How top-down and bottom-up attention modulate risky choice

We examine how bottom-up (or stimulus-driven) and top-down (or goal-driven) processes govern the distribution of attention in risky choice. In three experiments, participants chose between a certain payoff and the chance of receiving a payoff drawn randomly from an array of eight numbers. We tested the hypothesis that initial attention is driven by perceptual properties of the stimulus (e.g., font size of the numbers), but subsequent choice is goal-driven (e.g., win the best outcome). Two experiments in which task framing (goal driven) and font size (stimulus driven) were manipulated demonstrated that payoffs with the highest values and the largest font sizes had the greatest impact on choice. The third experiment added a number in large font to the array, which could not be an outcome of the gamble (i.e., a distractor). Eye movement and choice data indicated that although the distractor attracted attention, it had no influence on option selection. Together with computational modeling analyses, the results suggest that perceptual salience can induce bottom-up effects of overt selection but that the perceived value of information is the crucial arbiter of intentional control over risky choice.

What do laboratory-forgetting paradigms tell us about use-inspired forgetting?

Directed forgetting is a laboratory task in which subjects are told to remember some information and forget other information. In directed forgetting tasks, participants are able to exert intentional control over which information they retain in memory and which information they forget. Forgetting in this task appears to be mediated by intentional control of memory states in which executive control mechanisms suppress unwanted information. Recognition-induced forgetting is another laboratory task in which subjects forget information. Recognizing a target memory induces the forgetting of related items stored in memory. Rather than occurring due to volitional control, recognition-induced forgetting is an incidental by-product of activating items in memory. Here we asked whether intentional directed forgetting or unintentional recognition-induced forgetting is a more robust forgetting effect. While there was a correlation between forgetting effects when the same subjects did both tasks, the magnitude of recognition-induced forgetting was larger than the magnitude of directed forgetting. These results point to practical differences in forgetting outcomes between two commonly used laboratory-forgetting paradigms.

Attitudinal Effects of Stimulus Co-Occurrence and Stimulus Relations: Range and Limits of Intentional Control

Research suggests that evaluations of an object can be simultaneously influenced by (a) the mere co-occurrence of the object with a pleasant or unpleasant stimulus (e.g., mere co-occurrence of object A and negative event B) and (b) the object’s particular relation to the co-occurring stimulus (e.g., object A starts vs. stops negative event B). Using a multinomial modeling approach to disentangle the two kinds of influences on choice decisions, three experiments investigated whether learners can intentionally control the relative impact of stimulus co-occurrence and stimulus relations. An integrative analysis of the data from the three experiments ( N = 1,154) indicate that incentivized instructions to counteract effects of stimulus co-occurrence by focusing on stimulus relations increased the impact of stimulus relations without affecting the impact of stimulus co-occurrence. Implications for evaluative learning, intentional control, and public policy are discussed.

Functional requirements of intentional control over the integrated cortico-thalamo-cortical and basal ganglia systems using neural computations

Large scale brain models encompassing cortico-cortical, thalamo-cortical and basal ganglia processing are fundamental to understand the brain as an integrated system in healthy and disease conditions but are complex to analyze and interpret. Neuronal processes are typically segmented by region and modality in order to explain an experimental observation at a given scale, but integrative frameworks linking scales and modalities are scarce. Here, we present a set of functional requirements used to evaluate the recently developed large-scale brain model against a learning task involving coordinated learning between cortical and sub-cortical systems. The original Information Based Exchange Brain model (IBEx) is decomposed into functionally relevant subsystems, and each subsystem is analyzed and tuned independently and with regard to its relevant functional requirements. Intermediate conclusions are made for each subsystems according to the constraints imposed by these requirements. Subsystems are then re-introduced into the global framework. The relationship between the global framework and phenotypes associated with Huntington’s disease is then discussed and the framework considered in the context of other state-of-the-art integrative brain models.

Consciousness, Concepts and Natural Kinds

We have various everyday measures for identifying the presence of consciousness, such as the capacity for verbal report and the intentional control of behavior. However, there are many contexts in which these measures are difficult (if not impossible) to apply, and even when they can be applied one might have doubts as to their validity in determining the presence/absence of consciousness. Everyday measures for identifying consciousness are particularly problematic when it comes to ‘challenging cases’—human infants, people with brain damage, nonhuman animals, and AI systems. There is a pressing need to identify measures of consciousness that can be applied to challenging cases. This paper explores one of the most promising strategies for identifying and validating such measures—the natural-kind strategy. The paper is in two broad parts. Part I introduces the natural-kind strategy, and contrasts it with other influential approaches in the field. Part II considers a number of objections to the approach, arguing that none succeeds.

Tracking selective rehearsal and active inhibition of memory traces in directed forgetting

SummarySelectively remembering or forgetting newly encountered information is essential for goal-directed behavior. It is still an open question, however, whether intentional forgetting is an active process based on the inhibition of unwanted memory traces or whether it occurs passively through reduced recruitment of selective rehearsal [1,2]. Here we show that intentional control of memory encoding relies on both, enhanced active inhibition and decreased selective rehearsal, and that these two processes can be separated in time and space. We applied representational similarity analysis (RSA [3]) and timefrequency analysis to EEG data during an item-method directed forgetting experiment [4]. We identified neural signatures of both the intentional suppression and the voluntary upregulation of item-specific representations. Successful active forgetting was associated with a downregulation of item-specific representations in an early time window, 500ms after the instruction. This process was initiated by an increase in oscillatory alpha (8-13 Hz) power, a well-established signature of neural inhibition [5,6], in occipital brain areas. During a later time window, 1500ms after the cue, intentional forgetting was associated with reduced employment of active rehearsal processes, as reflected by an attenuated upregulation of item-specific representations as compared to intentionally encoded items. Our data show that active inhibition and selective rehearsal are two separate mechanisms whose consecutive employment allows for a voluntary control of memory formation.

The sensory representation of causally controlled objects

SummaryIntentional control over external objects is informed by our sensory experience of them. To study how causal relationships are learned and effected, we devised a brain machine interface (BMI) task utilising wide-field calcium signals. Mice learned to entrain activity patterns in arbitrary pairs of cortical regions to guide a visual cursor to a target location for reward. Brain areas that were normally correlated could be rapidly reconfigured to exert control over the cursor in a sensory feedback-dependent manner. Higher visual cortex was more engaged when expert but not naïve animals controlled the cursor. Individual neurons in higher visual cortex responded more strongly to the cursor when mice controlled it than when they passively viewed it, with the greatest response boosting as the cursor approached target location. Thus, representations of causally-controlled objects are sensitive to intention and proximity to the subject’s goal, potentially strengthening sensory feedback to allow more fluent control.

Portrayals of Mind

This essay offers readings of episodes from Crime and Punishment, in particular Raskolnikov’s receipt of the letter from his mother and his discussions with Zametov and with Porfiry Petrovich, with a view to identifying how Dostoevsky depicts the nature of the mind. In Dostoevsky’s picture, it is shown, mental privacy is itself socially grounded and contextual, and subject to destabilizing self-descriptions; mental contents are knowable only through our discursive connection to others; and the expressive potential of language far exceeds anyone’s intentional control. Dostoevsky’s presentation of the mind is compared to the philosophical views of Wollheim, Moran, and Murdoch.