Empirical Relationships Among Five Types of Well-Being

Philosophers, psychologists, economists, and other social scientists continue to debate the nature of human well-being. The authors argue that this debate centers around five main conceptualizations of well-being: hedonic well-being, life satisfaction, desire fulfillment, eudaimonia, and non-eudaimonic objective list well-being. Although each type of well-being is conceptually different, this chapter addresses the question of whether they are empirically distinguishable. The authors first developed and validated a measure of desire fulfillment and then examined associations between this new measure and several other well-being measures. In addition, they explored associations among all five types of well-being and found high correlations among all measures of well-being. However, correlations generally did not approach unity even when correcting for unreliability. Furthermore, correlations between well-being and related constructs (e.g., demographics, personality) depended on the type of well-being measured. The authors conclude that empirical findings based on one type of well-being measure may not generalize to all types of well-being.

Defending a Hybrid of Objective List and Desire Theories of Well-Being

This chapter extends previous work by the author on a view of human well-being that is a hybrid of objective list theories and desire theories. Though some of the chapter’s content traverses old ground, much is new—not in terms of ultimate conclusions, but rather in terms of routes toward these ultimate conclusions and certain implications of these ultimate conclusions (e.g., implications concerning the measurement of well-being). There are two different visions of what human beings are that the author privileges and attempts to synthesize: first, a broadly Aristotelian vision that pushes us toward an objective list theory and, second, a vision of humans as unique individuals with different sets of intrinsic desires, where this desire-focused vision is itself informed by Jacques Lacan and his view that each human self is constituted by a particular and dynamic chains-of-signifiers-plus-desire-flow structure.

Ye Cannot Serve God and Mammon

This final chapter begins by articulating a particular conception of the virtue of obedience and detailing its four components—humility, restraint, response, and love—and by showing how they work together both to nurture an abiding and deeply seated pro-attitude towards uniting one’s will with God’s will and also to create and maintain a robust and stable set of dispositions aimed at succeeding in this aim. It then illustrates the virtue of obedience in action, discusses its relation to happiness, and remarks on the role of perseverance, the difficult mission of anyone who commits to acquiring and developing this virtue in life. A refinement to the objective-list theories of well-being (or flourishing) is then proposed, followed by a formulation and defense of a new objective-list theory that attempts to state the conditions of receptivity in a subject in addition to identifying the range of welfare goods in the world. The virtue of obedience, it is argued, is not only one among many welfare goods, but plays a unique role vis-à-vis the other goods on the list, insofar as it serves as the priming condition under which they can realize the full extent of their value in the subject in which they manifest. Finally, the most worrisome aspects of the views defended in this book are identified, sympathetically presented with force and fairness, and addressed.

Fallenness and Flourishing

This book opens with defenses of the philosophy of pessimism, first on secular grounds and then again on distinctively Christian grounds with reference to the fallenness of human beings. It then details traditional Christian reasons for optimism with which this philosophy of pessimism can be qualified. Yet even among those who accept the general religious worldview underlying this optimism, many nevertheless willfully resist the efforts required to cooperate with God and instead pursue happiness and well-being (or flourishing) on their own power. On the assumption that we can acquire knowledge in such matters, arguments are presented in favor of objective-list theories of well-being and the Psychic Affirmation theory of happiness, and the question—“How are people faring in this quest for self-achieved happiness and well-being?”—is critically investigated. The unfortunate result is that nearly everywhere people are failing. The causes of failure, it is argued, are found in the noetic effects of sin—especially in inordinate self-love and self-deception, but also in insufficient self-love—and such failure manifests both in widespread unhappiness and in that most misunderstood of the seven deadly sins, sloth. After a literary tour designed to reveal the many different ways that sloth can damage a life, a constructive proposal for responding to this predicament featuring the virtue of obedience is articulated and defended. This virtue is analyzed, illustrated, located in a new theory of well-being, and recommended to the reader.

Thus Mammon Spake

Even those who endorse the religious worldview underlying the optimism discussed in the first chapter frequently willfully resist the efforts required to cooperate with God and to respond to the demands that love places upon us with respect to God and neighbor. Like the demons in Paradise Lost, many of us are beguiled by the prospect of pursuing our own happiness and well-being (or flourishing) on our own power, of making a Heaven of the Hell that the philosophy of pessimism has taught us is our current abode. Thus many of us adopt the frame of mind in which we are willing to trust in our own powers, skill, artistry, intelligence, and all the magnificent resources of our own selves. No need of God. No loss in rebellion. This chapter defends certain maligned aspects of a popular philosophical methodology and then conducts a critical study of the current leading literature on well-being and happiness. Assuming we can come to have knowledge of these matters, the chapter critically examines and argues against hedonistic, desire-fulfillment, and perfectionistic theories of well-being, advocating instead for an objective-list theory, and critically examines and argues against hedonistic and life-satisfaction theories of happiness, advocating instead for the Psychic Affirmation view. Thus, the attempt to seek out happiness and well-being on our own power without the benefit of reconciliation with the divine need not be thwarted by skepticism about happiness and well-being.

Consciousness

This chapter gives consciousness a central role in value. It begins by showing how we can interpret and defend the idea that many common forms of consciousness are intrinsically beneficial to us—even if we don’t embrace subjectivism about well-being. It then shows how we can rationally accord these benefits such importance that we would find our own continued existence worthless without them. Neither objective list nor desire-satisfactionist views of well-being threaten this result. Moreover, regarding subjects’ desire-satisfaction: we can see that this bears on a non-instrumental concern for them only if they are capable of subjective experience: consciousness makes desires matter morally. Finally, the moral significance of consciousness is further deepened by seeing how our self-expressive experience entitles us to a respect that is due beings who make themselves accountable to norms—and how, since we are such beings, our lives have irreplaceable value.

Explanatory perfectionism: a fresh take on an ancient theory

The ‘Big Three’ theories of well-being – hedonism, desire-satisfactionism and objective list theory – attempt to explain why certain things are good for people by appealing to prudentially good-making properties. But they do not attempt to explain why the properties they advert to make something good for a person. Perfectionism, the view that well-being consists in nature-fulfilment, is often considered a competitor to these views (or else a version of the objective list theory). However, I argue that perfectionism is best understood as explaining why certain properties are prudentially good-making. This version of perfectionism is compatible with each of the Big Three and, I argue, quite attractive.

Value and a Good Life

This chapter develops a Nietzschean picture of a good life. It distinguishes two organizing goods: flourishing and excellence. The first part focuses on flourishing. Flourishing is relationally and prudentially valuable: good for the person whose flourishing it is. The account emphasizes a range of psychological and activity-oriented conditions (self-understanding, self-mastery, autonomy, effective self-expressing agency) the meeting of which might be necessary and (subject to certain provisos) sufficient for flourishing to some degree, though how fully someone flourishes can also depend on the value (excellence) of the goals she realizes. This yields a ‘substantive good’ or ‘objective list’ model of a good or flourishing life. Nonetheless, the ingredients listed are multiply realizable, which allows for significant variation in how different people flourish; in particular, a person’s flourishing depends on a range of subjective conditions relating to (inter alia) her motives. The latter part of the chapter turns to excellence. Excellence is uncodifiable and impersonally valuable. Someone who excels typically thereby flourishes.