Behaviourism in Disguise: The Triviality of Ramsey Sentence Functionalism

Functionalism has become one of the predominant theories in the philosophy of mind, with its many merits supposedly including its capacity for precise formulation. The most common method to express this precise formulation is by means of the modified Ramsey sentence. In this article, I will apply work from the field of the philosophy of science to functionalism for the first time, examining how Newman’s objection undermines the Ramsey sentence as a means of formalising functionalism. I will also present a formal variation on Newman’s objection through mathematical induction. Together, these proofs suggest that functionalism formalised by the Ramsey sentence trivially reduces to a kind of behaviourism plus a cardinality constraint on the number of relations holding between mental-relevant behaviours. As most functionalists see functionalism as a distinct theory of mind from behaviourism, this suggests that the modified Ramsey sentence cannot form a satisfactory formalism for functionalism.

Neither Analytic Nor Dialectic I: Horizon

The second chapter contains an exposition and critique of Garcia’s definitions of analysis and dialectics, again tying his discussion to canonical discussion in analytic and continental philosophy. ‘Analysis’ is explicated via a discussion of G.E. Moore’s canonical arguments as well as more recent work on Ramsey sentences, Ramsifying the George Dickie’s Institutional Theory of Art in the Process. Recent criticisms of Ramsey Sentence Functionalism support Garcia’s contention about analysis. For dialectics Garcia’s tragic aporetic dialectics is contrasted with traditional explications of Hegel.