“Freely you have received, freely give”: A Socio-Ethical Analysis of Charismatic Engagements and Pentecostalism in Nigeria

The manifestation and demonstration of spiritual gifts have always generated a lot of argument among Christians and non-Christians in Nigerian society. While some people deny the reality of the gifts thereby camping with the cessationists, other parties submit to the continuation of the spiritual gifts among the contemporary Christians. However, in scholarship the discourse has taken different dimensions which include the theological, effectual, biblical and philosophical perspectives with little attention paid to the socio-ethical aspect of the matter which is the major concern of this paper. The work is premised on Thomas Hobbes’ Theory of Psychological Egoism, which emphasises the benefit or reward as the motivating factor for every action performed by man, this article intends to investigate the alleged commercialization of prophetic gifts among the Nigerian pastors and to determine whether this is the major cause for the increase of the demonstration of charismatic gifts in the country. Interviews were conducted with Christians and ministers for data collection; which were complemented with relevant literature. The paper pays attention to charismatic display and Pentecostalism, current level of charismata in Nigerian Pentecostal churches, encouraging factors of charismatic activities and socio-ethical assessment of the display of spiritual gifts in Nigeria’s churches, while Christian morally pertinent ways of demonstrating spiritual gifts in an ethical manner is recommended

Psychological selfishness

Selfishness is central to many theories of human morality, yet its psychological nature remains largely overlooked. Psychologists often rely on classical conceptions of selfishness from economics (i.e., rational self-interest) and philosophy (i.e. psychological egoism), but such characterizations offer limited insight into the richer, motivated nature of selfishness. To address this gap, we propose a novel framework in which selfishness is recast as a psychological construction. From this view, selfishness is perceived in ourselves and others when we detect a situation-specific desire to benefit oneself that disregards others’ desires and prevailing social expectations for the situation. We argue that detecting and deterring such psychological selfishness in both oneself and others is crucial in social life—facilitating the maintenance of social cohesion and close relationships. In addition, we show how utilizing this psychological framework offers a richer understanding of the nature of human social behavior. Delineating a psychological construct of selfishness can promote coherence in interdisciplinary research on selfishness, and provide insights for interventions to prevent or remediate negative effects of selfishness.

SHAFTESBURY ON SELFISHNESS AND PARTISANSHIP

In the Introduction to his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume credits “my Lord Shaftesbury” as one of the “philosophers in England, who have begun to put the science of man on a new footing.” I describe aspects of Shaftesbury’s philosophy that justify the credit Hume gives him. I focus on Shaftesbury’s refutation of psychological egoism, his examination of partiality, and his views on how to promote impartial virtue. I also discuss Shaftesbury’s political commitments, and raise questions about recent interpretations that have taken his Characteristicks to be a polemic, partisan text.

Introduction

This chapter introduces Sacrifice Regained: Morality and Self-interest in British Moral Philosophy from Hobbes to Bentham. The main topic of the book is explained within a framework first set out clearly by the Cambridge philosopher Henry Sidgwick, in the nineteenth century. The ancient background to the discussion is described, especially in connection to the views of Socrates and Plato. Psychological egoism—the view that the sole ultimate motivation of voluntary human action is self-interest—is elucidated. Rational egoism is defined as the view that the only reason any agent has for acting is to promote their own self-interest.

Cumberland

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of Richard Cumberland (1631–1718). Cumberland’s view that it is a natural necessity that human beings act always to advance their own self-interest (this view being a form of psychological egoism) is explained, along with his claim that ultimate moral motivation is possible, despite the fact that agents can never do what they believe will be worse for them overall. His utilitarian natural law ethics is described. His arguments for utilitarianism—based on preservation, sanctions, human make-up, agreement, and maximization—are critically interpreted.

