Do Mental Files Obey Strawson’s Constraint?

This chapter argues that the mental file approach makes it possible to treat so-called Frege cases as an instance of fragmentation; that is, as cases in which conflicting pieces of information are stored in the subject’s mind but remain insulated from each other in such a way that the inconsistency cannot be detected. The argument rests on a constraint on files which derives from Strawson’s work, to the effect that two coreferential files should be merged. The linking model, widely accepted in the mental file literature as a substitute for Strawson’s merge model, is shown to rest on the mistaken construal of recognition as a state, where in fact it is a transition between states.

Application: Names and the Mental Files Framework

This chapter continues the process of anthropocentric abstraction, here concentrating on proper names. Do AI systems use proper names? Using our example of ‘SmartCredit’, it highlights problems concerning how to treat the output of an AI system when some, but not all or most, of the information in its neural network fails to apply to the individual we interpret the output to be about. After giving reasons to think the standard Kripkean theory might not work well here, it suggests an alternative theory of communication about particular entities, the mental file framework, which is more apt for theorizing about AI systems. It then abstracts from the human-centric features of extant theories of mental files to consider how AI might use something like them to refer to particulars.

Nonconceptualism as the key to a new physicalist strategy in the knowledge argument

This paper presents and defends an alternative version to the so-called strategy of phenomenal concepts (aka PCS) in defense of type B materialism in Jackson’s knowledge argument. Endorsing Ball and Tye’s criticism, I argue in favor of the following claims. First: Mary’s newly acquired content is nonconceptual in the light of all available criteria. Second: Mary’s acquisition of such content is precisely what allows us to explain, at least in part, both her epistemic progress (once released from her confinement) and the increase in her expertize regarding her old PHENOMENAL RED. However, although the acquisition of such nonconceptual content is indispensable, it is sufficient to explain Mary’s epistemic progress. Third: assuming that concepts are mental files, after undergoing the visual experiences of red for the first time, such newly acquired nonconceptual content goes through a process of “digitization” so that it can be stored in the mental file PHENOMENAL RED. Fourth and final claim: it is based on this concept of PHENOMENAL RED, now phenomenally enriched by the newly acquired nonconceptual content, that Mary is able to identify introspectively the phenomenal red of her new experience.

The Situational Mental File Account of the False Belief Tasks: A New Solution of the Paradox of False Belief Understanding

How can we solve the paradox of false-belief understanding: if infants pass the implicit false belief task (FBT) by nonverbal behavioural responses why do they nonetheless typically fail the explicit FBT till they are 4 years old? Starting with the divide between situational and cognitive accounts of the development of false-belief understanding, we argue that we need to consider both situational and internal cognitive factors together and describe their interaction to adequately explain the development of children’s Theory of Mind (ToM) ability. We then argue that a further challenge is raised for existing accounts by helping behaviour versions of the FBT. We argue that the common two-stage accounts are inadequate: we need to allow for three central stages in a continuous development. Furthermore, drawing on Perner et al.’s (Cognition 145: 77–88, 2015) and Perner and Leahy’s (Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2): 491–508, 2016) recent mental files account, we provide a new account of the development of these three stages of ToM ability by describing the changes of the structure and organisation of mental files including the systematic triggering role of types of situations. Thereby we aim to establish a situational mental file (SMF) account as a new and adequate solution to the paradox of false-belief understanding.

Varieties of Singularity

What is it for a thought to be singular? The chapter argues that there is no single answer. Singularity in thought is associated with a variety of non-equivalent features. For example, some argue that the object of a singular thought should be something with which we are acquainted, or should involve the exercise of a mental file; or the thought should essentially “involve” its object, or refer to it rigidly. The chapter claims that the main task should be to examine the relations between these various features; there is little interest in trying to determine what a “real” singular thought is.

Singular Thought and Mental Files

Coinciding with recognition of the need for more clarity about the notion of singular (or de re) thought, there has been a surge of interest in the notion of a mental file as a way to understand what is distinctive about singular thought. But what isn’t always clear is what mental files are meant to be, and why we should believe that thoughts that employ them are singular (as opposed to descriptive). In order to make progress on these questions, this volume brings together original papers by leading scholars on singular thought, mental files, and the relationship between the two, as well as an introduction providing an overview of the central issues.

Descriptive Names and Singular Thought

This chapter is concerned with an apparent disagreement between Gareth Evans (1982) and David Kaplan (1989) with regard to the capacities of names introduced into the language by describing their referents. The question at issue is whether such expressions are potential sources of novel singular thought. While Evans’ response is an emphatic “no,” Kaplan’s response is an equally emphatic “yes.” The chapter attempts to resolve (or rather dissolve) this apparent dispute by suggesting that the two philosophers have importantly different phenomena in mind when they talk of “thoughts”—including (and in particular) singular thoughts. Whereas Evans construes thoughts as mental states, Kaplan construes them as semantic contents. Before concluding, it argues for the superiority of the proposed resolution of the Evans/Kaplan debate over that of Francois Recanati (2012), who invokes his Mental File Framework in an attempt to reconcile the seemingly contrary views of Evans and Kaplan.

Singular Thought and Mental Files

This introduction outlines some central challenges to a clear understanding of singular (or de re) thought, and illustrates why the literature has recently turned to the notion of a mental file as a way to theorize it. It sketches three central motivations behind the claim that singular thought is file-based thought. First, file-theorists have stressed that the descriptive information contained in a file does not determine its identity conditions or semantic content. Second, it is sometimes assumed that singular thoughts are devices of de jure coreference in thought and claimed that mental files are the cognitive reality of de jure coreference in thought. Finally, the file-theoretic approach to singular thought may seem to lend empirical respectability to the notion of singular thought. The chapter ends by?introducing some basic questions proponents of this approach must address if it is to fulfill its explanatory aims.

Singular Thought, Russellianism, and Mental Files

Many philosophers believe that there is a kind of thought about an object that is in some sense particularly directly about the object. The chapter will use the terms de re or singular thought for thoughts of this sort. It outlines a broadly Russellian approach to singular thought on which to have a singular thought about an object o is to have a thought whose content is a singular proposition having o as a constituent. It then explores some of the consequences of this view. It also critically discusses recent attempts by Francois Recanati and Robin Jeshion to explicate the notion of singular thought by means of the notion of a mental file.