Relativismo cognitivo y axiológico. Cognitive and Axiological Relativism

Haré a continuación una breve exposición de la postura del sociólogo francés Raymond Boudon sobre el relativismo contemporáneo, agregando consideraciones mías. Me referiré al relativismo cognitivo, especialmente al científico, con algunas alusiones al ético y estético. Para lograr esto, estudiaré las diferencias entre la sociología de la ciencia clásica y la posmoderna. La expresión sociología de la ciencia alude a todo lo que hoy se considera conocimiento científico. Es fácil advertir que involucra al conocimiento en general y que presupone una epistemología, una teoría del conocimiento y, de últimas, una ontología.Here I will do a brief exposition of the French sociologist Raymond Boudon’s posture about contemporary relativism, adding my thoughts. I will refer to the cognitive relativism, specially the scientifically one, with some allusions to ethic and esthetic. To achieve this, I will study the differences between sociology of classic science and postmodern science. The expression sociology of the science makes reference to everything that today is considered scientific knowledge. Is easy to warn that involves knowledge in general and that presupposes an epistemology, a theory of knowledge and, ultimately, ontology.

The tenets of hermeneutical realism

This article explores and attempts to resolve some issues that arise when at stake is the need to harmonize philosophical hermeneutics with a kind of realist philosophy of science. The author takes issue with established position in the realism-antirealism controversy. Interventionism is criticized for a residual Cartesian dualism. Cognitive relativism is debated by developing a concept of situated transcendence in the constitution of objects of inquiry. Non-behaviorist arguments against scheme-content dualism are advanced that appeal to context- sensitive theory of meaning. Social constructivism is rejected for the hypostatization of epistemic positions. The article suggests a model of the constitution of meaning. It undertakes an attempt at demonstrating how the integration of this model in a hermeneutic philosophy of science leads to realism without epistemological representationalism, foundationalism, and cognitive essentialism. The article is oriented toward a new dialogue between hermeneutic phenomenology and a holistic epistemology.