been achieved repeatedly without any significant sacrifice of national autonomy and to the common advantage of all concerned.