A systems framework for remedying dysfunction in US democracy

Democracy often fails to meet its ideals, and these failures may be made worse by electoral institutions. Unwanted outcomes include elite polarization, unresponsive representatives, and the ability of a faction of voters to gain power at the expense of the majority. Various reforms have been proposed to address these problems, but their effectiveness is difficult to predict against a backdrop of complex interactions. Here we outline a path for systems-level modeling to help understand and optimize repairs to US democracy. Following the tradition of engineering and biology, models of systems include mechanisms with dynamical properties that include nonlinearities and amplification (voting rules), positive feedback mechanisms (single-party control, gerrymandering), negative feedback (checks and balances), integration over time (lifetime judicial appointments), and low dimensionality (polarization). To illustrate a systems-level approach, we analyze three emergent phenomena: low dimensionality, elite polarization, and antimajoritarianism in legislatures. In each case, long-standing rules now contribute to undesirable outcomes as a consequence of changes in the political environment. Theoretical understanding at a general level will also help evaluate whether a proposed reform’s benefits will materialize and be lasting, especially as conditions change again. In this way, rigorous modeling may not only shape new lines of research but aid in the design of effective and lasting reform.

The implications of a supreme law Bill of Rights for judicial appointments in New Zealand

<p>The enactment of a supreme law Bill of Rights in New Zealand would have significant implications for the process of appointing judges. This essay contends that the present judicial appointments system is insufficiently transparent and offers too few safeguards to prevent judicial appointments from becoming politicised. It draws on Canada's experience after enacting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to illustrate why reform is needed. Ultimately, it is contended that the adoption of a supreme law Bill of Rights in New Zealand should be accompanied by the creation of a judicial appointments commission.</p>

Appointment, discipline and removal of judges: A comparison of the Swiss and New Zealand judiciaries

<p>This paper gives an overview of the legal system of Switzerland and then compares the judiciaries of Switzerland and New Zealand. As far as Switzerland is concerned, it covers both the system of the Swiss Federation and the systems in the Cantons. After analysing the powers enjoyed by the judiciary via the legislature, the paper examines the appointment of judges in detail. The author explains how in Switzerland openly political and other considerations are weighed in the course of electing judges and how the appointment of lay judges is balanced with an active role of law clerks. In contrast, New Zealand has a proud tradition of apolitical judicial appointments that are made solely based on merit. The author criticises that Swiss judges are elected for a term of office, whereas New Zealand judges enjoy the security of tenure and thus, a greater judicial independence. Lastly, the paper covers the removal and discipline of judges, where the author, while he commends the recent reform in New Zealand, speaks out for a system where the ultimate decision is given to an independent judicial body rather than a parliament.</p>

The implications of a supreme law Bill of Rights for judicial appointments in New Zealand

<p>The enactment of a supreme law Bill of Rights in New Zealand would have significant implications for the process of appointing judges. This essay contends that the present judicial appointments system is insufficiently transparent and offers too few safeguards to prevent judicial appointments from becoming politicised. It draws on Canada's experience after enacting the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to illustrate why reform is needed. Ultimately, it is contended that the adoption of a supreme law Bill of Rights in New Zealand should be accompanied by the creation of a judicial appointments commission.</p>

Appointment, discipline and removal of judges: A comparison of the Swiss and New Zealand judiciaries

<p>This paper gives an overview of the legal system of Switzerland and then compares the judiciaries of Switzerland and New Zealand. As far as Switzerland is concerned, it covers both the system of the Swiss Federation and the systems in the Cantons. After analysing the powers enjoyed by the judiciary via the legislature, the paper examines the appointment of judges in detail. The author explains how in Switzerland openly political and other considerations are weighed in the course of electing judges and how the appointment of lay judges is balanced with an active role of law clerks. In contrast, New Zealand has a proud tradition of apolitical judicial appointments that are made solely based on merit. The author criticises that Swiss judges are elected for a term of office, whereas New Zealand judges enjoy the security of tenure and thus, a greater judicial independence. Lastly, the paper covers the removal and discipline of judges, where the author, while he commends the recent reform in New Zealand, speaks out for a system where the ultimate decision is given to an independent judicial body rather than a parliament.</p>

