1. Political obligation

This chapter discusses the justifications for political obligation. The most important historical justification for political obligation is what is often called consent theory or contract theory. Consent theorists claim that we should obey the law because we have consented to do so. Meanwhile, the theorist H. L. A. Hart argues that if we accept a benefit, then it is only fair that we should reciprocate and give something back; if we enjoy the protection of police and armies, if we use roads, hospitals, schools, and other government-run services, then we should reciprocate by obeying the law. Other theorists argue that political obligation is something that we are bound by simply for being a member of a political community. If we cannot justify an obligation to obey the law, then we may have to adopt some form of philosophical anarchism — the view that we have no obligation to obey the law.

Godwin, William (1756–1836)

William Godwin is considered the founder of philosophical anarchism. His An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice (1793) contends that although government is a corrupt force in society, perpetuating dependence and ignorance, it will increasingly be rendered impotent by the gradual spread of knowledge. Politics will be displaced by an enlarged morality as truth conquers error and mind subordinates matter. He predicts the end to cooperative activities (which restrain individual freedom), the abandonment of marriage and private property, and increasing longevity and ultimate immortality. Godwin’s moral theory is often described as utilitarian, but he understands pleasure to be inseparable from the development of truth and wisdom through the full and free exercise of private judgment and public discussion. As such, his position is better understood as perfectionist.

Political Obligation

Although it is an ancient and much-discussed problem, political obligation continues to pose challenges to political and legal philosophers. Some of these challenges are conceptual, for they require explanations of what a political obligation is and how it differs from other obligations, duties, or responsibilities. Other challenges concern the practical matters of whether and to what extent political obligations are truly binding on us. In this respect, the foremost challenge is that of anarchism, including the “philosophical anarchism” that has become increasingly influential in recent decades. This chapter aims to meet these challenges by setting out a coherent account of political obligation and providing reason to believe that neither political nor philosophical anarchists have made a satisfactory a priori case against the possibility of a compelling theory of political obligation.

AUTHORITY, LEGITIMACY, AND THE OBLIGATION TO OBEY THE LAW

ABSTRACTAccording to the standard or traditional account, those who hold political authority legitimately have a right to rule that entails an obligation of obedience on the part of those who are subject to their authority. In recent decades, however, and in part in response to philosophical anarchism, a number of philosophers have challenged the standard account by reconceiving authority in ways that break or weaken the connection between political authority and obligation. This paper argues against these revisionist accounts in two ways: first, by pointing to defects in their conceptions of authority; and second, by sketching a fair-play approach to authority and political obligation that vindicates the standard account.

Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism

This chapter examines Robert Paul Wolff’s arguments in In Defense of Anarchism about state authority and individual autonomy, and how plausible they are for philosophical anarchism. According to Wolff, the authority of the modern state cannot be justified because it conflicts with the autonomy of the individual. The presumptive clash between state authority and individual autonomy that Wolff highlights remains central to the philosophical anarchist critique of the state, a position that has gained prominence—and widespread acceptance—in contemporary political philosophy. The rest of this chapter comments on Wolff’s views in more detail, including those concerning compliance with the state, a state’s right to rule, unanimous direct democracy, and majority rule. It also discusses Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s assertion that persons must remain free in obeying the state.

1. Political authority and obligation

This chapter examines the various approaches that political theorists have used to answer questions surrounding political authority and obligation. It considers arguments in favour of political authority and obligation as well as anarchist positions, which claim that we are not obliged to obey the law. To illustrate these themes, the chapter presents a case study that explores military conscription as a problem of political obligation. The concepts of consent, fairness, community, morality, and philosophical anarchism are also discussed. The chapter includes Key Thinkers boxes that feature Plato and Robert Nozick. Based on the arguments that have been put forward, it seems clear that the state is justified at least in so far as it seeks to enforce morality.