In a democracy, what makes an external self-determination claim reasonable? Some reflections on the moral aspect of the question

The central part of this article deals with the morality of secession. We present the three main "pure" theories about the morality of secession and suggest the greatest justifying power of an "impure" or mixed theory. At the same time, however, we advocate the need for a proper understanding of the question of the morality of secession. More specifically, we suggest that the best way to raise it is by introducing the notion of "reasonableness" into the question itself.

Parsimony and the Sentencing of Multiple Offenders

This chapter examines the principle of parsimony (PP) as it applies to the sentencing of multiple offenders. It first explains what the PP means and challenges its basic assumptions as an independent, substantive sentencing principle. It then recasts the PP as a second-order principle, that is, as a principle designed to help us better ensure that the traditional aims of sentencing are more fully realized. It also distinguishes crime reduction and retributivism versions of the PP as a second-order principle and considers how they might be integrated into a mixed theory of sentencing. Finally, it explores whether and to what extent the PP as a second-order principle is useful in thinking about multiple-offense sentencing. It argues that the PP might play a role in determining sentence ranges for crime types, as well as in formulating broader penal and social policies.

CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO THE THEORIES OF RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The article examines the problem of recognition of new states in international law. The author considers the concept, sources, theories, criteria of the institution of recognition of new states. The author analyzes various theories of the Institute of recognition of states, taking into account the provisions of the international law doctrine and practice. The author notes that at the present stage of development of the institute of recognition we should be guided by the mixed theory of recognition as the most corresponding to international law, and by States’ practice. The author discloses criteria for the recognition of States enshrined in international legal acts. At the same time, the author singles out the criterion of the legality of new states’ emergence. The conclusion is that the creation of a new State as a subject of international law is legitimate, if its appearance corresponds to the fundamental principles of international law. The appearance of a new state must not violate the mandatory principles of international law jus cogens, otherwise, a territorial formation can not claim to be internationally recognized and must be considered from the point of view of international law as illegally created.

Pure Retributivism and the Problem of Psychopathy: A Preliminary Investigation / Retributivismo Puro e o Problema da Psicopatia: Uma Investigação Preliminar

My present goal is to explore some possible responses pure (or strict) retributivists might have to the gathering of empirical data on psychopaths. In addressing this issue, I will first briefly examine the strides researchers have recently made in understanding the nature of psychopathy, paying particular attention to work on the neural and genetic components of the disorder (§1). Then, I will survey several ways that a pure retributivist might respond to this data (including giving up on pure retributivism altogether and adopting instead a mixed theory of punishment that incorporates both forward-looking and backward-looking elements). (§2). As we will see, the retributivist has a fairly limited range of appealing options in this context. But my primary task here isn't to somehow refute retributivism (which comes in too many varieties to adequately address in a single paper). Rather, I am mainly interested in showing that the problem of psychopathy is relevant when it comes to our philosophical theorizing about punishment. In this sense, my over-arching task is methodological. I survey the interdisciplinary terrain and highlight some interesting and important connections between the research on the philosophy and the psychology of psychopathy.Keywords: Retributivism; Philosophy of punishment; PsychopathyResumo: O objetivo deste artigo é explorar possíveis respostas que retributivistas puros podem ter à coleta de dados empíricos sobre psicopatas. Ao tratar deste assunto, primeiro examinarei brevemente os recentes avanços de pesquisadores em relação ao entendimento da natureza da psicopatia, dando atenção especial ao trabalho acerca dos components neurais e genéticos da doença (§1). Após, demonstrarei diversas maneiras pelas quais um retributivista puro poderia enfrentar essas novas questões (incluindo desistir do retributivismo puro para adotar uma teoria punitiva mista que incorpora ambos elementos voltados para o futuro quanto para o passado) (§2). Como veremos, o retributivista tem uma gama bastante limitada de opções que sejam atraentes neste contexto. Mas a minha tarefa primordial não é a de refutar o retributivismo (que vem em variedades muito numerosas para serem trabalhadas em um único artigo). Em vez disso, estou preocupado em demonstrar que o problema da psicopatia é relevante quando pensamos sobre a nossa teorização filosófica acerca da punição. Nesse sentido, minha tarefa é metodológica. Eu avalio o terreno interdisciplinar e enfatizo algumas conexões importantes e interessantes entre a pesquisa na filosofia e na psicologia da psicopatia.Palavras-chave: Retributivismo; Filosofia da punição; Psicopatia