Sacrifice Regained

Does being virtuous make you happy? This book examines the answers to this ancient question provided by the so-called ‘British Moralists’, from about 1650 for the next two hundred years. This involves elucidating their views on happiness (self-interest, or well-being) and on virtue (or morality), in order to bring out the relation of each to the other. Themes ran through many of these writers: psychological egoism, evaluative hedonism, and—after Thomas Hobbes—the acceptance of self-standing moral reasons. But there are exceptions, and even those taking the standard views adopt them for very different reasons and express them in various ways. As the ancients tended to believe that virtue and happiness largely, perhaps entirely, coincide, so these modern authors are inclined to accept posthumous reward and punishment. Both positions sit uneasily with the common-sense idea that a person can truly sacrifice their own good for the sake of morality or for others, and the book shows that David Hume—a hedonist whose ethics made no appeal to the afterlife—was the first major British moralist to allow for, indeed to recommend, such self-sacrifice. Morality and well-being of course remain central to modern ethics, and this book demonstrates how much there is to learn from this remarkable group of philosophers.

Egoism and altruism

Henry Sidgwick conceived of egoism as an ethical theory parallel to utilitarianism: the utilitarian holds that one should maximize the good of all beings in the universe; the egoist holds instead that the good one is ultimately to aim at is only one’s own. This form of egoism (often called ‘ethical egoism’) is to be distinguished from the empirical hypothesis (‘psychological egoism’) that human beings seek to maximize their own good. Ethical egoism can approve of behaviour that benefits others, for often the best way to promote one’s good is to form cooperative relationships. But the egoist cannot approve of an altruistic justification for such cooperation: altruism requires benefiting others merely for their sake, whereas the egoist insists that one’s ultimate goal must be solely one’s own good. One way to defend ethical egoism is to affirm psychological egoism and then to propose that our obligations cannot outstrip our capacities; if we cannot help seeking to maximize our own well being, we should not hold ourselves to a less selfish standard. But this defence is widely rejected, because psychological egoism seems too simple a conception of human behaviour. Moreover, egoism violates our sense of impartiality; there is no fact about oneself that justifies excluding others from one’s ultimate end. There is, however, a different form of egoism, which flourished in the ancient world, and is not vulnerable to this criticism. It holds that one’s good consists largely or exclusively in acting virtuously, and that self-interest properly understood is therefore our best guide.

CUESTIONES ÉTICAS Y EMOCIONALES ALREDEDOR DEL EGOÍSMO ECONÓMICO

<p><strong>RESUMEN</strong></p><p>El autointerés constituye el principal postulado de la teoría económica ortodoxa. Se trata de una perspectiva que ancla sus raíces en el egoísmo psicológico del siglo XVII, que se abre paso en el pensamiento económico a través de los trabajos de autores como Bernard Mandeville y Joseph Butler durante el siglo XVIII, y que encuentra su lugar en la ciencia económica con la revolución marginalista y la posterior emergencia de la escuela neoclásica a lo largo de la segunda mitad del siglo XIX. Sin embargo, la teoría de juegos, en su versión tradicional, evolutiva y neuronal, lleva décadas mostrando una realidad comportamental del agente económico motivacionalmente heterogénea y moralmente comprometida. Por ello, el objetivo del presente estudio será doble. Por un lado, mostrar cómo nace, concreta y desarrolla la perspectiva egoísta para la economía, y, por otro, dilucidar cuál es la perspectiva comportamental que subyace de los últimos estudios neuroeconómicos.</p><p><strong><br /></strong></p><p><strong>ETHICAL AND EMOTIONAL QUESTIONS ON ECONOMIC EGOISM</strong></p><p><strong>ABSTRACT</strong></p><p>Self-interest is the main postulate of the orthodox economic theory. It is a perspective that takes root in the psychological egoism of the 17th century, which opens out to economic thought through the works of authors like Bernard Mandeville and Joseph Butler in the 18th century, and which has found its place in economic science with the marginalist revolution and the subsequent appearance of the Neoclassic School in the second half of the 19th century. Nonetheless, in its traditional evolutionary and neuronal version, the Game Theory has spent decades showing a completely different behavioural reality of the economic agent: One that is motivationally heterogeneous and morally compromised. Therefore, the objective of the present study is twofold: on the one hand, to show how the egoistic perspective for economy comes about, is specified and develops; on the other hand, elucidate the behavioural perspective that underlies the latest neuroeconomic studies.</p>