Epilogue

In the Epilogue, various possible implications of Survival Nihilism are considered. It is argued, first, that Rational Egoism must be rejected if Survival Nihilism is true. Second, the question of whether Survival Nihilism excludes both the possibilities of compensation and of moral responsibility is examined. The conclusion is that it does but only if compensation and moral responsible require that there some relation matters in survival, but it is uncertain one way or the other that this is a requirement of either compensation or moral responsibility. Finally, the possibility of a purely pragmatic justification for having a practice of prudential concern—organized around identity or some other relation—that cannot be defeated by metaphysical considerations is assessed. It is suggested that, in fact, given the metaphysical reflections of this work, a pragmatic justification for adopting a practice of prudential concern, so organized, would not mean that identity or an alternative non-identity relation would give you a non-derivative or derivative reason for prudential concern.

Reconciling Epicurean Friendship and Egoism Through a Rule Egoist Reading

Ancient Greece gave rise to many prominent philosophical figures. Of these, a notable academic was Epicurus (341 - 270 BC), a Samoan who was influential in the development of the Stoic school of thought. While Epicurus’s scholarship includes several subject areas, he is most notable for his work in ethics and egoism. As a subset of this philosophical field, Epicurus investigates the role of a selfless, virtuous friendship in the cultivation of a moral life, as well as the need for a selfish and rational egoism. Thus, as scholars have pointed out, the notions of selfless friendship and self-interest egoism, while maintained parallelly by Epicurus, seem to be in tension with each other. This paper examines the relationship between an ideal Epicurean friendship and Epicurus’s concept of egoism, and attempts to resolve both notions under a reading of rule egoism.

The Poetics of Schism: Dostoevsky Translates Hamlet

F.M. Dostoevsky (1821–1881) never translated Shakespeare’s works into Russian, at least not in the common sense. His fascination, however, with Hamlet and his choices, led him to interrogate the cult of Hamlet in his own culture to better understand the political and philosophical schism of the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia, torn between Western and Populist ideals. Translatio, in the broader sense of “carrying over” Hamlet’s character, caught on a threshold, into the Russian context represents an important aspect of Dostoevsky’s re-interpretation of modern ethics. More immediately, this translatio is a call to the “old morality” of the 1840s generation of Russian intellectuals, who rejected notions of rational egoism and of the means justifying the ends. Dostoevsky’s schismatic hero, Rodion Romanovich Raskolnikov in Crime and Punishment, is Dostoevsky’s reimagining of his own culture’s translation of Hamlet that produced extreme and radical forms of Hamlet. Raskolnikov mimics Hamlet’s conscience-stricken personality at war with itself but achieves a more ambiguous ending typical of Dostoevsky’s regenerative paradigm.

“Reasonable egoism” as a source of socio-cultural institutions of the future?

On the basis of the ideology of “rational egoism” described by V.M. Rosin, analyzes the processes of social and cultural dynamics, which are expressed in the formation of new sociocultural institutions, such as multiple citizenship, new types of interpersonal relations (civic partnership), multilingualism, gig economy, electronic media.

The problem of moral liberation of personality in the philosophy of Russian populism

The subject of this research is the problem of moral liberation of personality in ideological heritage of Russian Populism. In the social philosophy of Russian populism this problem is an integral part of the theory of holistic liberation of personality (moral, socioeconomic, political). Emphasis is made on the concept of “rational egoism” and principle of oneness of human nature (unity of material and moral) of N. G. Chernyshevsky; significance of subjective method in social sciences in formation of anthropological (“moral”) ideal of P. L. Lavrov; as well as theory of solidary relations as the key concepts of ethicism of social philosophy of Russian Populism. The scientific novelty consists in examination of the problem of moral liberation in the context of theory of holistic liberation of personality, developed by the Russian populists on the basis of socio-philosophical ideas of Enlightenment. The problem of autonomous (sovereign) personality in the social philosophy of Russian populism is viewed in the context of “liberation of personality”, with emphasis on the anthropological ideal of “moral personality”. Advancing the theory of “rational egoism”, N. G. Chernyshevsky came to the conclusion that autonomy of personality is achieved due to social solidarity. P. L. Lavrov, having continued the inner logics of populist thought on the development of solidary relations in the society, basically neglected the autonomy of personality. An attempt to solve the problem of correlation between moral freedom and moral demand, applicable to the ideal personality, led to formation of the fundamentals of solidarism within the philosophy of Russian populism.

Price

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Welsh dissenting minister, theologian, probability theorist, and philosopher, Richard Price (1723–91). Price’s deontological pluralism is described, and his distinction between practical and abstract virtue elucidated. Price’s volitionalism is compared with the views of Adam Smith. The question of whether Price believes partial virtue sufficient for virtue is discussed. Price’s view of supererogation, and his opposition to rational egoism are explained. Price’s identification of the truth about duty with God is elucidated, along with its implications for any conflict between morality and self-interest.

Reid

This chapter discusses the views on self-interest and morality of the Scottish ‘common-sense’ philosopher Thomas Reid (1710–96). The influence of Joseph Butler on Reid’s conception of human nature is explained, and the similarities and differences between their positions elucidated. Reid’s arguments against rational egoism are discussed. His view that virtue is a component of well-being is outlined, and it is suggested that his position on the pleasures of virtue may be said to be somewhat exaggerated. Reid’s appeal to the afterlife to guarantee complete overlap between self-interest and morality is explained.