scholarly journals Unraveling in a repeated moral hazard model with multiple agents

10.3982/te833 ◽  
2015 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Madhav Chandrasekher
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Hazard Model ◽  
Multiple Agents ◽  
Repeated Moral Hazard

scholarly journals Migrant wages, remittances and recipient labour supply in a moral hazard model

2009 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 60-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Claire Naiditch ◽  
Radu Vranceanu
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Labour Supply ◽  
Hazard Model

A Moral Hazard Model of Parental Care

2013 ◽  
Vol 207 (4) ◽  
pp. 101-115
Author(s):  
Baomin Dong ◽  
Tianpeng Zhou
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Parental Care ◽  
Hazard Model

scholarly journals A Double Moral Hazard Model of Organization Design

2010 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elazar Berkovitch ◽  
Ronen Israel ◽  
Yossi Spiegel
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Organization Design ◽  
Hazard Model ◽  
Double Moral Hazard

To work or to work out: a moral-hazard interpretation of labor supply, retirement, and investments in longevity

2009 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 219-234
Author(s):  
STEFAN HUPFELD
Keyword(s):  
Moral Hazard ◽  
Labor Supply ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Life Time ◽  
Hazard Model ◽  
Second Best ◽  
Aggregate Output ◽  
Effort Level ◽  
Multiple Tasks

AbstractIn a moral-hazard model with multiple tasks, an agent engages in different activities, labelled work, delayed retirement, and work out (investments in longevity). The latter imposes higher effort costs on weekly labor supply, but increases possibilities for life time labor supply. Work out does not affect aggregate output and does therefore not accrue to the benefit of the principal. Second-best incentives for work out areU-shaped in the agent's ability, and so is the effort level supplied by the agent. These theoretical findings are supported by recent empirical evidence on longevity, which is not always monotonically increasing in ability.

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