Empirical evidence of innovation in economic theory

2013 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 77-105 ◽  
Author(s):  
Magda Fontana ◽  
Teodora Diana Corsatea
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence

Are Jobs and the Quality of the Environment Mutually Exclusive?

1995 ◽  
Vol 27 (5) ◽  
pp. 781-791 ◽  
Author(s):  
O Izraeli ◽  
L Mobley
Keyword(s):  
Economic Growth ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Environmental Quality ◽  
General Public ◽  
Maintenance Costs ◽  
Trade Off

In this paper it is shown that there is no support in economic theory for the suggested trade-off between jobs and the environment. Moreover, improved environmental quality may accelerate economic growth via improved health and productivity of workers, lower maintenance costs, and enhanced productivity of capital inputs. Also, empirical evidence is presented on the preference of the general public regarding environmental quality. The empirical evidence indicates that people are ready to trade part of their income for improved environmental quality.

Budget Deficits: A Major Cause of Inflation?

1978 ◽  
Vol 6 (1) ◽  
pp. 115-127 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ansel M. Sharp ◽  
Phyllis Smith Flenniken
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Money Supply ◽  
The Other ◽  
Real Output ◽  
Budget Deficits ◽  
Single Variable ◽  
Other Hand

This paper examines the proposition that budget deficits are a major cause of inflation. Economic theory does not unconditionally support the proposition, and available empirical evidence does not support the proposition. During periods of expansion, 1949–1973, the increases in the money supply that can be directly traced to budget deficits are often a contributing but not necessarily a major cause of inflations. On the other hand, the fiscal effects of the budget, because of the automatic growth in federal receipts, are usually checking the growth in both prices and real output. Based on the discussion and data presented in this paper, the deficit hypothesis cannot be accepted. Inflations are too complicated phenomena to be explained by a single variable such as budget deficits.

scholarly journals Uniformisation des taux de profit et hypothèse sectorielle

2009 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-369
Author(s):  
Alain Chiavelli ◽  
Michel Rainelli
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
New Classification ◽  
Statistical Observation ◽  
Long Time

Abstract The hypothesis of an equalization of sectorial rates of profit has an important role to play in the economic theory. Though it has been formulated a long time ago (A. Smith, D. Ricardo…), now as a definite principle (with its mechanism) and now as a postulate, it is however contradicted by statistical observation. There have been various answers to this problem. We propose to study it in a new light, emphasizing that the formulation of this "law" as well as its empirical evidence are registered within the traditional framework of activity sector. Then, we have to think about the latter as it has a fundamental role to play. But the activity sector is no longer a homogeneous category, for firms can considerably differentiate the conditions (technological and financial ones) of capital allowance, independently of any reference to the notion of product. Then, we must think over this problem, no longer wondering where this allowance of the capital is produced, but how. This brings us to propose the elaboration of a new classification of the firms, that leads to an analysis at an "intermediary level" other than the insufficient level that results from the division of the economy into activity sectors.

The Economics of Antitrust Sanctioning

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yannis Katsoulacos ◽  
Eleni Metsiou
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Developing Countries ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Antitrust Enforcement ◽  
Cartel Formation

In this chapter, we first discuss the empirical evidence on cartel formation that is particularly worrying in recent years for the case of BRICS and developing countries and the traditional economic theory on deterrence as applied to sanctioning policies. We evaluate the available empirical evidence and discuss the reasons why cartels are still very active, despite the significant increase in the fines imposed, the application of leniency programmes, and the tougher antitrust enforcement. We point out three reasons why current sanctioning methods are not as effective as they could be, specifically currently: (1) penalties are misdirected to corporations and not to responsible individuals; (2) penalties on corporations are inefficiently designed by using wrong penalty bases; and (3) there is no exploitation of complementary policies, specifically for policies preventing recidivism in cartel formation. We conclude by pointing to a number of proposals for enhancing the effectiveness of sanctioning regimes.

scholarly journals Kleine Bundesländer – Achillesferse des Föderalismus?

2007 ◽  
Vol 56 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Norbert Berthold ◽  
Holger Fricke ◽  
Andreas Müller
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Economies Of Scale ◽  
The Other ◽  
Economic Outcome ◽  
External Effects ◽  
Federal Level ◽  
Strategic Behaviour ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Political Decisions

AbstractIn this article we examine whether or not the small size (in terms of population) of some German Laender (states) is harmful. The economic theory of federalism forms the ground on which we present empirical evidence, focusing on our own results for the German Laender. We find evidence that political decisions on federal level instead of Laender level cause preference costs, and so do decisions in big or merged Laender. On the other hand, economies of scale as an assumed advantage of big jurisdictions obviously do not influence the economic outcome very much. We do not find indications for strategic behaviour due to external effects either. Nonetheless, if external effects are regarded as a problem concerning “Stadtstaaten”, they should rather be internalised by horizontal negotiations than by other instruments such as vertical payments or mergers between Laender. Hence, mergers of Laender do not seem to be a necessary precondition for decentralisation, which in turn is advisable as our results show.

Outside Intervention in Monopolistic Price Warfare: The Case of the “Plug War” and the Union Tobacco Company

1982 ◽  
Vol 56 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-53 ◽  
Author(s):  
Malcolm R. Burns
Keyword(s):  
Nineteenth Century ◽  
Economic Theory ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Late Nineteenth Century ◽  
Tobacco Company ◽  
Chewing Tobacco ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Contentious Issue ◽  
Late Nineteenth ◽  
American Tobacco Company

The now-famous merger movement that highlighted the economic cross-currents of the late nineteenth century created no more controversial enterprise than James B. Duke's American Tobacco Company. From the time of its incorporation in 1890, Duke's firm dominated the cigarette business, for which it is so justly renowned, but this controlling position by no means extended into other branches of the industry, particularly the manufacture and marketing of chewing tobacco, or what was known as plug. Yet with almost ineluctable force, Duke and his associates gradually extended their domination to this segment of the business, albeit by a much more uncertain course that included the “plug war” of the mid-1890s and some questionable securities transactions later on. While Dr. Burns takes no side in the still-simmering controversies of the day, in this essay he examines the historical events through which American Tobacco acquired its dominant position in chewing tobacco; equally important, he brings economic theory and new empirical evidence to bear on the contentious issue of predatory pricing as a strategy of monopolization, and from that emerges his surprising conclusion.

Ten Principles for State Tax Incentives

1995 ◽  
Vol 9 (4) ◽  
pp. 339-355 ◽  
Author(s):  
Keith R. Ihlanfeldt
Keyword(s):  
Economic Theory ◽  
Economic Development ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Tax Incentives ◽  
The State ◽  
Incentive Programs ◽  
State Tax

The use of tax incentives for economic development is growing among states. This growth is partially caused by a response to new incentives of neighboring states, and similar incentive laws are passed in the interest of remaining competitive. As a result, many states have adopted tax incentives not well founded on economic theory or empirical evidence. This article draws on the latter to develop ten principles that states can employ to enhance the fairness and effectiveness of tax incentives. To illustrate their application, the principles are used to evaluate the state of Georgia's incentive programs.

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