SMART: A new implementation of Schwarzschild’s Orbit Superposition technique for triaxial galaxies and its application to an N-body merger simulation

We present SMART, a new 3D implementation of the Schwarzschild Method and its application to a triaxial N-body merger simulation. SMART fits full line-of-sight velocity distributions (LOSVDs) to determine the viewing angles, black hole, stellar and dark matter (DM) masses and the stellar orbit distribution of galaxies. Our model uses a 5D orbital starting space to ensure a representative set of stellar trajectories adaptable to the integrals-of-motion space and it is designed to deal with non-parametric stellar and DM densities. SMART’s efficiency is demonstrated by application to a realistic N-body merger simulation including supermassive black holes which we model from five different projections. When providing the true viewing angles, 3D stellar luminosity profile and normalized DM halo, we can (i) reproduce the intrinsic velocity moments and anisotropy profile with a precision of $\sim 1\%$ and (ii) recover the black hole mass, stellar mass-to-light ratio and DM normalization to better than a few percent accuracy. This precision is smaller than the currently discussed differences between initial-stellar-mass functions and scatter in black hole scaling relations. Further tests with toy models suggest that the recovery of the anisotropy in triaxial galaxies is almost unique when the potential is known and full LOSVDs are fitted. We show that orbit models even allow the reconstruction of full intrinsic velocity distributions, which contain more information than the classical anisotropy parameter. Surprisingly, the orbit library for the analysed N-body simulation’s gravitational potential contains orbits with net rotation around the intermediate axis that is stable over some Gyrs.

Capacity Constraints and Horizontal Merger Effects

This article examines how capacity constraints affect horizontal mergers. Binding capacity constraints for merging firms may mitigate merger price effects, but capacity constraints for nonmerging firms may either amplify or mitigate such effects. The presence of capacity constraints for both the merging and nonmerging firms in a market further complicates the analysis of merger price effects. Capacity constraints may also confound the relationship between market concentration and merger price effects. In addition, capacity constraints affect market definition analysis and analytical tools such as merger simulation and upward pricing pressure indexes. Analyzing the effects of capacity constraints on mergers continues to be a challenge for merger reviews.

THE PROFITABILITY AND RISK EFFECTS OF RUSSIAN BANKING INSTITUTIONS’ INVOLVEMENT IN BANCASSURANCE: MERGER SIMULATION METHODOLOGY

This paper presents the methodology taken to evaluate the potential profitability and risk effects of Russian banking institutions’ involvement in bancassurance. An original methodology is applied, which was developed by Boyd and Graham, to conduct merger simulations between commercial banks and insurance companies. The methodology is based on mergers between firms, like the accounting principle of consolidation by pooling. This principle entails summing up the balance-sheet indicators of previously independent firms to simulate a hypothetical merger.

Does Merger Simulation Work? Evidence from the Swedish Analgesics Market

We analyze a large merger in the Swedish market for analgesics (painkillers). The merging firms raised prices by 40 percent, and some outsiders raised prices by more than 10 percent. We confront these changes with predictions from a merger simulation model. With basic supply side assumptions, the models correctly or moderately underpredict the merging firms' price increase. However, they predict a larger price increase for the smaller firm, which was not the case in practice, and they underpredict the outsiders' responses. We consider several supply side explanations: a plausible cost increase after the merger and the possibility of partial collusion. (JEL C63, D22, G34, L11, L25, L65)

Quantitative Methoden der Fusionskontrolle

Seit einigen Jahren werden bei Fusionskontrollverfahren international verstärkt neue Methoden der quantitativen ökonomischen Analyse angewandt. Mit diesen Verfahren können neue Argumente Einzug in Fusionskontrollentscheidungen erhalten und traditionelle Ansätze der Fusionskontrolle bereichern. Dabei basieren die Verfahren verstärkt auf betriebs- und volkswirtschaftlichen Daten und Methoden. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt daher diese neuen Methoden, den UPP-Test, den GUPPI-Test, den IPR-Test und Merger-Simulationsverfahren vor und erläutert ihre Eignung für Fusionskontrollentscheidungen. Dabei wird ein Vergleich der Verfahren hinsichtlich ihrer Einsetzbarkeit vorgenommen. Schließlich werden bisherige Anwendungsfälle vorgestellt. In recent years innovative quantitative methods were introduced in international merger control procedures, giving rise to a stronger focus on economic theory and managerial data. Therefore, in this article these new methods, the UPP-Test, the GUPPI-Test, the IPR-Test and merger simulations are discussed and evaluated. One particular focus of this analysis is the suitability of these tests given the restrictions of typical merger control procedures. Keywords: pricing pressure, merger simulation, diversion ratio