The Political Economy of International Organizations: A Public Choice Approach

1992 ◽  
Vol 59 (2) ◽  
pp. 349
Author(s):  
Robert D. Tollison ◽  
Roland Vaubel ◽  
Thomas D. Willett
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
International Organizations ◽  
The Political ◽  
Choice Approach ◽  
Public Choice Approach

scholarly journals Séparation, annexion, et fédéralisme : au-delà des préceptes normatifs usuels

2009 ◽  
Vol 59 (3) ◽  
pp. 596-619
Author(s):  
Richard Carter
Keyword(s):  
Public Choice ◽  
Political History ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Approach ◽  
Canadian Society ◽  
Positive Approach ◽  
Normative Approach ◽  
Society Today ◽  
Choice Approach ◽  
Public Choice Approach

AbstractThe author uses a Public Choice approach to analyze the evolution of the political structures of Canadian society and the options facing Canadian society today. The insights provided by a positive approach as opposed to the traditional normative approach are discussed. The records of economic and political history are used to validate the insights provided by this economic approach.

Public Administration, Public Choice and the Pathos of Reform

1979 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 344-374 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. L. Wade
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Science ◽  
Public Administration ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
Administrative Reform ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Analysis ◽  
Choice Approach ◽  
Public Choice Approach

In recent years, several writers using the new political economy or public choice approach to political analysis have sought to improve our understanding of bureaus, bureaucrats and governments and, in some cases, to suggest ways in which their behavior might be “improved” in the public interest. The public choice approach to public administration rejects the so-called sociological or traditional political science approaches with their alleged Parsonian, Weberian, Marxist, historical, institutional or organic biases and limitations in favor of an individualistic, deductive, noninstitutional analysis, which is thought to be more cogent, more fertile in testable hypotheses, more genuinely theoretical and more relevant in terms of reform. Here the view is taken that the pathos of the public choice approach to public administration consists in this: that public choice advocates by virtue of their methodology are fated to “lose” consistently on questions of administrative reform and prescriptive efficacy, even while contributing, potentially importantly, to the scientific understanding of nonmarket, usually public, organizations or “bureaus.”

The Political Economy of Trust

2019 ◽  
pp. 627-648
Author(s):  
Christian Bjørnskov
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Empirical Evidence ◽  
Government Policy ◽  
Social Trust ◽  
The Political ◽  
Institutional Changes ◽  
Reverse Causality ◽  
Quality Of Institutions

This chapter provides a selective survey of the literature on social trust in public choice and political economy. It outlines the empirical evidence and discusses theoretical channels through which social trust can affect the quality of institutions and policies, and the conditions under which such mechanisms are likely to work. It also addresses the discussion of reverse causality, that is, whether good institutions or policies actively create trust. It then discusses whether trust can be created or destroyed by activist government policy or accidental institutional changes. Its main focus is on the set of theories and evidence of the association between social trust and institutions of governance.

scholarly journals The Political Economy of Redistribution Policy

2019 ◽  
pp. 519-541
Author(s):  
Luna Bellani ◽  
Heinrich Ursprung
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Choice ◽  
Political Institutions ◽  
The Political ◽  
Economic Relationships ◽  
The Public ◽  
Generic Models ◽  
Redistribution Policy ◽  
Choice Analysis ◽  
Beliefs And Attitudes

The authors review the literature on the public-choice analysis of redistribution policies. They restrict the discussion to redistribution in democracies and focus on policies that are pursued with the sole objective of redistributing initial endowments. Since generic models of redistribution in democracies lack equilibria, one needs to introduce structure-inducing rules to arrive at a models whose behavior realistically portrays observed redistribution patterns. These rules may relate to the economic relationships, political institutions, or to firmly established preferences, beliefs, and attitudes of voters. The chapter surveys the respective lines of argument in turn and then present the related empirical evidence.

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