Herbert G. Bohnert. Communication by Ramsey-sentence clause. Philosophy of science, vol. 34 (1967), pp. 341–347. - Israel Scheffler. Reflections on the Ramsey method. The journal of philosophy, vol. 65 (1968), pp. 269–274. - Herbert G. Bohnert. In defense of Ramsey's elimination method. The journal of philosophy, vol. 65 (1968) pp. 275–281. - Ilkka Niiniluoto. Empirically trivial theories and inductive systematization. Logic, probability, and language, edited by Radu J. Bogdan and I. Niiniluoto, D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht1973, pp. 101–107.

1974 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 617-619 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raimo Tuomela
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Elimination Method ◽  
Ramsey Sentence

scholarly journals Behaviourism in Disguise: The Triviality of Ramsey Sentence Functionalism

Axiomathes ◽  
2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. S. Lowther
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Philosophy Of Mind ◽  
Mathematical Induction ◽  
Common Method ◽  
Cardinality Constraint ◽  
Precise Formulation ◽  
Ramsey Sentence ◽  
First Time

Abstract Functionalism has become one of the predominant theories in the philosophy of mind, with its many merits supposedly including its capacity for precise formulation. The most common method to express this precise formulation is by means of the modified Ramsey sentence. In this article, I will apply work from the field of the philosophy of science to functionalism for the first time, examining how Newman’s objection undermines the Ramsey sentence as a means of formalising functionalism. I will also present a formal variation on Newman’s objection through mathematical induction. Together, these proofs suggest that functionalism formalised by the Ramsey sentence trivially reduces to a kind of behaviourism plus a cardinality constraint on the number of relations holding between mental-relevant behaviours. As most functionalists see functionalism as a distinct theory of mind from behaviourism, this suggests that the modified Ramsey sentence cannot form a satisfactory formalism for functionalism.

An AI-Based Philosophy of Science

1990 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 274-275
Author(s):  
William Bechtel
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science

Philosophy of Science Applied to Psychology’s Ethics

PsycCRITIQUES ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 62 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Janet R. Matthews
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science

The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Hoinski ◽  
Ronald Polansky
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Modern Science ◽  
Michael Polanyi ◽  
Contemporary Philosophy ◽  
The Face ◽  
Human Desire ◽  
The Mind ◽  
Theoretical Science

David Hoinski and Ronald Polansky’s “The Modern Aristotle: Michael Polanyi’s Search for Truth against Nihilism” shows how the general tendencies of contemporary philosophy of science disclose a return to the Aristotelian emphasis on both the formation of dispositions to know and the role of the mind in theoretical science. Focusing on a comparison of Michael Polanyi and Aristotle, Hoinski and Polansky investigate to what degree Aristotelian thought retains its purchase on reality in the face of the changes wrought by modern science. Polanyi’s approach relies on several Aristotelian assumptions, including the naturalness of the human desire to know, the institutional and personal basis for the accumulation of knowledge, and the endorsement of realism against objectivism. Hoinski and Polansky emphasize the promise of Polanyi’s neo-Aristotelian framework, which argues that science is won through reflection on reality.

The Science in Hume's Science of Man

2020 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 257-271
Author(s):  
Tamás Demeter
Keyword(s):  
Comparative Analysis ◽  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Dynamic Theory ◽  
Newtonian Dynamic ◽  
The Mind

This paper sketches a recently emerging divide between two interpretations of Hume's methodology and philosophy of science. On the first interpretation Hume relies on an inductive methodology and provides a (Newtonian) dynamic theory of the mind, and his philosophy of science reflects this methodology. On the second, Hume relies on inferences to the best explanation via comparative analysis of instances, and offers an anatomy of the mind relying on a chemical and organic imagery. The paper also aspires to lean the reader's sympathies toward the latter interpretation while outlining some of its potential consequences for the character of Hume's psychology, the limits of associationism, and his empiricism.

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document