Perception of geometric sequences and numerosity both predict formal geometric competence in primary school children

While most animals have a sense of number, only humans have developed symbolic systems to describe and organize mathematical knowledge. Some studies suggest that human arithmetical knowledge may be rooted in an ancient mechanism dedicated to perceiving numerosity, but it is not known if formal geometry also relies on basic, non-symbolic mechanisms. Here we show that primary-school children who spontaneously detect and predict geometrical sequences (non-symbolic geometry) perform better in school-based geometry tests indexing formal geometric knowledge. Interestingly, numerosity discrimination thresholds also predicted and explained a specific portion of variance of formal geometrical scores. The relation between these two non-symbolic systems and formal geometry was not explained by age or verbal reasoning skills. Overall, the results are in line with the hypothesis that some human-specific, symbolic systems are rooted in non-symbolic mechanisms.

The geometrical basis of arithmetical knowledge: Frege & Dehaene

Frege writes in Numbers and Arithmetic about kindergarten-numbers and “an a priori mode of cognition” that they may have “a geometrical source.” This resembles recent findings on arithmetical cognition. In my paper, I explore this resemblance between Gottlob Frege’s later position concerning the geometrical source of arithmetical knowledge, and some current positions in the literature dedicated to arithmetical cognition, especially that of Stanislas Dehaene. In my analysis, I shall try to mainly see to what extent (Frege’s) logicism is compatible with (Dehaene’s) intuitionism.

Arithmetic Certainty

This chapter considers the idea that we have certainty in our basic arithmetic knowledge. The claim that arithmetical knowledge enjoys certainty cannot be extended to a similar claim about number theory “as a whole.” It is thus necessary to distinguish between elementary number theory and other, more advanced, levels in the study of numbers: algebraic number theory, analytic number theory, and perhaps set-theoretic number theory. The chapter begins by arguing that the axioms of Peano Arithmetic are true of counting numbers and describing some elements found in counting practices. It then offers an account of basic arithmetic and its certainty before discussing a model theory of arithmetic and the logic of mathematics. Finally, it asks whether elementary arithmetic, built on top of the practice of counting, should be classical arithmetic or intuitionistic arithmetic.

LOGICISM, INTERPRETABILITY, AND KNOWLEDGE OF ARITHMETIC

A crucial part of the contemporary interest in logicism in the philosophy of mathematics resides in its idea that arithmetical knowledge may be based on logical knowledge. Here, an implementation of this idea is considered that holds that knowledge of arithmetical principles may be based on two things: (i) knowledge of logical principles and (ii) knowledge that the arithmetical principles are representable in the logical principles. The notions of representation considered here are related to theory-based and structure-based notions of representation from contemporary mathematical logic. It is argued that the theory-based versions of such logicism are either too liberal (the plethora problem) or are committed to intuitively incorrect closure conditions (the consistency problem). Structure-based versions must on the other hand respond to a charge of begging the question (the circularity problem) or explain how one may have a knowledge of structure in advance of a knowledge of axioms (the signature problem). This discussion is significant because it gives us a better idea of what a notion of representation must look like if it is to aid in realizing some of the traditional epistemic aims of logicism in the philosophy of mathematics.