scholarly journals Free Trade Between the United States and Canada — The Potential Economic Effects, par R.J. WONNACOTT et P. WONNACOTT. Un vol., 5¾ po. x 8¼, relié, 430 pages. — HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, Cambridge (Mass.), 1967. ($9.00)

1967 ◽  
Vol 43 (3) ◽  
pp. 571
Author(s):  
Bernard Bonin
Economica ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 35 (140) ◽  
pp. 463
Author(s):  
William J. Woodfine ◽  
Ronald J. Wonnacott ◽  
Paul Wonnacott

2005 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 1850070 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kozo Kiyota ◽  
Robert M Stern

The Michigan Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model of World Production and Trade is used to calculate the aggregate welfare and sectoral employment effects of the menu of U.S. trade policies. The menu of policies encompasses the various preferential U.S. bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs) negotiated and in process, unilateral removal of existing trade barriers, and global (multilateral) free trade. The welfare impacts of the FTAs on the United States are shown to be rather small in absolute and relative terms. The sectoral employment effects are also generally small but vary across the individual sectors depending on the patterns of the bilateral liberalization. The welfare effects on the FTA partner countries are mostly positive though generally small, but there are some indications of potentially disruptive employment shifts in some partner countries. There are indications of trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on nonmember countries for some of the FTAs analyzed. In comparison to the welfare gains from the U.S. FTAs, the gains from both unilateral trade liberalization by the United States and the FTA partners and from global (multilateral) free trade are shown to be rather substantial and more uniformly positive for all countries in the global trading system. The U.S. FTAs are based on “hub” and “spoke” arrangements. It is shown that the spokes emanate out in different and often overlapping directions, suggesting that the complex of bilateral FTAs may create distortions of the global trading system, which could be avoided if multilateral liberalization in the context of the Doha Round were to be carried out. Kozo Kiyota is Associate Professor of International Economics in the Faculty of Business Administration, Yokohama National University. He is also a Research Fellow at the Manufacturing Management Research Center (MMRC), the University of Tokyo and a Faculty Fellow at the Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI). He received his Ph.D. from Keio University, Tokyo, Japan. His research focuses on empirical microeconomics. He has published articles in the International Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, and The World Economy. Robert M. Stern is Professor of Economics and Public Policy (Emeritus) in the Department of Economics and Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan.


Author(s):  
Andrew Schmitz ◽  
Charles B. Moss ◽  
Troy G. Schmitz

AbstractThe COVID-19 crisis created large economic losses for corn, ethanol, gasoline, and oil producers and refineries both in the United States and worldwide. We extend the theory used by Schmitz, A., C. B. Moss, and T. G. Schmitz. 2007. “Ethanol: No Free Lunch.” Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization 5 (2): 1–28 as a basis for empirical estimation of the effect of COVID-19. We estimate, within a welfare economic cost-benefit framework that, at a minimum, the producer cost in the United States for these four sectors totals $176.8 billion for 2020. For U.S. oil producers alone, the cost was $151 billion. When world oil is added, the costs are much higher, at $1055.8 billion. The total oil producer cost is $1.03 trillion, which is roughly 40 times the effect on U.S. corn, ethanol, and gasoline producers, and refineries. If the assumed unemployment effects from COVID-19 are taken into account, the total effect, including both producers and unemployed workers, is $212.2 billion, bringing the world total to $1266.9 billion.


1990 ◽  
Vol 84 (2) ◽  
pp. 394-443 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jean Raby

This is a good deal, a good deal for Canada and a deal that is good for all Canadians. It is also a fair deal, which means that it brings benefits and progress to our partner, the United States of America. When both countries prosper, our democracies are strengthened and leadership has been provided to our trading partners around the world. I think this initiative represents enlightened leadership to the trading partners about what can be accomplished when we determine that we are going to strike down protectionism, move toward liberalized trade, and generate new prosperity for all our people.On January 2, 1988, President Ronald Reagan of the United States and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada signed the landmark comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the two countries that already enjoyed the largest bilateral trade relationship in the world. The FTA was subsequently ratified by the legislatures of both countries, if only after a bitterly fought election on the subject in Canada. On January 1, 1989, the FTA formally came into effect.


Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document