Animalismo e non violenza. L’incidenza della lezione gandhiana sul pensiero di Tom Regan

In opposition to the anthropocentric model of domination, in Gandhi as in Regan there is the full recovery of an ethical-philosophical tradition based on the model of kinship or fraternity and that insists on the possibility of extending the rules of justice to all living beings. The result of this perspective is the duty of vegetarianism and the radical opposition to any practice that treats animals as means at the service of human interests. But Gandhi’s lesson is particularly useful both to address the properly political issues arising from animal ethics, that are at the heart of Regan’s philosophy (starting with the debate on the nature and justification of animal rights theories and their possible inclusion in the political community), and to define the most appropriate non-violent fighting strategies for the achievement of the aims of animal rights defenders.

Almost Like Waging War. Tom Regan and the Conditions for Using Violence for the Sake of Animals

This paper investigates Tom Regan’s attitude towards violence as a litmus test to understand the justifiability of the use of violence in animal rights activists (ARAs). Although Regan’s take seems uncontroversially against a recourse to violence, there is an ambiguity in his position. By comparing Regan’s conditions for the legitimate use of violence for the sake of animal liberation with the standard conditions for jus ad bellum, I show that Regan construed the conditions for the former in a specular manner as the conditions for the latter. However, since he was not an absolute pacifist, there is some contradiction, and he should have been more willing to justify some recourse to violence than he in fact does. I conclude by gesturing towards some possible changes that his thought should undergo in order to adjust this incoherence.

DIREITOS ANIMAIS: ZOOLÓGICOS COMO PRÁTICA COLONIAL HUMANA

Diante das barreiras do Direito posto, que toma como orientação o paradigma colonial da humanidade, reflexões acerca dos animais não-humanos são necessárias para que se possa transcender a significação clássica de animais enquanto propriedade, já que não se pode continuar a mercê de tradicionais comportamentos humanos que insistem numa arbitrária hierarquização de vidas igualmente sencientes. Objetivou-se no decorrer do texto demonstrar a relação de colonialidade presente no tratamento entre humanos e animais não-humanos, resultado do paradigma especista da humanidade, responsável por subjugar animais não-humanos e reduzi-los ao status de coisa inanimada. Contudo, argumenta-se ser possível compreender o animal não-humano enquanto ser sujeito de direitos a partir de justificativas ético-filosóficas encontradas nas obras de Tom Regan e Peter Singer, autores expoentes da Ética Animal. Ademais, apresenta-se a necessidade de um esforço do Direito para passar a enxergar o Outro, diferente do humano também enquanto ser sujeito de direitos a partir de compreensões descoloniais da norma, sobretudo no que se refere à Carta Constitucional de 1988 e à lei federal n° 7.173/1983, que dispõe sobre o estabelecimento e funcionamento de jardins zoológicos.

Animal welfare versus animal abolitionism: a comparison of the theories by Peter Singer and Tom Regan and their influence on the Brazilian Federal Constitution

With the emergence of environmental concerns and the awakening regarding animal treatment issues, the anthropocentric paradigm has begun to shift, causing many countries to review their position on the legal status of animals. Within the movement for animals, there are two mainly followed philosophical theories: the animal welfare perspective, which has Peter Singer as its leading author, and the animal rights theory, likewise known as the abolitionist movement, with Tom Regan as its central theorist. Utilizing the method of comparative analysis, this article seeks to analyze each author’s thought process and compare theories, contrasting each viewpoint’s moral and philosophical foundations and which principle each author has determined as most fundamental. The main differences between them will also be compared, as well as their conclusions and effects on society, with a particular focus on their influences on the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988.

A Christian Case for Farmed Animal Welfare

It is now common to blame Christianity for broader society’s general inattention to the needs and comfort of animals in general, and farmed animals in particular. This critique of Christianity claims that certain biblical themes and particular biblical passages form the foundation for an anti-animal position that Christianity has imposed on Christians and on wider Western society. This article concedes that Christianity has often been used to justify exploitation of animals, but argues that it is a mistake to consider Christianity inevitably opposed to concern for animals. After reviewing the views of critics such as Lynn White Jr., Peter Singer, and Tom Regan, the article demonstrates the complexity of interpreting biblical passages and the possibility of readings that affirm the importance of treating animals well. It shows that Christians have indeed been advocates for animals, notably in relation to the first legislation against animal cruelty in the early nineteenth century and the formation of the RSPCA. Finally, it proposes a constructive framework for a Christian ethics of farmed animal welfare that could provide the basis for Christian action to reduce consumption of animals and shift to higher welfare sources of animal products.

Deprivation as Un-Experienced Harm?

Tom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.