Research on dual innovation incentive mechanism in terms of organizations’ differential knowledge absorptive capacity

Differences in the capacity for absorption between different organizations will have an important impact on an organization’s choices of innovation exploration and exploitive innovation strategies. Organizations need to explore correct strategic decisions under different policies for long-term development. This study with limited rational first-mover and late-mover organizations as the research object, based on the evolutionary game theory model, using visualization system deduced first-mover and late-mover organizations in the knowledge absorptive capacity differences and incentive policies under the condition of different strategies selection process. The research shows that the rationality of policy incentive setting has a direct impact on the choice of organizational dual innovation strategy with different knowledge absorption capacities. The market pattern is stable and organizational knowledge absorption capacity is different. The higher the policy incentive level is, the more the organization is inclined to carry out exploratory innovation activities. Under the environment of stable market structure, different organizational knowledge absorption capacity, and no policy incentive, late-mover cannot adopt exploratory innovation strategy alone. When the market pattern is stable and the absorptive capacity of the organization is different, whether the late-mover can adopt the exploratory innovation strategy depends on the policy incentive level. In this case, the optimal situation is to have the opportunity to change to exploratory innovation at the same time as the first-movers.

The Incentive Mechanism of the Subject Librarians with Computer Information Retrieval Under Competition

Based on the H-M model, the optimal incentive model under competition was constructed, the best incentive system was constructed by solving the model, and its incentive characteristics are analyzed. Based on the theory of econometrics, an empirical model of incentive system was constructed, and the correlation and significance between the main core variables and incentive intensity are empirically tested. The results show that competition has a significant effect and positive effect on incentive level. Incentive level has a non-linear correlation with service cost and risk preference, within a certain range, the best incentive level is negatively related to them.

Test-Enhanced Learning and Incentives in Biology Education

This study examined the testing effect in a postsecondary biology course with low- and high-incentive treatments and measured student learning. Although exposure to exams predicted better learning, incentive level did not moderate this effect, an outcome that contradicted recent laboratory findings that higher incentives decreased the testing effect.

Research on decision-making behavior of crowdsourcing task based on loss aversion and incentive level

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to study the decision-making behavior of the initiator and the participant under innovative and project-based tasks, respectively. It further explores the impact of the participant’s loss aversion and the initiator’s incentive level on the participant’s optimal effort level to reveal the implicit managerial mechanism. Design/methodology/approach This paper uses the Principal-agent Theory, Prospect Theory and Game Theory to study the decision-making behavior in crowdsourcing tasks. First, according to the return at the reference point, it establishes the utility function models of the participant and the initiator. Second, based on diverse loss aversion coefficient and incentive coefficient, it constructs the decision-making models of two types of task respectively. Third, it verifies the validity of models through simulation analysis. Findings For innovative task, the participant’s optimal effort level increases with the increment of loss aversion and incentive level, but decreases with the increase of his effort cost. For project-based task, the participant’s optimal effort level rises with the decrease of loss aversion; if the initiator does not take appropriate incentives, information asymmetry will lead to the task becoming a low-level innovation approach. Moreover, under innovative task, when the participant has loss aversion (or loss aversion reversal), his optimal effort level is higher (or lower) than that with no loss aversion, while the result under project-based task is just the opposite. Originality/value This paper characterizes two types of crowdsourcing task. Based on the prospect theory, it develops the decision-making models of the participant and the initiator under innovative and project-based tasks, thus exploring the impact of loss aversion and incentive level on their decision-making behavior. According to the findings in this paper, the initiator may effectively speculate the participant’s effort level and adopt reasonable monetary incentive measures to optimize the crowdsourcing return. In addition, this study can provide some reference for the design of incentive mechanism in crowdsourcing tasks and improve the relevant research of crowdsourcing.

Design Mechanism on Dynamic Incentive Machnism Considering Special Talents of the Manager

Suppose the firm's output is influenced by the agent’s effort level observable and the ability unobservable, researching the optimal level of incentives under the two levels of incentives associated. Study found that corporate client based on the first period of corporate performance, the agents ability to judge the case, risk aversion, the variance of the degree of capacity, the degree of attention of the principal agents the ability have an impact on the agents first and second of the optimal incentive level. In addition, of the optimal incentive level in first period is correlated with the contribution of the efforts with the manager of the firm's output, the agent's incentive level in the second period as well as the effort cost associated of the first period; while the second period of the optimal the incentive level is a decreasing function of the current cost of effort.

An Examination of the Relationships Among Monetary Incentives, Goal Level, Goal Commitment, and Performance

This study tested the effects of incentive type, incentive level, and goal level on valence, goal commitment, and performance. Subjects (N=251) worked on a class scheduling task under either piece-rate, hourly, goal attainment bonus, or no-pay conditions, under either high or low amounts of money, and were assigned either easy, moderate, or difficult goals (a 4X2X3 design). Results demonstrated that both the level of valence and valence slope mediated the relationship between incentives and goal commitment. Incentive type, incentive level, and goal level interacted in determining performance, and these effects were not completely mediated by goal commitment.