Market Entry in Public Procurement

This study analyzed market entry timing based on the procurement data of construction works of the eight Regional Development Bureaus of Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism. After reviewing key aspects, a regression analysis was performed on the possible factors leading to entry. We found that when an efficient company enters the market, the number of bids is large and there are many tender participants, regardless of the previous bid rate and predetermined planned price trend.

At Nash equilibrium when new market competitions appear?

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the dynamics of a coordinate monopoly with established, risk-neutral firms; how these firms compete by adjusting prices; and when new competition(s) might enter the market with expectations of making more profits than any of the incumbents. Design/methodology/approach All results are established on the intuition of systems research and the concept of Nash equilibria of game theory. Findings Established results include how in a developed marketplace, risk neutrality would lead to stagnation in profits and irrational decision on pricing, and a sufficient and necessary condition under which new competition(s) would enter, although the market is coordinately monopolized. Research limitations/implications Conclusions presented are initial results in the direction of research. More real-life-like, asymmetrical conditions need to be considered to see what variations of similar results could hold true. Practical implications Presented are an operational aspect on how to compete although the consequent level of profits might not change much or any at all and how some of the key issues on market entry timing are theoretically resolved. Social implications This work indicates that for the minimum objective of business survival, existing firms, no matter how established, have to without any choice participate in market competition and look for new market opportunities. Originality/value Other than the established thought-provoking results, this work is the first of its kind. It organically combines recent achievements of systems research with game theory to explore issues of marketing, market entry timing and the dynamics of business firms’ behaviors.