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2021 ◽  
pp. 155-186
Author(s):  
Christopher Martin

This chapter turns to the question of who should pay for an education system founded on the right to higher education. First, it explains how moral intuitions about fair funding can challenge the claim that higher education should be allocated as an entitlement or primary good. Second, its show how these intuitions are conventionally justified in terms of a distribution’s effects on socioeconomic equality. Third, it argues that there are also liberty-based reasons for the public to fund higher education. Finally, it shows why these liberty-based reasons take on a special significance in the context of the right to higher education, warranting full public funding so long as two other distributive conditions (non-exclusivity and support for diverse conceptions of the good) are satisfied.


2020 ◽  
Vol 11 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-170
Author(s):  
Valerio Napoli

In his reflection on the nature of evil, the Neoplatonic philosopher Proclus affirms that evil itself (to autokakon) is “also beyond the abso­lute non-being” (epekeina kai tou mēdamōs ontos). With this assumption, he intends to reinforce the thesis of the non-existence of absolute evil, conceived as totally separate from good, and contrasted with the collat­eral and parasitic existence of evil mixed with good. He thus maintains a distinction between absolute evil and relative evil, conceived with reference to the distinction between absolute non-being (i.e., nothing­ness) and relative non-being. In Proclus, the thesis of the non-existence of absolute evil is presented as a necessary consequence of the non-dualist theory of evil in the sphere of a protology that identifies the first Principle of all things in the primary Good (identical to the supra-essen­tial One), and which aims to reconcile the absolute primacy of the latter with the presence of evil in some orders of reality.


Uncertainty ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 179-192
Author(s):  
Kostas Kampourakis ◽  
Kevin McCain

A primary good of science is that it allows us to accurately predict what will happen in the future. Knowing what to expect helps alleviate anxiety about the future and allows for good planning. However, although scientific predictions are often very precise and accurate, they are inherently uncertain. In order for a scientific prediction to be certain, several conditions would have to be satisfied. First, it would have to be certain that the universe is deterministic, but this is contested by both philosophers and scientists. Second, it would have to be certain that the actual scientific laws governing the deterministic universe have been identified—this is far from certain. Third, the precise initial conditions that the prediction is drawn from would have to be known with certainty—it is impossible to know these with certainty. Nevertheless, despite the fact that scientific predictions are uncertain, it would be foolish to disregard them.


Bioethics ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 774-775
Author(s):  
Adam James Roberts
Keyword(s):  

2016 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-50 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nuraan Davids

Events such as New York’s 9/11, London’s 7/7, and Paris’ Charlie Hebdohave played dramatic roles in redirecting the focus of multiculturalism in liberal European democracies. Against a backdrop of the “failure of multiculturalism” or “multiculturalism in crisis,” liberal democracies continue to struggle and stumble in their efforts to accommodate minority groups, while simultaneously trying to sustain the primary good of the majority. One stumble appears to be the effort to “emancipate” and “democratize” Muslim women by regulating their dress code. In return, liberal democracies are accused of seeking to expunge their multicultural baggage by pursuing a particular orientation of integrationism, one that disregards selfunderstandings of religious and cultural particularities. By focusing upon this issue, this article explores why multiculturalism in Europe might be perceived as failing in its response to Muslims and Islam. In weighing the increasing levels of fear and insecurity among majority groups within a context of growing social marginalization among minority groups, I argue for a reinvocation of multiculturalism as a dialectical encounter. Such an encounter, based on mutual trust and respect, will lead to the equal citizenship necessary to counter the simmering alienation and skepticism that always threaten to undermine any notion of peaceful co-existence between majority and minority groups.


2015 ◽  
Vol 32 (2) ◽  
pp. 31-50
Author(s):  
Nuraan Davids

Events such as New York’s 9/11, London’s 7/7, and Paris’ Charlie Hebdohave played dramatic roles in redirecting the focus of multiculturalism in liberal European democracies. Against a backdrop of the “failure of multiculturalism” or “multiculturalism in crisis,” liberal democracies continue to struggle and stumble in their efforts to accommodate minority groups, while simultaneously trying to sustain the primary good of the majority. One stumble appears to be the effort to “emancipate” and “democratize” Muslim women by regulating their dress code. In return, liberal democracies are accused of seeking to expunge their multicultural baggage by pursuing a particular orientation of integrationism, one that disregards selfunderstandings of religious and cultural particularities. By focusing upon this issue, this article explores why multiculturalism in Europe might be perceived as failing in its response to Muslims and Islam. In weighing the increasing levels of fear and insecurity among majority groups within a context of growing social marginalization among minority groups, I argue for a reinvocation of multiculturalism as a dialectical encounter. Such an encounter, based on mutual trust and respect, will lead to the equal citizenship necessary to counter the simmering alienation and skepticism that always threaten to undermine any notion of peaceful co-existence between majority and minority groups.


2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandrine Blanc ◽  
Ismael Al-Amoudi

ABSTRACT:This paper re-examines the import of Rawls’s theory of justice for private sector institutions in the face of the decline of the welfare state. The argument is based on a Rawlsian conception of justice as the establishment of a basic structure of society that guarantees a fair distribution of primary goods. We propose that the decline of the welfare state witnessed in Western countries over the past forty years prompts a reassessment of the boundaries of the basic structure in order to include additional corporate institutions. A discussion centered on the primary good of self-respect, but extensible to power and prerogatives as well as income and wealth, examines how the legislator should intervene in private sector institutions to counterbalance any unfairness that results from the decline of the welfare state.


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