scholarly journals Luciano Rocha Santana. La teoría de los derechos animales de Tom Regan: Ampliando las fronteras de la comunidad moral y de los derechos más allá de lo humano - Tirant lo Blanc (Valencia 2018) 339p

2018 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 128
Author(s):  
Carlo Salzani
Keyword(s):  
2014 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Sônia T. FELIPE
Keyword(s):  
De Se ◽  

Apresento, neste artigo, as teses centrais, extraídas da argumentação de<br />Humphry Primatt, elaborada em 1776, em The Duty of Mercy, em defesa da coerência<br />moral humana na consideração da dor e do sofrimento de animais humanos e nãohumanos.<br />Os argumentos de Primatt, críticos à filosofia moral tradicional, por seu<br />antropocentrismo, e radicais no emprego do princípio da igualdade, contrário a<br />todas as formas de discriminação moral, são hoje centrais à ética de Peter Singer, Tom Regan e Richard D. Ryder, e sustentam a proposta de se estabelecer um novo<br />estatuto jurídico para os animais. Se os animais estão sujeitos à inflição de dor e<br />sofrimento, por parte de humanos, devem ser incluídos, como sujeitos de direitos, no<br />âmbito da proteção legal constitucional, tese defendida por Gary L. Francione e<br />Steven M. Wise.


1990 ◽  
Vol 70 (2) ◽  
pp. 313-313
Author(s):  
William French
Keyword(s):  

2019 ◽  
Vol 27 (5-6) ◽  
pp. 469-486
Author(s):  
Külli Keerus ◽  
Mickey Gjerris ◽  
Helena Röcklinsberg

AbstractTom Regan encapsulated his principle of harm as a prima facie direct duty not to harm experiencing subjects of a life. However, his consideration of harm as deprivation, one example of which is loss of freedom, can easily be interpreted as a harm, which may not be experienced by its subject. This creates a gap between Regan’s criterion for moral status and his account of what our duties are. However, in comparison with three basic paradigms of welfare known in nonhuman animal welfare science, Regan’s understanding coheres with a modified version of a feelings-based paradigm: not only the immediate feelings of satisfaction, but also future opportunities to have such feelings, must be taken into account. Such an interpretation is compatible with Regan’s understanding of harm as deprivation. The potential source of confusion, however, lies in Regan’s own possible argumentative mistakes.


Dialogue ◽  
1984 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 669-676 ◽  
Author(s):  
Hugh Lehman

In his previous papers written on the topic of animal rights, Tom Regan argued that on the assumption that certain human beings have moral rights then so do certain animals. Here the argument is carried a stage further; Regan argues that some animals have certain moral rights. For the most part the book is taken up with criticizing alternative views concerning our moral obligations to animals and explaining and defending “The Rights View”. In the final chapter, Regan draws out the implications ofthe rights view. These include arguing for an obligation to be a vegetarian, moral condemnation of hunting and trapping of wild animals as well as of most of the uses of animals for scientific purposes. Animals are not to be used for toxicity tests, in education contexts or in scientific research even though this may produce beneficial consequences for humans and other animals. The book is very clearly written and well argued. It covers all important positions and arguments related t o the question of our moral obligations to animals. It is, I believe, the best book to appear on this subject to date.


Philosophy ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 53 (206) ◽  
pp. 560-561 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth M. Pybus ◽  
Alexander Broadie

In Philosophy 51, October 1976, 471–472, Professor Tom Regan takes ud to task for our attack on Kant's theory concerning the moral status of animals. The ground of Regan's criticism is that ‘… it is clear that Kant does not suppose, as… Broadie and Pybus erroneously assume that he does, that the concept of maltreating an animal, on the one hand, and, on the other, the concept of using an animal as a means, are the same or logically equivalent concepts’ (p. 471). Regan argues that Kant does not say that we should avoid treating animals as a means. Rather, he claims, Kant's view is that we have an indirect duty not to maltreat animals, since in maltreating them we treat, or run the risk of treating, as a mere means rationality in ourselves or in others.


2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-106
Author(s):  
Dorota Probucka

The purpose of my article is to present and analyze the ethical views of Gary Francione – the leading, contemporary representative of the Animal Rights Movement. He built his theory by criticizing the views of two other supporters of the idea of animal liberation: Peter Singer and Tom Regan. In his opinion, neither of these philosophers did not escape from the anthropocentric paradigm binding the moral obligations to animals with the primacy of human interest. Singer believed that only humans have the ability to plan their own future, and only they want to live and extend their own existence. While according to Regan, in conflict situations, respect for human interest should be dominant. Francione agrees that only people understand a deeper meaning of their own existence, but it does not follow that only they want to live and do not want to die. The need to preserve and continue life is not the result of mental states, but it is a consequence of sensitivity – the biological trait which aims to safeguard and continuation of life. According to Francione, if every sensitive creature has an interest in preserving his own life and avoiding suffering it they also have a moral right to life and not being treated in a cruel manner.


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