scholarly journals Séparation, annexion, et fédéralisme : au-delà des préceptes normatifs usuels

2009 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 596-619
Author(s):  
Richard Carter
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Political History ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Canadian Society ◽  
Positive Approach ◽  
Normative Approach ◽  
Society Today ◽  
Choice Approach ◽  
Public Choice Approach

AbstractThe author uses a Public Choice approach to analyze the evolution of the political structures of Canadian society and the options facing Canadian society today. The insights provided by a positive approach as opposed to the traditional normative approach are discussed. The records of economic and political history are used to validate the insights provided by this economic approach.

The Political Economy of International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach

1992 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 349
Author(s):  
Robert D. Tollison ◽  
Roland Vaubel ◽  
Thomas D. Willett
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
The Political ◽  
Choice Approach ◽  
Public Choice Approach

On Voting: A Public Choice Approach

1999 ◽  
Vol 66 (1) ◽  
pp. 204
Author(s):  
Richard F. Potthoff ◽  
Gordon Tullock
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Choice Approach ◽  
Public Choice Approach

Outsourcing Personnel Functions

2000 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gilbert B. Siegel
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Administrative Staff ◽  
Fee For Service ◽  
The Public ◽  
Pressure Groups ◽  
Goods And Services ◽  
Efficiency And Effectiveness ◽  
Economic Choices ◽  
Choice Approach ◽  
Public Choice Approach

One of the more recent “hot button” issues in our field is that of outsourcing all or some human resource (HR) functions whether by fee for service or contract. Advocates from the field of Public Choice Economics assume and, in many cases, economically substantiate the case for privatization of governmental functions.1 Even though these economists demonstrate an underlying anti-government bias, their basic argument with supply of government services is “that agencies should compete to provide citizens with goods and services instead of acting like monopolies under the influence of organized pressure groups.”2 Responsiveness to the needs of individual citizens (or to governmental units to be served by staff agencies, for that matter) is best obtained by competing within markets, with the result of economic choices by clientele between competing services. From this market environment economies in resource allocation and efficiency and effectiveness in operations are said to result. Public Choice Economists would also include simulation of market forces by introducing competition, possibly within the same department, governmental jurisdiction, or between other public, profit or nonprofit providers.3 This essay departs from an article by Robert J. Agresta.4 He argues for an extension of the Public Choice approach from one of “citizen-customers being empowered to select freely among providers of a service—whether it is schools or health care (with vouchers) or groceries (with food stamps)—and have control over the resources needed to acquire the service…”,5 to the same market relationship between central administrative (staff or auxiliary staff) agencies and the line units to which they provide services. While Agresta writes of building choice into any line-staff relationships, this article is concerned with HR service supply alternatives and alternative modes for their delivery.

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