Response: Freedom from Pain as a Rawlsian Primary Good

Bioethics ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 30 (9) ◽  
pp. 774-775
Author(s):  
Adam James Roberts
Keyword(s):  
1981 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 303-324 ◽  
Author(s):  
William Lad Sessions ◽  
Keyword(s):  

Author(s):  
Masakazu Matsumoto

This article provides a philosophical foundation for the legitimacy of multicultural education by developing the analyses of Rawlsian political philosophy. For Rawls the most important primary good is that of self-respect, and this can be reinterpreted to make a convincing argument for multicultural education, provided that it has a strong connection to cultural minorities' sense of self-respect. After clarifying this connection, this article addresses the objection raised against the idea of equating multicultural education with a social basis of students' self-respect. It ends with a brief overview of a recent example of multicultural education in Japan.


Uncertainty ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 179-192
Author(s):  
Kostas Kampourakis ◽  
Kevin McCain

A primary good of science is that it allows us to accurately predict what will happen in the future. Knowing what to expect helps alleviate anxiety about the future and allows for good planning. However, although scientific predictions are often very precise and accurate, they are inherently uncertain. In order for a scientific prediction to be certain, several conditions would have to be satisfied. First, it would have to be certain that the universe is deterministic, but this is contested by both philosophers and scientists. Second, it would have to be certain that the actual scientific laws governing the deterministic universe have been identified—this is far from certain. Third, the precise initial conditions that the prediction is drawn from would have to be known with certainty—it is impossible to know these with certainty. Nevertheless, despite the fact that scientific predictions are uncertain, it would be foolish to disregard them.


2013 ◽  
Vol 23 (4) ◽  
pp. 497-525 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sandrine Blanc ◽  
Ismael Al-Amoudi

ABSTRACT:This paper re-examines the import of Rawls’s theory of justice for private sector institutions in the face of the decline of the welfare state. The argument is based on a Rawlsian conception of justice as the establishment of a basic structure of society that guarantees a fair distribution of primary goods. We propose that the decline of the welfare state witnessed in Western countries over the past forty years prompts a reassessment of the boundaries of the basic structure in order to include additional corporate institutions. A discussion centered on the primary good of self-respect, but extensible to power and prerogatives as well as income and wealth, examines how the legislator should intervene in private sector institutions to counterbalance any unfairness that results from the decline of the welfare state.


Author(s):  
Nadia Urbinati

This chapter argues that Giuseppe Mazzini's thought belongs to the tradition of cosmopolitanism insofar as he deems the self-determination of autonomous and democratic nations the precondition for a peaceful international order. Countering the nationalistic interpretation of his thought, and Giovanni Gentile's reading in particular, it maintains that Mazzini, whose political education occurred in the aftermath of the collapse of Napoleon's empire, believed that the individual (as a primary good and the recipient of equal rights) and the nation (as the collective sovereign that has the power of giving individual rights a legal status) were the two modern agents of political and moral resistance against imperial projects. Beginning with the Abbé de Saint–Pierre, Kant, and the Saint–Simonians, the pact of union and the association of autonomous nations became, in a kind of federative covenant of mutual help and cooperation, the language of European democrats and republicans. In the 20th century it was adopted by those jurists who deemed the consolidation of the rule of law and constitutional democracy intermediary and necessary steps towards a global legal order. Mazzini must be interpreted as belonging to this tradition, though in a peculiar way since he was a cosmopolitan not despite, but because of, his advocacy of the principle of nationality.


2021 ◽  
pp. 155-186
Author(s):  
Christopher Martin

This chapter turns to the question of who should pay for an education system founded on the right to higher education. First, it explains how moral intuitions about fair funding can challenge the claim that higher education should be allocated as an entitlement or primary good. Second, its show how these intuitions are conventionally justified in terms of a distribution’s effects on socioeconomic equality. Third, it argues that there are also liberty-based reasons for the public to fund higher education. Finally, it shows why these liberty-based reasons take on a special significance in the context of the right to higher education, warranting full public funding so long as two other distributive conditions (non-exclusivity and support for diverse conceptions of the good) are satisfied.


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