Improved incentive pricing-based quasi-linear utility function of wireless networks

The model of the incentive pricing scheme-based quasi-linear utility function in wireless network was designed. Previous research seldom focusses on user’s satisfaction while using network. Therefore, the model is then attempted to be set up that is derived from the modification of bundling and models of reverse charging and maintain the quality of service to users by utilizing quasi-linear utility function. The pricing schemes then are applied to local data server traffic. The model used is known as mathematical programming problem that can be solved by LINGO 13.0 program as optimization tool to get the optimal solution. The optimal results show that the improved incentive pricing can achieve better solution compared to original reverse charging where the models will be obtained in flat fee, usage-based, and two-part tariff strategies for homogeneous consumers.

Competition Among Contests: a Safety Level Analysis

We study a competition among two contests, where each contest designer aims to attract as much effort as possible. Such a competition exists in reality, e.g., in crowd-sourcing websites. Our results are phrased in terms of the ``relative prize power'' of a contest, which is the ratio of the total prize offered by this contest designer relative to the sum of total prizes of the two contests. When contestants have a quasi-linear utility function that captures both a risk-aversion effect and a cost of effort, we show that a simple contest attracts a total effort which approaches the relative prize power of the contest designer assuming a large number of contestants. This holds regardless of the contest policy of the opponent, hence providing a ``safety level'' which is a robust notion similar in spirit to the max-min solution concept.

Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing link

This article seeks to analyze the political economy of military conscription policy and its relationship with a country’s external security environment. National security is modeled as a non-rivalrous and non-excludable public good, whose production technology consists of either centrally conscripted or competitively recruited military labor. Conscription is construed as an implicit discretionary tax on citizens’ labor endowment. Based on this, I propose a simple political economy model of pure public goods provision financed by two policy instruments: a lump-sum income tax and a conscription tax. Constraint optimization of a quasi-linear utility function gives rise to three general classes of preferences: high- and low-skilled citizens will prefer an all-volunteer army, albeit of different size, whereas medium-skilled citizens will favor positive levels of conscription. These derived preferences allow me to tease out an explicit relationship between military manpower procurement policy, a country’s level of external threat, and its pre-tax income inequality levels. One of my key findings is that more egalitarian countries are more likely to use conscription as a military manpower procurement mechanism.

Supply Chain Contracting with Linear Utility Function

The supply chain contracting has traditionally been based on the profit maximization assumption. Recent research has shown that some behavior factors may influence the decision making of supply chain members. The authors utilize a linear utility function to depict such behavior factors and incorporate these into the newsvendor model. The linear utility function provides sufficient flexibility to better capture people's various behavior factors. By supposing the agents are concerned with behavior factors, the authors first investigate how the factors affect the supply chain under wholesale price contract, and find that they do not influence coordination condition, but can adjust the distribution of profits. Then they extend their study to other four common contracts with a similar method and systematically demonstrate that the behavior of agents in such a linear setting has no effect on the conditions of coordinating supply chain.

Equilibrium Joining Strategies in the Geo/GeoK/1 Queueing System

We study strategic behavior in the G e o / G e o K / 1 queueing system under both fully observable case and fully unobservable case. Furthermore, equilibrium and socially optimal strategies are obtained according to the available information and the linear utility function. We compare the impact of system parameters on the equilibrium strategies and socially optimal strategies. At the same time, we illustrate the effects of parameters on the obtained equilibrium social benefit. Finally, some numerical examples are presented.

The semi-martingale equilibrium equity premium for risk-neutral investors

In this paper, we study the risk-neutral investor’s equilibrium equity premium in a semi-martingale market with arbitrary, normal, binomial and gamma jumps. We simulate graphs for discrete distribution of jump amplitudes in order to study the parameter effect. The equity premium for this investor remains the same regardless of [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text] variations in the linear utility function. In fact, there is no optimal consumption for [Formula: see text]. For normal jumps, our results are consistent with the risk-averse investor’s power utility effect on the equity premium. However, the binomial and gamma amplitudes show significant variations between risk neutrality and risk aversion.

Supply Chain Contracting with Linear Utility Function

The supply chain contracting has traditionally been based on the profit maximization assumption. Recent research has shown that some behavior factors may influence the decision making of supply chain members. The authors utilize a linear utility function to depict such behavior factors and incorporate these into the newsvendor model. The linear utility function provides sufficient flexibility to better capture people's various behavior factors. By supposing the agents are concerned with behavior factors, the authors first investigate how the factors affect the supply chain under wholesale price contract, and find that they do not influence coordination condition, but can adjust the distribution of profits. Then they extend their study to other four common contracts with a similar method and systematically demonstrate that the behavior of agents in such a linear setting has no effect on the conditions of coordinating supply chain.

Health Investments under Risk and Ambiguity

This article deals with the question of how a public decision maker should think about issues of known and unknown risks. The optimal investment levels are then derived and compared for a number of different decision rules. It discusses three decision rules: the best guess, the maximin, and the expected value decision rules. It presents the St Petersburg paradox, which clearly shows that the expected value decision rule cannot be universally applied and introduces a non-linear utility function to the model. It discusses the optimal investment rules for a special case of a state-dependent expected utility model. This article then presents another paradox, the Ellsberg paradox. It deals with the problem of unknown probabilities by adding probability distributions of the probabilities. Decision rules for three different models that allow for ambiguity aversion are then derived and discussed. The article returns to the more fundamental question regarding whether models of ambiguity aversion can be justified for normative analysis.