Vulnerability of Religious Minority in Indonesia due to the Implementation of the Blasphemy Law

The establishment and application of blasphemy law in Indonesia is generally under the justification of maintaining public order, preventing violent-conflict, and protecting the enjoyment of the right to freedom of religion. However, when the blasphemy law should be applied to adjudicate an internal religious conflict among the sects then the debate arises on whose interpretation and how it will be referred by the State authorities as demarcation or exclusionary standard to distinguish between the deviant religion and legally valid ones. Issues on the fragility of fair and impartial trial as protection to the existence of religious minority group therefore becomes very central due to the implementation and application of blasphemy law will be always influenced by power relation among the involved parties. This paper is intended to explore Tajul Muluk case that has been exhaustively ruled by all level of Indonesian courts in order to reveal complex roles of judiciary in applying service-conception of blasphemy law into first-order reason of person’s faith. Source-based legal reason of the court which merely refers to the historical or social facts as texted in the blasphemy law with prejudice to human rights’ moral test has been paradoxically widen penumbra of legal rule to uncertainty that undermines access to justice for religious minority group especially when addressing social conflict.

Respecting the GDPR in Online Interviewed Focus Groups

Since March 2020 the Corona virus has limited personal encounters due to social distancing measures. Thus, many data collection techniques relying on face-to-face interaction, like interviews or Focus Groups (FG), are now being practised in online environments. Such change requires the implementation of innovative measures to comply with Regulation EU 2016/679 (GDPR) and obey national data protection laws. Processing personal data of voluntary participants has to have a lawful ground and a clear purpose behind it. Moreover, the researcher has to respect legal requirements and principles for processing personal data, provide the participants with information about the research procedure and apply security measures to avoid risks to the rights and freedoms of individuals. This process has to apply to any interaction mediated by Web-Conferencing Systems (WCS). The purpose of this paper is to describe the legal requirements for conducting online interviews or FG under social distancing conditions. The project of reference for the application of these requirements is the EU Horizon2020 HELIOS project consisting of the development of a decentralised social media platform. Lay summary At universities or in industry researchers can interview people personally to test, for instance, the use of a specific technology. The objective is to collect data for future improvements. In 2020 people all over the world found themselves in a pandemic. The Covid-19 limited social meetings with beloved ones and also restricted the work of scientific researchers. Individual or group interviews could not take place in presence. Thus, a solution was seen in online conferencing platforms such as Zoom. Modifying the space and the way in which an interview takes place poses some legal challenges regarding data protection. Such conversations with individuals always have to apply European and national data protection laws. Among other things, this means that there needs to be a specific legal reason to process personal data and a specific purpose behind the interview. Additionally, the researcher has to inform participants about all the legal terms, legal guarantees and research procedure. All this applies as well if online conferencing platforms are used. In this article, you can find a description of the necessary legal steps to develop online interviews with individuals or focus groups and fulfil European data protection requirements.

Critical Review of Domestic Violence as Reason for Divorce (Comparison of Divorce Laws in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Maldives)

The phenomenon of domestic violence is on the rise every year and often puts a marriage into divorce. Divorce on the grounds of domestic violence frequently appears in the courtroom of Religious Courts in Indonesia as stipulated in Article 19 letter d PP No. 9 of 1975. It affirms that one party committing cruelty or severe persecution that endangers another party can be the legal reason for divorce. And then what about other Muslim countries? This research is library research with a descriptive-analytical method using a juridical normative approach. It found that domestic violence is accommodated as one of the reasons for divorce in family law in Indonesia, Malaysia (Negeri Sembilan, Persekutuan Pulau Pinang, Selangor dan Johor), and the Maldives. However, there are differences in granting the right for filing a divorce because of domestic violence. Divorce law in Indonesia and Malaysia enables both husband and wife to file for divorce because of domestic violence while Maldives law only enables the wife to do so. Fenomena kekerasan dalam rumah tangga selalu meningkat setiap tahunnya dan seringkali menjadi sebab perceraian. Perceraian karena kekerasan dalam rumah tangga sering muncul di ruang sidang pengadilan agama di Indonesia. Ini sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 19 huruf d PP No. 9 Tahun 1975 bahwa salah satu pihak yang melakukan kekejaman atau penganiayaan berat yang membahayakan pihak lain dapat menjadi alasan hukum terjadinya perceraian. Lalu bagaimana dengan di negara-negara Muslim lainnya? Penelitian ini termasuk dalam penelitian pustaka (library research) yang bersifat deskriptif analitis dengan pendekatan normatif yuridis. Dalam penelitian ini diperoleh temuan bahwa kekerasan dalam rumah tangga diakomodir sebagai alasan perceraian dalam hukum keluarga di Indonesia, Malaysia (Negeri sembilan, Persekutuan Pulau Pinang, Selangor dan Johor), maupun Maladewa. Hanya saja, terdapat perbedaan dalam hak mengajukan perceraian karena kekerasan dalam rumah tangga. Hukum perceraian di Indonesia dan Malaysia membolehkan kedua belah pihak untuk mengajukan perceraian karena kekerasan dalam rumah tangga, sementara hukum Maladewa hanya memungkinkan pihak istri.

