A language of thought for the mental representation of geometric shapes

Why do geometric shapes such as lines, circles, zig-zags or spirals appear in all human cultures, but are never produced by other animals? Here, we formalize and test the hypothesis that all humans possess a compositional language of thought that can produce line drawings as recursive combinations of a minimal set of geometric primitives. We present a programming language, similar to Logo, that combines discrete numbers and continuous integration in higher-level structures based on repetition, concatenation and embedding, and show that the simplest programs in this language generate the fundamental geometric shapes observed in human cultures. On the perceptual side, we propose that shape perception in humans involves searching for the shortest program that correctly draws the image (program induction). A consequence of this framework is that the mental difficulty of remembering a shape should depend on its minimum description length (MDL) in the proposed language. In two experiments, we show that encoding and processing of geometric shapes is well predicted by MDL. Furthermore, our hypotheses predict additive laws for the psychological complexity of repeated, concatenated or embedded shapes, which are experimentally validated.

Core Language of Thought

Fodor’s “Language of Thought” (also called Mentalese) hypothesis—that we use a language-like, syntactic system in processing thoughts instead of natural languages—caused controversies in philosophy, psychology, and linguistics. While many researchers proposed their perspectives, both for and against, none of them addressed its evolutionary and sociocultural variabilities as far as I know. Accordingly, I provide a novel perspective on the hypothesis by discussing the interplay among our cognition, natural languages, evolution, and sociocultural factors. First, like one speaks personalized English as his/her idiolect, individuals have their own “Idiolects of Thought” as a derivative of Mentalese. Second, while Mentalese varies from individual to individual, “Core Language of Thought” is cognitively fundamental and largely shared across individuals.

Towards Protolanguage

In this paper, I attempt to offer a general outline of my views on the origin and evolution of language. I do not pretend in any way to a completely new conception of language evolution. It seems to me that all the most important and productive hypotheses about the origin of language have already been made before, and it is only a matter of putting the pieces of the puzzle together correctly. As far as I can see it, the evolution of language is directly related to the embedded and embodied emotional types, which served as the basis for the subsequent categorization of perceived objects, and thus laid the ground for the formation of first an internal language (of thought), and then an external verbal language. Consistent with this, the paper is organized as follows. In the Introduction I briefly describe the problem I am facing in this article and outline a plan for solving it. Next section comprises a survey of relevant empirical findings related primarily to the processing and understanding of abstract terms and concepts. In my view, it supports the idea of the close connection of abstract terms proceeding, and thus language comprehension, with emotional states. The third section provides relevant theoretical considerations of the relationship between emotions, cognition, and language. Consistently considering various theories of emotions and concepts of language formation, I pay attention to the connection between affective states and language as a sign system. In the fourth section, my views are presented directly. In so doing, I illustrate my approach with a telling example that shows how, in the course of evolution, embedded and embodied emotional responses and reactions could become the building blocks first for the internal language of thought, and then for the external natural language.

On the Cognitive Foundation of Lexical Classification of the Subject World

The paper presents a language of thought (a set of cognitive units and relations) used to provide non-verbal definitions for the following five concepts: ARMCHAIR, MUG, RAVINE, LAKE, TREE. These definitions make it possible to describe concepts on two levels of specificity. On the first level, a concept is presented as a holistic cognitive unit. On the second, more specific, level, the same concept is viewed as a partitive system, i.e. a hierarchical system of its parts, the latter being smaller concepts into which the original holistic unit is decomposed. A hypothesis is advanced that such structure is inherent to all visible objects. The partitive system is argued to play a major role in human cognition. It, first, provides for an in-depth understanding of the perceived objects through understanding the role of their parts, and, second, underlies the formation of the hierarchy of concepts with respect to their generality. Besides, it can be considered as one of the defining properties of the human species as it accounts for the human ability to purposefully change the world.

Eliminativní materialismus, lidová psychologie a jazyk myšlení

The article provides an analysis of Paul and Patricia Churchland’s eliminative materialism. I will distinguish two lines of argument in their eliminativism: one seeking to eliminate folk psychology and the second criticising Jerry Fodor’s language of thought hypothesis. Then I will closely examine the second line of argument, and show that it represents the main motive of Churchland’s work since the end of 1980s and demonstrate why the success of the argument against the language of thought hypothesis does not constitute a reason for the elimination of folk psychology. Finally, I will examine the consequences of this approach for the role of folk psychology in the study of mind and show that the weakened eliminativist position still fulfils the original aim of Churchland’s program.

Fodor and demonstratives in LOT

In this paper, we consider a range of puzzles for demonstratives in the language of thought we had raised in our last philosophical conversation we had with Jerry Fodor. We argue against the Kaplan-inspired indexing solution Fodor proposed to us, but offer a Fodor-friendly account of the demonstratives in the language of thought in its stead, building on our account of demonstrative pronouns in English.