Promotion of Green Technology under Different Environmental Policies

In this paper, I develop a two-stage game of pollution abatement technology adoption in a Cournot oligopoly to investigate a firm’s decision to adopt pollution abatement technology. In particular, I study the adoption incentives and welfare implications of popular environmental policies, namely emission fees and quotas. Tradeable permits result in identical outcomes to emission fees. Within each policy regime, the conditions for Nash equilibria are identified where both firms invest in the green technology, neither firm invests in the technology, or only one firm invests. The following extensions are also analyzed: asymmetric adoption costs, increase in the marginal cost of production from adoption, and a type-dependent fee where adoption reduces the emission fee. Social welfare under an emission fee is identical to that under a quota. However, when policy is (not) stringent, firms are more willing to adopt expensive technology under a fee (quota) than under a quota (fee, respectively).

Hybridity, possibility: Degrees of marketization in tradeable permit systems

Tradeable permit systems for allocating rights to impact the environment have become an important part of the regulatory toolkit over the last 35 years. Informed by elegant neoclassical economic thought, these regulatory markets promise lowest-cost environmental benefit by delegating decision-making to market participants. This article examines tradeable permits systems, including cap-and-trade carbon markets, tradeable water quality permits, and individual transferable quotas for fisheries, to understand the actual outcomes of attempts to transfer environmental governance to markets. Drawing on heterodox economic thought and the neoliberal natures literature, this article examines the institutional forms tradeable permit systems engender in conjunction with a neoclassical definition of ‘market’ to provide an internal critique of environmental marketization. In general, tradeable permit systems do not facilitate highly liquid financial markets that might signal the increasing importance of regulatory markets as an accumulation strategy for capital. Instead, market-based regulation tends to behave rather differently, acting as performance standards, quotas, or environmental taxes. The article concludes by reflecting on the political possibilities afforded by the recognition that regulatory markets, for the most part, bear little resemblance to high-flying financial markets.

Modelli economici di allocazione delle risorse idriche: l'analisi del mercato cileno dei water rights

Market instruments have been often proposed with the aim of improving the efficient allocation of use rights over natural resources. This article analyzes the potential of market mechanisms in the field of water resources and focuses attention on the experience of Chile, one of the few cases in which water markets have been implemented on a wide scale. Evidence from the Chilean case is discussed in order to verify theoretical hypotheses and to outline the potential benefits but also the many drawbacks of these instruments.Key words: Water policy, water markets, tradeable permits.JEL classifications: Q25, Q58.Parole chiave: Risorse idriche, mercati ambientali, permessi trasferibili.