Guatemala anti-corruption protests will endure

Significance The move, which follows a series of contentious judicial appointments earlier in the year, has heightened concern over the state’s commitment to addressing corruption. President Alejandro Giammattei’s government is set to experience increased pressure domestically and from the US government, which has prioritised tackling corruption in its engagement with Central America. Impacts Protests will disrupt business activity nationwide, further weighing on Guatemala’s post-pandemic economic recovery. Investigations into spending during the pandemic have the potential to spark further unrest. The US curtailment of cooperation with Guatemala raises risks of similar action against Honduras, which has comparable corruption issues.

Re-Thinking Models of Judicial Appointments in the Superior Courts of Pakistan: A Quest for a Better Model

Purpose: Since the inception of the notions of separation of powers and judicial independence, different judicial systems across the globe have devised various models of judicial appointments to meet the standards of the concepts of separation of powers and judicial independence. Methodology: In general, three moles of judicial appointments namely the politicised, the judicialised and the institutionalised models have been used in different jurisdictions. Findings: In Pakistan, since its independence, all these three models have been practiced, however none of these could help to achieve the required standards of judicial independence. The causes of failure perhaps rooted in the attitudes and intentions of the constitutional players rather than internal flaws of these three models. Implications: This article analyses the pros and cons of these models of judicial appointments and the causes of failure of these models in provision of independent and trustworthy judiciary in Pakistan and then proposes a better model with further improvements for judicial appointments in Pakistan.

8. The Judiciary and their Appointment

This chapter provides an introduction to the courts and tribunals judiciary. It discusses the judicial office, judicial appointments, judicial diversity and judicial training. There are different levels of judges within the courts and tribunals, with the senior judiciary comprising the Lord Chief Justice and Heads of Division. The Lord Chief Justice is the Head of the Judiciary. The Head of the Tribunals is the Senior President of the Tribunals. There are also part-time members of the judiciary known either as district judges, recorders, or Deputy High Court Judges depending on which court they sit in. This chapter assesses the similarities and differences between the court judiciary and tribunal judiciary. The quasi- judicial role of magistrates is also considered in this chapter. Discussing them in this chapter allows for their role to be considered and contrasted with that of district judges (magistrates’ courts) who also sit within the magistrates’ court.

Briefly Noted

On Tuesday, April 20, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) ruled in Case C-896/19, Repubblika v. Il-Prim Ministru that Malta's system for appointing judges did not contradict EU law. As reported by JURIST, the ruling went before the national court when Repubblika, an association created to promote the rule of law in Malta, had challenged the procedure, which was provided by the Constitution of Malta. The process in the Maltese Constitution stated that judiciary members are appointed by the president acting under the advisement of the prime minister. However, appointees must satisfy certain conditions and are subject to background checks or other examinations by the Judicial Appointments Committee, whose purpose is to assess candidates and provide feedback to the prime minister. The national court brought this to the CJEU to decide whether this system was constitutional under EU law, specifically under Article 19(1) of the Treaty on European Union, in light of Article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which states that member states must provide conditions for a fair, independent, and impartial trial to ensure true justice. The court reached the conclusion that this practice was not prohibited by EU law because, in order to guarantee conditions of judicial independence and impartiality, procedures must exist to ensure that appointees are free from influence from the legislature and/or executive with regard to judiciary proceedings. The Court found that power of the prime minister to submit a candidate that was not suggested by the Judicial Appointments Committee was not contrary to EU law because of various safeguarding measures included in the Constitution. The Court held: “Inasmuch as the Prime Minister exercises that power only in quite exceptional circumstances and adheres to strict and effective compliance with that obligation to state reasons, that power is not such as to give rise to legitimate doubts concerning the independence of the candidates selected” (para. 71). Therefore, the Court concluded that the national provisions at issue do not give rise to any legitimate uncertainties, or doubts of independence, regarding the chosen judiciary candidates.