DISKURSUS SOSIOLOGI PUTUSAN MAHKAMAH KONSTITUSI NOMOR 46/PUU-VIII/2010

The Constitutional Court Decision Number 46 / PUU-VIII / 2010 annulled the provisions of Article 43 paragraph (1) of the Marriage Law because it contradicts the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and does not have binding legal force. The legal reason behind the rechtfinding is to emphasize that children born outside of marriage have the right to legal protection. This research was conducted with the aim of knowing the impact of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 46 / PUU-VIII / 2010 on one of the judges' judicial duties. This study uses a socio-legal approach with data collection techniques for study documents of literature materials. Based on the results of the analysis of the Constitutional Court Decision Number 46 / PUU-VIII / 2010, it does not contradict and intersect with the sociological discourse in accordance with the argumentum a contrario method. Then have coherence between the parental or bilateral kinship system with the Constitutional Court Decision No. 46 / PUU-VIII / 2010 in its application in Indonesia. This condition demands the intellectuality of Judges who are required to think on a broad scale and consider other disciplines in their legal findings.

The Standard Concept of the Advocate Profession in Implementing Professional Advocate

The law stipulates what should or should be done and what is prohibited. The principle of a rule of law requires, among other things, the guarantee of equality for everyone before the law (equality before the law). Therefore, the Constitution also stipulates that everyone has the right to recognition, guarantee, protection, and legal certainty that is just equal treatment before the law. From a philosophical point of view, the Legis standard ratio of the advocate profession is to guarantee the protection of human rights by the conceptual objectives of the state of law. Meanwhile, the legal reason is to guarantee legal protection. both for the benefit of the client and the benefit of the advocate himself, so that disputes between advocates and clients can be avoided which are built based on trust.

The Destruction of Legal Reason: Lessons from the Past

The legal predicament of today in Europe and beyond takes the form of a devaluation of the meaning of legality, constitutionality and, of the rule of law. What we are dealing with is yet another crisis of both the tradition of the Rechtsstaat in continental setting and, more broadly, of liberal legality. While this disruption within the sphere of the law seems to mirror the reshuffling in established politics that took place over the last twenty years, it traces back to central jurisprudential questions that have made the substance of crucial debates during the interwar and have fashioned both the field of constitutional theory of the continent and our jurisprudential apparatus for approaching the nexus between law and politics. In this article I argue that the apparent uchronia that the current status of the law opens in relation to past theoretical questions that were seeking to ground legality, is neither a simple by-product of a Zeigeist oversaturated by appeals to procedural democracy or for returns to sovereign power, nor a mere regression to past juridico-political settings. It is a historical development that has been dormant for the past decades, yet has slowly undermined legal thought and praxis. Revisiting, as a matter of historical and jurisprudential inquiry, the context and the content of this original opposition between liberal legality and its enemy, is a way of understanding what constructs our own contemporary situation.

Cancellation of Land Certificate Based on The Court Decision in Indonesian Legal System

Judge's decision has many benefits in achieving legal certainty, including in the case of the cancellation of certificate of ownership, but for the cancellation of the certificate must be canceled through the Land Office, because legally formally the cancellation is not enough with a court decision only, based on the Regulation of the National Land Agency Number 11 of 2016 concerning Settlement of Land Cases there are rules on how to revoke certificates of ownership based on court decisions that have permanent legal force. Object of research is how the to cancel the certificates of land based on court decisions that have permanent legal force, then the legal status of certificates of ownership rights that have not been canceled based on decisions that have permanent legal force. The cancellation certificates of land based on court decisions that have legal force must still be carried out based on the qualifications of Article 49 of Law Number 11 of 2016. The legal reason for refusing to cancel the certificate is to be qualified according to Article 49 paragraph 2 and Article 58 of Law Number 11 In 2016. The status of the certificate that has not been canceled, then legally formally it still belongs to the party listed on the certificate so that legally transferring rights can still be carried out on behalf of the parties listed on the certificate. The suggestion in this research is that the process of canceling the certificate is by requesting the determination of the court to cancel the certificate contained in the object of the case so that a formal juridical cancellation can be carried out at the Land Office based on Law No. 11 of 2016.