repeated moral hazard
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2021 ◽  
Vol 0 (0) ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai Ding ◽  
Filippo Rebessi

Abstract Reforms to agricultural policy have been stalling in OECD economies. In this paper, we quantify the potential for public savings from switching to an optimal transfer system in small open economies. Following the insights from the literature on repeated moral hazard, optimal subsidies are front-loaded, which provides stronger incentives for farmers to transition out of agriculture, compared to the existing policies. In our counterfactual experiments, we find government savings of 6% for Chile, 45% for Japan, 24% for Switzerland, and 51% for Turkey. In addition, optimal subsidies more than double the speed of the transition of employment out of agriculture.


2020 ◽  
Vol 57 (2) ◽  
pp. 211-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kinshuk Jerath ◽  
Fei Long

The authors study multiperiod sales force incentive contracting in which salespeople can engage in effort gaming, a phenomenon that has extensive empirical support. Focusing on a repeated moral hazard scenario with two independent periods and a risk-neutral agent with limited liability, the authors conduct a theoretical investigation to understand which effort profiles the firm can expect under the optimal contract. The authors show that various effort profiles that may give the appearance of being suboptimal, such as postponing effort exertion (“hockey stick”) and not exerting effort after a bad or a good initial demand outcome (“giving up” and “resting on laurels,” respectively) may indeed be induced optimally by the firm. This is because, under certain conditions that depend on how severe the contracting frictions are and how effective effort exertion is in increasing demand, the firm wants to concentrate rewards on extreme demand outcomes. Doing this induces gaming and reduces expected demand but also makes motivating effort cheaper, thus saving on incentive payments. On introducing dependence between time periods, such as when the agent can transfer demands between periods, this insight continues to hold and, furthermore, “hockey stick,” “giving up,” and “resting on laurels” can be optimal for the firm even under repeated short time horizon contracting. The results imply that one must carefully consider the setting and environmental factors when making inferences about contract effectiveness from dynamic effort profiles of agents.


2019 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 964-1008
Author(s):  
Pak Hung Au

Abstract This paper examines the optimal compensation scheme, job design, and severance policy for a team using a model of repeated moral hazard. In the optimal contract, the agent may be paid to quit after a poor performance. We show that a generous severance policy facilitates the adoption of team incentives and team-based production by making it cost-effective to implement peer monitoring and sanction among the agents.


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