Economic Peace Revisited: Coercion and Democracy

Scholars have argued whether democratic peace also holds in the realm of economic sanctions — whether there is an economic peace. Substantial amounts of evidence have been gathered both for and against economic peace and findings have been extremely sensitive to changes in research design. This article provides a new insight, with the use of the updated TIES data set and improved methodology, into the topic of economic peace. It find that democracies are more likely to issue economic sanctions and that there is no economic peace. In fact, democracies are more likely to sanction one another. The article indicate that lack of economic peace is consistent with the public choice approach to economic sanctions. It also argue that the exercise of power among democracies has been rechannelled to economic coercion.

The Impact of Corruption and Rent-Seeking Behavior upon Economic Wealth in the European Union from a Public Choice Approach

The current paper evaluates the impact of corruption and rent-seeking behaviors upon economic wealth in the European Union states using a public choice approach. The period of study is 2000 to 2019. To measure this impact, the present study uses a regression with variables reflecting governance quality and considered relevant, from a public choice approach, to corruption and rent-seeking. The main results of this study show a negative relationship between the level of corruption and economic wealth for all analyzed countries, especially for the ones that compose the new member states group. For all the EU member states, the variables capturing governance quality seem to have a positive impact on economic wealth. The higher levels of governance performance, synonymous with lower levels of rent-seeking, personal interest, and political pressures on state administrations, contribute to economic wealth, as public choice theory emphasizes. There is a need for reform and an increase in the efficiency of public institutions, especially in new member states.

The European Union building from Public Choice to Ordo, Röpke’s and Einaudi’s ideas of Europe

The first part the article deals with the Public Choice approach to the European Union as a club of sovereign states that decide to share, without losing sovereignty, some segment of their public goods and related power under the subsidiarity principle. It also deals with Ordo, Röpke’s and Einaudi’s liberal third way between historical capitalism and a competitive market economy, with – at its centre – the people and the civitas humana. The second part presents the dualistic performances of the main countries of the euro area, building on the analysis of eight parameters for the period 2013–18, and discusses the incompleteness of the institutional construct of the European Union. The third part discusses potential solutions to these problems in the light of Ordo, Einaudi’s and Röpke’s ideas of Europe.

Christian History and Public Choice

In the last twenty years, Christian history has attracted the effort of a number of economists, challenged by the fact that the mainline churches are among the longest-lasting institutions in world history. This chapter covers the subset of that research that, while part of the broader field of the economics of religion, more nearly falls within the public-choice approach, dividing it into main topics: doctrine and theology, Catholic saint-making, the working of the papacy as an institution, religious orders, and church leadership and governance. It is shown that the essential analytical tools of this research have been the classic public-choice models of collective decision-making, bureaucracy, dictatorship, rent-seeking, and clubs. The conclusion reviews neglected topics and modeling approaches that show potential for further progress.

Exploring Increasing Income Inequality in the United States: A Public Choice Approach

In this article, we present some exploratory analysis of a common measure of income inequality in the United States. That measure is the Gini coefficient, and we explore how, and why, it has increased over the 50-year period in the United States from 1967 to 2017. Our hypothesis in doing so is that rising U.S. income inequality is due, at least in part, to growth in efforts by individuals, groups and even large companies in the United States to use government, with its power to compel, to bend the income distribution in their favor—an activity that public choice economists refer to as rent-seeking. When compared with some simple measures that proxy rent-seeking activity, such as the number of licensed lawyers and the number of registered political action committees, our analysis suggests that the U.S. Gini coefficient rises, a move that indicates increasing income inequality, over time with similar cycles in rent-seeking activity.

Understanding the Relationship Between the State and Markets in Public Administration

This chapter evaluates several theoretical perspectives to examine the role of the state and its relationship with markets. It divides theories into two groups: macro and micro. The macro theories covered in the chapter include Adam Smith's approach, Keynesian views, the Austrian school of thought, Marxism, pluralist theory, public choice approach, and elite theory. The selected macro theories provide an elaborate perspective on the relationship between markets and the state. In order to have a holistic picture the chapter also discusses several micro theories, which effectively depict the relationship between markets and the state from the budgetary perspective. Incrementalism and punctuated equilibrium are included in the evaluation. The application of theories in relation to specific public policies is provided.