Estimating Judicial Ideology

We review the substantial literature on estimating judicial ideology, from the US Supreme Court to the lowest state court. As a way to showcase the strengths and drawbacks of various measures, we further analyze trends in judicial polarization within the US federal courts. Our analysis shows substantial gaps in the ideology of judges appointed by Republican Presidents versus those appointed by Democrats. Similar to trends in Congressional polarization, the increasing gap is mostly driven by a rightward movement by judges appointed by Republicans. We conclude by noting important avenues for future research in the study of the ideology of judges.

Authoritarian Dimension of Judicial Ideology of the Slovenian Constitutional Court

After the democratization and independence of Slovenia, the Constitutional Court has generated the paradigm reform in the Slovenian constitutional system by protecting individual rights against the heritage of the former system. The constitutional judges are not blank slates, but individuals embedded in their private and professional environments. In the past three decades, the Court has delivered several seminal decisions concerning the protection of the rule of law, human rights, and constitutional democracy. What motivates constitutional judges to protect individual rights in some cases and show preference for the preservation of authority and stability of the existing legal system in others? The article is based on the empirical research measuring the presence of judicial ideology at the Constitutional Court of Slovenia in three mandates (1993–1997, 2002–2006, 2011–2016). The methodological and theoretical model aims to measure economic, social, and authoritarian dimensions of judicial ideology (three-fold judicial ideology model). The research group has analysed the decisions and separate opinions of the Constitutional Court from selected periods based on hypotheses provided by the model. This article intends to present and analyse the research results concerning the authoritarian dimension of judicial ideology. More specifically, it examines the level of authoritarianism of the Slovenian Constitutional Court in its judicial decision-making during the three mentioned mandates. Through the obtained empirical results, the paper seeks to strengthen fair, impartial, and independent functioning of the Slovenian Constitutional Court and its respective judges.

Revisiting Senatorial Courtesy and the Selection of Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals

We examine how elite attitudes and institutional rules and norms affect appointments to lower federal courts. Using voting data from 1,339 U.S. Courts of Appeals cases, we estimate new ideological measures for 475 individual circuit judges appointed between 1913 and 2008. We find that both presidential and home-state senators’ preferences strongly predict judicial ideology. While we find evidence that conditions of senatorial courtesy can constrain presidents from nominating like-minded individuals for lower court vacancies, this trend peaked during the 1960s and has been eroding ever since.

Conceptual Framework and Empirical Methodology for Measuring Multidimensional Judicial Ideology

The article presents a conceptual framework and empirical methodology of an on-going research on the role of ideology in the decisions of the Slovenian Constitution Court. The literature review demonstrates that research on judicial ideology in the courts of European countries and international courts is still rare. This can be explained by conceptual, methodological and empirical challenges posed by this type of research. The article hence advances a conceptual framework which is, contra to the mainstream theoretical approach in the field, based on a multidimensional conception of ideology that is empirically operationalised along the economic, social and authoritarian dimensions with five possible ideological positions on each dimension. By applying the newly developed methodology to a sample of Court’s decisions, it is demonstrated that this methodological approach is able to account for ideological differences between judges. This confirms that (judges’) ideology is a complex multidimensional set of values and convictions that cannot be reduced to simply equating ideology with (possible) political affiliations.

Exploring the Dynamics of Latent Variable Models

Researchers face a tradeoff when applying latent variable models to time-series, cross-sectional data. Static models minimize bias but assume data are temporally independent, resulting in a loss of efficiency. Dynamic models explicitly model temporal data structures, but smooth estimates of the latent trait across time, resulting in bias when the latent trait changes rapidly. We address this tradeoff by investigating a new approach for modeling and evaluating latent variable estimates: a robust dynamic model. The robust model is capable of minimizing bias and accommodating volatile changes in the latent trait. Simulations demonstrate that the robust model outperforms other models when the underlying latent trait is subject to rapid change, and is equivalent to the dynamic model in the absence of volatility. We reproduce latent estimates from studies of judicial ideology and democracy. For judicial ideology, the robust model uncovers shocks in judicial voting patterns that were not previously identified in the dynamic model. For democracy, the robust model provides more precise estimates of sudden institutional changes such as the imposition of martial law in the Philippines (1972–1981) and the short-lived Saur Revolution in Afghanistan (1978). Overall, the robust model is a useful alternative to the standard dynamic model for modeling latent traits that change rapidly over time.