Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma

2016 ◽  
Vol 47 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-232 ◽  
Author(s):  
Guido Melchior
Keyword(s):  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Knowledge Closure

scholarly journals Epistemic levels, the Problem of Easy Knowledge and Skepticism

2009 ◽  
Vol 54 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Tito Flores
Keyword(s):  
Easy Knowledge

O problema do conhecimento fácil tem sido definido na literatura epistemológica contemporânea com um problema que nasce de duas formas distintas. O propósito deste ensaio é mostrar que essas supostas maneiras diferentes de gerar o mesmo problema em verdade originam dois problemas distintos, que requerem respostas distintas. Um deles está relacionado à aquisição fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento de primeira-ordem e o outro à aquisição fácil (inaceitável) de conhecimento de segunda-ordem. Além disso, é apresentada a maneira como o infinitismo, a teoria epistêmica segundo a qual as razões que justificam uma opinião devem ser infinitas em número e não-repetidas, pode lidar com cada um desses problemas.

WHAT THE INTERNALIST SHOULD SAY TO THE TORTOISE

Episteme ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 209-217 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Fumerton
Keyword(s):  
Infinite Regress ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Inferential Justification ◽  
Justified Belief ◽  
Upper Limit ◽  
Short Piece ◽  
Vicious Regress

Carroll's (1895) short piece “What the Tortoise said to Achilles” in many ways anticipates issues that arise in a number of contemporary controversies. One might argue, for example, that initially plausible attempts to deal with the problem of easy knowledge will land one in the unfortunate position of Achilles who followed the Tortoise down a road that leads to vicious infinite regress. Or consider the conditions required for inferential justification. For idealized inferential justification, I have defended (1995, 2004, 2006) the view that to be justified in believing P on the basis of E one needs to be not only justified in believing E, but justified in believing that E makes probable P (where entailment is the upper limit of making probable). And again, critics have argued that such a strong requirement fails to learn the lesson that Achilles should have been taught by the Tortoise. Even more generally, one might well argue that strong access internalists will need to deal with a variation of Carroll's puzzle even for their accounts of non-inferential justification. In this paper I'll examine these controversies with a mind to reaching a conclusion about just exactly how one can accept intellectually demanding conditions on justified belief without encountering vicious regress.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 414-416
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Misleading Evidence ◽  
Tacit Assumption ◽  
Knowledge Closure

The hangman/surprise-examination/prediction paradox is solved. It is not solved by denying knowledge closure (although knowledge closure is false). It is not solved by denying KK or denying that knowing p implies other iterated knowing attitudes (although these are false). It is not solved by misleading evidence causing the students to lose knowledge because students cannot lose knowledge this way. It is solved by showing that a tacit assumption (what is being said to the students/prisoner is informative) is overlooked and that inferences by contradiction are invalid if assumptions are left out. The phenomenology of the surprise-exam paradox is explored to explain why this solution has been missed. Crucial is that in many cases the students/prisoner know(s) there will be a surprise exam/execution because of an inference from what the teacher/judge meant to say, and not directly by the literal application of what he did say.

Analysis of Knowledge Fusion System Model Based on Ontology and Multi-Agent Theory

2014 ◽  
Vol 989-994 ◽  
pp. 1505-1508
Author(s):  
Li Lei ◽  
Man Zhang
Keyword(s):  
System Model ◽  
Fusion System ◽  
Easy Knowledge ◽  
Agent Theory ◽  
Knowledge Fusion ◽  
Model Based ◽  
Multi Agent ◽  
Effective Use ◽  
Analysis Of Knowledge

Information increase rapidly in recent years which make the effective use of information is not that easy. Knowledge fusion can improve the semantic accuracy and specification of knowledge; it’s a useful way to make the mass disordered information integrated and easy to be recognized for users. The paper proposed a knowledge fusion system model based on ontology and multi-agent theory to meet with the user’ changing needs at any time.

Usage Challenges to Fallibilism

2020 ◽  
pp. 343-385
Author(s):  
Jody Azzouni
Keyword(s):  
Necessary Truths ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Knowledge Closure

A definition of fallibility shows that agents are fallible about necessary truths. It is shown that fallibility of agents implies a denial of parity reasoning. Moorean paradoxes appear to undercut fallibility, but they are due entirely to the factivity of “know.” Kripke’s dogmatism paradox is explained: the key is recognizing that knowledge fallibility applies to the knowledge that all evidence against something one knows is misleading. That we do not know we will lose a lottery is denied. Fallibility shows this. And that people argue over this also indicates this. Knowledge closure fails because of fallibility; so does aggregation of assumptions. Vagueness shows why debates about whether we know outcomes of lotteries before winning tickets are drawn are irresolvable. Irrational penny reasoning is analyzed; it applies to nonfactive attitudes such as being really really sure. Preface paradoxes are explained. That it is sometimes rational to believe contradictory propositions is explained.

Transmission arguments against knowledge closure are still fallacious

Synthese ◽  
2014 ◽  
Vol 191 (12) ◽  
pp. 2617-2632
Author(s):  
Tim Kraft
Keyword(s):  
Knowledge Closure
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