Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity

This chapter argues that the commonsense intuitionist particularist response to radical skepticism laid out in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight does not fall prey to the Problem of Easy Knowledge, which can also be called the ‘Problem of Epistemic Circularity.’ The core concern here is that one can’t rationally rely on a belief source to justify the belief that that very belief source is trustworthy or reliable because that would be too easy, as well as circular. The chapter concedes that this sort of epistemic circularity is often problematic, yet argues that this is not true in general, but only in certain specified circumstances. It explains how epistemic circularity (which is disparaged largely on the basis of intuitions) can be defended both by arguments and by intuitions. And it uses these defenses to respond to the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity and to explain why it seems threatening even though it isn’t.

The Problem of Easy Rationality

This chapter discusses a version of Cohen’s problem of easy knowledge, arguing for a novel resolution. A brief history of the problem is presented, and then a systematized version of it is developed. Possible solutions are examined, and denying the existence of ampliative inference is defended as a possible solution. It is explained how this is not as bad as it sounds. The chapter also discusses the relation between this solution and one of the arguments against Factualism presented in chapter 4. It is explained that those arguments against Factualism remain in place even if one rejects the possibility of ampliative inference. Finally, the issue of whether and how the problem of easy rationality applies to Experientialism is discussed.

Being Rational and Being Right

This book defends a cluster of theses related to the rationality of action and belief. The starting point is that rational action requires rational belief but tolerates false belief. From there, it argues for a novel account of empirical evidence according to which said evidence consists of the content of undefeated experiences. This view, “Experientialism,” differs from the two main views of empirical evidence on offer nowadays: Factualism, according to which our evidence is what we know, and Psychologism, according to which our experiences themselves are evidence. The book argues that Experientialism fares better than these rival views in explaining different features of rational belief and action. The discussion is embedded in a Bayesian framework, and the book also examines the problem of normative requirements, the easy knowledge problem, and how Experientialism compares to Evidentialism, Reliabilism, and Comesaña’s own (now superseded) Evidentialist Reliabilism.

Epistemic Entitlement

This volume collects new work on epistemic entitlement partly motivated by Tyler Burge’s and Crispin Wright’s seemingly identical distinctions between two forms of warrant: entitlement and justification. But despite nomenclature, Burge and Wright are engaged in different projects. Recognizing that we cannot provide a non-question begging evidential reply to the sceptic, Wright seeks an a priori, non-evidential, rational right to accept and claim to know cornerstone propositions. He calls these rights epistemic entitlements. Epistemic justifications are evidential warrants, contributors to knowledge. Tyler Burge does not engage the sceptic. Instead, he assumes knowledge and investigates its structure. Burge’s two core notions are warrant and reasons. Warrants are exercises of belief-forming competences that are good routes to truth and knowledge. A reason is a proposition with a mode that contributes to an explanation of the belief-worthiness of a belief for the individual. A justification is a warrant with reasons. An entitlement is a warrant without reasons. The volume begins with a substantial chapter by Burge. Burge discusses the functional structure of epistemic norms, the case against internalism, clairvoyance and demon world cases, Moore’s anti-sceptical argument, so-called “easy-knowledge”, and Bayesianism in perceptual psychology and objections from Bayesianism to moderate foundationalism. The other chapters by leading figures in epistemology further advance our understanding and possibility of both forms of epistemic entitlement and related topics central to ongoing research in epistemology.

The Puzzles of Easy Knowledge and of Higher-Order Evidence

The goal of this chapter is to provide a unified solution to two widely discussed epistemological puzzles: the puzzle of easy knowledge and the puzzle of higher-order evidence. The chapter begins by setting out each of these two puzzles. It then briefly surveys some of the proposed solutions to each puzzle, none of which generalizes to the other. Finally, the chapter argues that the two puzzles arise because of a widespread confusion concerning the relation of substantive and structural constraints of rationality: or, in the epistemic domain, the relation of evidence and coherence. Clearing up this confusion allows us to clear up both puzzles at once.

Circles, Epistemic and Benign

If we reject level-crossing principles, some apparently circular reasoning becomes licensed. This looks like a problem for normative externalism. This chapter responds to the problem. The response takes some time, because it turns out there are many different ways to understand what it is for reasoning to be circular. The ultimate argument is that for every such way, either it is not problematic, or normative externalism does not license it. But there is no quick proof of this; each way to understand circular reasoning has to be treated separately. The chapter ends with a discussion of the Problem of Easy Knowledge, and of the norms for proper testing of measuring devices.